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Abstract 
 This thesis investigates the discursive construction of culturally idealized 
(„hegemonic‟) and alternative („pariah‟) femininities in the spoken accounts of a group 
of Japanese women. Semi-structured individual and group interviews were conducted 
with a sample of women and the data was analyzed using a Critical Discursive 
Psychology (CDP) approach. This study makes a contribution to both gender theory and 
critical discursive psychology. It contributes to gender theory by empirically 
investigating the theoretical constructs of „hegemonic‟ and „pariah‟ femininities. The 
results of this study indicate that a full-time homemaker is a culturally dominant image 
of hegemonic femininity. In contrast, working professional women challenge and 
potentially subvert the homemaker image and thus can be seen as „pariah‟ femininities. 
Second, this study fills a gap in existing research by attempting to relate concepts from 
discursive psychology to characteristic discursive features. These relationships suggest 
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that critical discursive psychologists can make claims about the workings of gender 
hegemony assisted by identifying participants‟ use of characteristic discursive features. 
Inquiries such as this one contribute to closing the gap between critical discursive 
psychology and discourse analysis and the development of a more robust and synthetic 
form of discourse analysis.  
KEY WORDS:  critical discursive psychology, hegemonic femininity, pariah 
femininity  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Personal motivation for the research 
 My association with Japan began in 1998 as a university exchange student. I 
clearly remember the first time I entered an administrative office in order to file some 
paperwork. I walked into a room filled predominately with middle-aged men sitting at 
their desks and young women serving them tea. My initial impression was one of shock 
at this highly gendered division of labor. At the same time, I reminded myself that I was 
a visitor in this culture, thus I was not in a position to criticize a system that I did not 
fully comprehend. During my one year there I was able to observe many other things 
that did not conform to my western notion of „gender equality.‟  
 That year was the catalyst for what is turning into a long association with Japan 
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and a research area that is evolving into a professional career. My initial observation of 
gender relations left a strong impression on my mind. I pondered various questions 
during that time. For example, why aren‟t women able to work on the same level as 
men? Why do women who supposedly „control‟ the household through managing the 
household budget occupy such professionally weak positions? But as with other cultures 
and situations, Japanese gender relations are not as simple as they appear on the surface. 
 
1.2 Intellectual motivation for the research  
The passage of the 1985 Equal Employment Opportunities Law (EEOL) in 
Japan was a major step forward for increasing women‟s rights because their gender 
inequality then became recognized at the national level. This law prohibits gender-based 
discrimination in recruiting, hiring, pay, and promotion (Mouer & Kawanishi, 2005). 
Nonetheless, significantly, there is no penalty clause for employers who engage in 
discriminatory employment practices.  
This law was passed at least partially in response to growing international 
concern over gender-based discrimination (Ehara, 2008a). Since this legislation was 
prompted by international, rather than grassroots pressure, the extent to which it 
benefits the lives of individual Japanese women is questionable. As Sugimoto (2003) 
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points out, “While advocating the tatemae [„surface level‟] of gender equality, the honne 
[„hidden sentiment‟] of many employers appear to be that the bulk of women should 
remain in subordinate positions in the workforce” (Sugimoto, 2003, p. 157). Sugimoto‟s 
comments suggest that women‟s main task in life is still the fulfillment of domestic 
roles. Relatedly, I am interested in the extent to which this „equal opportunities‟ 
discourse (Wetherell et al., 1987) articulated by the state translates actually into the 
everyday lives of women and their discourse surrounding this.    
My intellectual motivation to pursue this topic was piqued by the concept of 
„hegemonic masculinity‟ (see section 2.5.2). The notion that femininity is rendered 
subordinate to masculinity seemed to correspond to my initial observations of gender 
relations in Japan, so I saw hegemonic masculinity as the link between my interest in 
gender studies and Japan. However, as I mention in section 2.5.2, the concept of 
hegemonic masculinity has generated a plethora of masculinities research (see Connell 
& Messerschmidt, 2005), but unfortunately femininities research has fallen by the 
wayside. Therefore, I thought it would be interesting and provide a new contribution to 
gender studies research not to study the idealized form of masculinity in Japanese 
society, but instead locate my focus on femininity.  
The central aim of this study is to investigate the discursive construction of 
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culturally idealized or „hegemonic‟ and alternative or „pariah‟ femininities in the spoken 
accounts of a sample of Japanese women. More specifically, I am interested in the 
„interpretative repertoires‟ (see section 3.4.1) or cultural themes that participants draw 
on as they discuss gender roles during semi-structured interviews. The identification and 
analysis of repertoires that participants invoke during talk indexes and thus provides 
insight into the commonsense notions of hegemonic and pariah femininities.  
The apparent discrepancy between equal employment opportunities legislation 
and my informal observations suggests that tensions may exist between repertoires 
constituting femininity and participation in the paid labor market. Therefore, this study 
is also concerned with identifying the emergence of any contradictions between 
repertoires as participants discursively construct their accounts. Contradictions between 
repertoires suggest that gender relations are in a state of flux and illustrate individuals‟ 
agency to accept, contest, or even reformulate these repertoires. Hopefully, the results of 
this inquiry will contribute to furthering our understanding of the fluid nature of identity 
construction, individual agency, and allow us to draw parallels between Japan and other 
societies. 
This study is part of a growing body of gender research which emphasizes the 
importance of investigating the discursive practices of specific speech communities or, 
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more recently, „communities of practice‟ (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1992). Such 
research takes as given that the „accomplishment‟ of gender is shifting and fluid and 
interacts with other categories such as age, race, ethnicity, and social class (Bergvall et 
al., 1996; Bucholtz et al., 1999; Hall & Bucholtz, 1995; Thorne, 1993). A shift has 
occurred from making general claims about women and men as distinct or even 
overlapping social categories to the multifarious ways that social actors „perform‟ 
(Butler, 1999) gender in specific interactional and situational contexts. Gender is also 
described as „accomplished‟ (Coates, 1999), „done‟ (West & Zimmerman, 1987), 
„performed‟ (Butler, 1999), or „practiced‟ (Yancey Martin, 2003) in specific 
„communities of practice.‟ 
Despite this growing body of research, relatively few studies investigate the 
accomplishment of gender by non-western women. To assist with filling this gap, this 
study is contributing to a small but growing body of research investigating the 
discursive practices of non-western women both outside Japan (e.g., Martin Rojo & 
Gomez Esteban, 2003) and inside (Kamada, 2005, 2008, 2009; Okamoto & Smith, 
2004). Although research is transcending cultural boundaries, the focus remains on 
middle-class women.   
1.3 Relevant Japanese background 
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The role women play has been crucial to the successful management of the 
Japanese household and men‟s ability to devote themselves to their institutions of 
employment (Borovoy, 2005; Ito et al., 2007; Iwao, 2003; Nemoto, 2008). This role 
involves caring for the children and husband‟s parents, doing housework, and managing 
the budget. The roots of this caregiving role can be traced back to the Meiji Era 
(1869-1912) with the birth of the „good wives, wise mothers‟ ideology.  
Ideologies have been defined as the beliefs, values, and practices of a particular 
society (Billig et al., 1988; Edley, 2001a) which both guide and rationalize social 
actions (Wetherell et al., 1987). Therefore, the role of wife and mother can become 
exonerated above other roles and develop into „commonsense‟ for members of a society. 
A „good wives, wise mothers‟ ideology emerged in educational texts during a time when 
Japan was undergoing rapid changes due to the advent of westernization (Davies & 
Ikeno, 2002; Koyama, 1991). One major change was that compulsory education was 
instated for all children. However, the type of education that girls and boys received was 
different. For women, education focused on producing dutiful wives and mothers 
(Davies & Ikeno, 2002). The education of women advocated the values of simplicity, 
thrift, honesty, selflessness, and obedience (Koyama, 1991). While Japan was rapidly 
transforming itself economically and culturally during this period, women‟s 
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professional opportunities decreased. Evidence that this ideology still influences 
women‟s lives today is suggested by the central role they are expected to play in their 
children‟s education.  
The nomenclature kyoiku mama or „education mothers‟ (Allison, 1991, 2000) 
signals the pivotal role that mothers are expected to play in their children‟s educational 
success. Japan is still very much a gakureki shakai or „pedigree society‟ that places great 
value on academic achievements (Sugimoto, 2003). Admission to prestigious junior and 
senior high schools and institutions of higher education is based upon performance in 
entrance examinations. Thus, children and teenagers spend much of their time studying 
and attending specialized juku or „cram schools‟ that prepare them for these 
examinations. The goal is to enter a prestigious junior high school, high school, 
university, and ultimately secure employment with a top company. Mothers play a 
pivotal role in embedding the importance of studying in their children, offering their 
children emotional support, and even „boning up‟ themselves on subjects where the 
children fall short (Allison, 1991, 2000). This is done by encouraging their children to 
study, making them snacks, and organizing the payment for their private tutoring 
lessons. Some mothers finance these lessons with their earnings from their own 
part-time employment.  
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The above discussion suggests that dominant or hegemonic femininity (for a 
full discussion see section 2.5.3) in Japan involves being a „good wife, wise mother.‟ 
Performing the role of a „good wife and wise mother‟ involves considerable 
self-sacrifice and privileging the needs of family over self. Similar values are reflected 
in what Michelle Lazar (2000) calls „Other-centeredness‟ (see section 3.2) as a defining 
feature of heterosexual femininity, where other-centeredness is “the systematic 
cultivation of an acute consciousness and devotedness to men (boyfriends and 
husbands) and children in the achievement of woman‟s own self-identity” (Lazar, 2002, 
p. 112). Similarly, Japanese hegemonic femininity, as I hope to show, is constructed 
around the roles of mother and wife. The extent to which the institution of marriage is 
revered is reflected by the „synonymous‟ term eikyu shushoku („lifetime employment‟) 
(Iwao, 1993), which suggests women‟s dependency on a male breadwinner and men‟s 
autonomy and professional development.  
A „good wives, wise mothers‟ ideology constructs Japanese femininity in a 
specific way. Traditional virtues of Japanese femininity include bi (beauty), jujun 
(obedience), and hairyo (consideration) (Inoue, 2004, p. 120). These traditional virtues 
are still expressed in the modern ritual of secular marriages. Even today, a groom 
usually says, “Korekara ha anshinshite katei no koto ha X kosan ni makasete, ooi ni 
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shigoto ni hagendekudasai” (I will leave the household matters up to X. Please allow 
me to devote myself to my work) (Inoue, 2004, p. 118). A bride, on the other hand, says 
to her husband, “X kun no tameni, oishi teryori wo tsukuteagete kudasai. X kun ga 
shigotode osokunattemo atatakakute mukaete agetekudasai” (Please allow me to make 
homemade food for X. Even when he is late due to his work, please allow me to wait 
for him) (Inoue, 2004, p. 118). Another example of a typical promise brides make is, 
“Kodomo wo hayaku unde goryoshin wo anshinsasetekudasai” (Please allow me to 
have children early and put his parents at ease) (Inoue, 2004, p. 118). This expression 
rests upon the patriarchal assumption that a wife‟s primary role is to continue the male 
line. Inoue (2004) maintains that these highly formulaic expressions reflect different 
expectations for men and women regarding a traditional division of labor, and, indeed, 
gendered social and reproductive obligations within the social institution of marriage. A 
wife is responsible for managing the household and is supposed to consider her 
husband‟s and his family‟s needs as paramount. Women who work outside the home 
almost always also face a „second-shift‟ (Hochschild & Machung, 2003) once they 
finish their day jobs (Inoue, 2004).  
The femininity constructed for a „good wife and wise mother‟ is incompatible 
with the pursuit of a serious career. While women often choose to work for several years 
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after college graduation, often doing clerical work, many still resign after marriage or 
pregnancy (Ito et al., 2007; Iwao, 1993; Sugimoto, 2003). For this reason, a large 
proportion of managerial positions are occupied by men (Ito et al., 2007; Sugimoto, 
2003). Women may return to work later in their lives, but this is almost always in a 
part-time capacity.  
This current employment pattern first emerged after World War II, when a shift 
occurred in Japanese society from manufacturing silk and cotton to more heavy industry 
such as steel. This shift led to the „masculinization‟ of the manufacturing work force 
(Broadbent & Morris-Suzuki, 2000). At the same time, a labor shortage in the service 
sector led to the recruitment of women in the capacity of part-time workers (Broadbent 
& Morris-Suzuki, 2000). State labor policies encouraged full-time work for unmarried 
women and part-time work for married women, as long as it did not interfere with their 
„domestic‟ responsibilities (Nemoto, 2008). This trend, where increasing numbers of 
married women are working as marginalized part-time employees, is still evident today 
(Broadbent & Morris-Suzuki, 2000; Gottfried, 2003; Ito et al., 2007; Sugimoto, 2003).  
 Women who work full-time are typically young and unmarried. The term OL 
(„office lady‟) denotes a woman working in a clerical position in a company, “a woman 
working regularly in an office who engages in simple, repetitive, clerical work without 
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any expert knowledge or management responsibility” (Ogasawara, 1998, p. 27). They 
are also responsible for light cleaning tasks before the office opens and making tea for 
other employees and customers. Due to the large number of women in this position, this 
is referred to as the „mommy track‟ (Gelb, 2003). The term „shigoto nyoubyou‟ („office 
wives‟) (Inoue, 2001) indicates their largely supportive but extremely important role 
they play in the company. They are also referred to as „shokuba hana‟ („office flowers‟) 
to express their symbolic function of portraying a certain image of the company to 
customers (McVeigh, 1997). This image is formed from their institutionally polite 
manner of speaking and behaving, youth, and pleasing appearance.  
 Ogasawara (1998) points out that on one level OLs are more liberated than 
their male counterparts working as „salarymen‟ („white-collared employees‟). Given that 
most OLs do not intend to work long-term, they are not as bound to their roles as their 
male colleagues working as salarymen („white-collared employees‟). Former OLs 
interviewed by McVeigh (1997) viewed their time as OLs as their hana no jidai 
(literally, „flower period‟: best days of their lives) and an opportunity for shakai benkyo 
(„learning about society‟) before marriage. Similarly, Ogasawara (1998) comments that, 
“they remain aloof from the office hierarchy because they are excluded from the race 
for promotion” (p. 92). This „flower period‟ is however of course highly problematic. As 
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Ogasawara (1998) further maintains, “being powerful means having simultaneously 
fewer and more constraints. Similarly, being powerless means having both less and 
more freedom” (p. 138). So while women are powerfully positioned by their ability to 
ignore hierarchical relations, at the same time their marginalized position outside the 
company hierarchy ensures that they do not attain powerful positions within the 
organization. Ogasawara is also careful to cite the unchallenging nature of OLs‟ work 
and lack of opportunities for advancement as reasons why they remain uncommitted to 
their work. Ogasawara‟s (1998) study demonstrates how different expectations for men 
and women can ultimately disadvantage women. If OLs were given more 
responsibilities and opportunities for advancement, they might regard their work 
differently.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 This thesis is composed of nine chapters. The first three chapters provide 
relevant background information which contextualizes the study within the field of 
gender studies and critical discursive psychology (my chosen analytical approach). 
Chapters four and five provide detailed information about my data collection and 
analysis procedures. Chapters six through eight are the analytical chapters of the thesis 
where I present and analyze extracts from my data. In the final chapter, I draw 
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conclusions from the study and discuss their implications.  
1.5 Conclusion 
Chapter one began with my personal and intellectual motivation for conducting 
this study. I traced the development of a „good wives, wise mothers‟ ideology which has 
influenced modern conceptualizations of Japanese femininity. Women still play a 
pivotal role as caretakers of their children‟s education and managers of domestic 
responsibilities. The focus of this study is how a group of Japanese women discursively 
construct what I call hegemonic and pariah femininity in a society where the roles of 
wife and mother are exalted above all others. 
In the next chapter, I provide an overview of research on gender, masculinities, 
and femininities, both outside and inside the Japanese context.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Gender 
2.1.1 The gender/sex dichotomy 
While commonsense understandings of „sex‟ see it as referring to bodily 
differences between men and women, „gender,‟ by contrast, is „learned‟ through 
socialization in a particular society. „Sex‟ and „gender‟ are not neutral, value-free terms, 
but it has been argued, are used to serve political agendas.  
Weedon (1997) argues that “patriarchal power rests on the social meanings 
given to biological sexual differences” (p. 2). Social meaning is attached to childbearing 
when women are also constructed as „natural childrearers‟ and thus encouraged to stay 
in the home. Weedon continues: 
Behind the general unwillingness, except among feminists, to rethink the 
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sexual division of labor and its implications for the equality of women lies a 
fundamental patriarchal assumption that women‟s biological difference from 
men suits them for different social tasks (p. 2).  
In addition to rationalizing full-time mothering, such an understanding can accordingly 
construct women as unsuited for „masculine‟ professions, for example, law, medicine, or 
politics, which incur greater symbolic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977) as well as 
financial reward. 
 In light of the above discussion, we can now define both sex and gender.   
Sex refers to the biological and anatomical differences between men and women. 
Gender, on the other hand, “refers to the meanings that are attached to those differences 
within a culture” (Kimmel, 2000, p. 3). In North American culture, exemplary physical 
strength is associated with „masculinity‟ while in Japan it is not. Miller (2003) points 
out that attention to appearance has become part of Japanese heterosexual masculinity. 
Men go to beauty salons where they receive facials, electrolysis, and also use cosmetics. 
Much earlier, Mead (1935) had demonstrated that men do not always perform in 
aggressive roles and women in passive roles, thus demonstrating that meaning is 
attached to sex, creating gender—perhaps to serve political purposes. These examples 
illustrate how gender is socially constructed and does not preexist individuals (e.g., 
Baxter, 2003; Burr, 1998; Butler, 1999; Lorber, 1994; West & Zimmerman, 1987). 
Extending this further, Sunderland maintains that gender is “a process, something that 
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people orient to and do—including in their spoken and written discourse” (Sunderland, 
2004, p. 17). Sunderland importantly points out that gender is not solely the property of 
individuals, but that discourse also indexes gender. Hence, a married couple‟s promise 
to perform in traditional roles reflects cultural norms about masculinity and femininity 
and therefore is gendered. Individuals have agency to actively construct gender, whether 
in accordance with or against culturally accepted notions of masculinity and femininity.  
In many western cultures it is common to view sex and ultimately gender as 
dichotomous categories (Burns, 2004), but this tendency is not ubiquitous elsewhere. As 
an example, over 155 North American Native American Indian tribes distinguish more 
than two sexes (Roscoe, 1998; Williams, 1986). The term „berdache‟ or „two-spirit‟ 
refers to those who are biologically male or female, but adopt the social roles associated 
with the opposite sex. This is similar to girls are seen as „tomboys‟ in western cultures. 
Unlike „berdaches,‟ „tomboys‟ however eventually construct an identity which embraces 
„normative‟ femininity (Thorne, 1993). Cultures, then, assign social significance to 
biological differences. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003) maintain that “gender builds 
on biological sex, it exaggerates biological difference and, indeed, it carries biological 
difference into domains in which it is completely irrelevant” (p. 10). For example, 
women‟s childbearing capacity becomes the basis for developing an argument that 
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women have a „maternal instinct‟ and thus are suited for raising children. The „maternal 
instinct‟ serves the ideological function of legitimizing women‟s exit from the 
workforce to oversee childcare and gender-based social inequalities such as unequal 
wage structures and restricted access to top-level positions are legitimized.  
The existence of multiple masculinities and femininities (see section 2.5) 
illustrates that gender does not map evenly onto binary biological sex. „Femininity‟ does 
not always neatly correspond to „female‟ bodies, nor does „masculinity‟ always with 
„male‟ bodies. As I later discuss (see section 2.5), masculinity and femininity are 
embodied by individuals regardless of biological sex. For example, women can work in 
„masculine‟ professions‟ such as the military or civil service and men in „feminized‟ 
professions such as nursing and primary education (Bagilhole, 2002; Williams, 1989). 
Nevertheless, such non-normative gender performances are often sanctioned (Butler, 
1999; Messerschmidt, 2004; Schippers, 2007; Sunderland, 2004). As Judith Butler 
eloquently stated, “we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right” (Butler, 
1999, p. 178). „Right‟ refers to doing hegemonic masculinity and femininity. When an 
individual‟s embodied social actions are incongruent with hegemonic masculinity or 
femininity, the individual becomes „gender deviant‟ (Messerschmidt, 2004) and can face 
stigmatization (see section 2.5.4)    
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Doing gender is an active process that is not „universal‟ but in part regulated by 
the „communities of practice‟ (Lave & Wenger, 1991) it emerges in, which in turn it 
constitutes. For this reason, gender is a form of „embodied structured action‟ 
(Messerschmidt, 2000, 2004). In the process of embodying masculinities or femininities, 
individuals perform social actions such as styles of dress, ways of moving, or manners 
of speaking. Actions are structured in that „normative‟ masculinities and femininities are 
defined within particular communities of practice. Nevertheless, individuals possess 
agency to accept, contest, or even reformulate masculinities and femininities (see 
section 2.5). Accordingly, gender is done in different ways which reflect the norms of 
particular social structures, ways which in turn reproduce and sometimes change those 
social structures (West & Fenstermaker, 1995). The previous discussion of the „good 
wives, wise mothers‟ (see section 1.3) ideology illuminated how educational policies 
came to shape and in part determine hegemonic femininity, in many Japanese 
communities of practice. Women were encouraged through education to embody social 
actions befitting a „good wife and wise mother‟, which in turn constructed hegemonic 
femininity.  
Because gender can be shaped in part by particular communities of practice, 
individuals may be unaware that they are „doing gender‟ in line with certain normative 
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assumptions. In other words, they are not always „reflexive‟ (Yancey Martin, 2003) 
about their performances of gender in situationally „appropriate‟ ways. To practice 
gender reflexively, one would “carefully consider the content of one‟s actions and act 
only after careful consideration of the intent, content, and effects of one‟s behavior” 
(Yancey Martin, 2003, p. 356). 
Yancey Martin (2003) demonstrated how corporate executives practiced gender 
with varying degrees of reflexivity. One executive, Tom, discussed with Yancey Martin 
his policy not to dine alone with women colleagues when away on business trips. For 
Tom, this policy prevented others from developing the „wrong impression‟ about his 
relationship with these associates. While Tom positively evaluated his heteronormative 
policy, he was also unreflexively practicing gender because he was not consciously 
aware that his policy constructed women as „temptresses‟ and men as „easily tempted.‟ 
Tom became aware of all this after participating in a gender sensitivity group.   
The notion of reflexivity captures how individuals consciously and 
unconsciously practice gender in situationally specific ways which are regulated by 
social institutions and an individual‟s role and status within them. Agency is also closely 
linked with reflexivity. Tom was eventually reflexive about his heteronormative policy 
and ultimately the way in which he practiced gender. Like most people, Tom had agency 
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to do gender differently; however, he chose to adhere to his policy.  
In the next section I develop this discussion of how gender is not 
predetermined by biological sex but is accomplished in social interaction.        
2.1.2 The Social Construction of Gender  
This study takes a social constructionist view of gender (Lorber, 1994; 
Sunderland, 2004; Weatherall, 2002). Social constructionist perspectives emphasize the 
continued and active accomplishment of gender and fluidity of identities. Gender is 
neither something we are born with nor acquire solely through socialization, but is a 
continuous, dynamic process or „gender project‟ (Connell, 1995). It is “created and 
renegotiated in interpersonal relationships and encouraged and maintained through 
social structures” (Weatherall, 2002, p. 85).  
An important contribution to the view of gender (and other identities) as 
socially constructed is the concept of community of practice (see section 1.2). Eckert 
and McConnell-Ginet (1992), who apply the construct to gender, define a community of 
practice (hereafter CofP) as:   
an aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an 
endeavor. Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power 
relations—in short, practices—emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor (p. 
64). 
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1999) cite a choir, gang, family, and friendship groups as 
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examples of CofPs. The wide range of possible CofPs indicates they can be seen on a 
continuum from more formally organized (e.g., a choir) to less formally organized (e.g., 
a friendship group) and vary in permanence. Accordingly, members engage in various 
levels of participation, from active to more peripheral, in different groups.  
It is through these various levels of social engagement in various CofPs that 
identities can be seen as constructed (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1992). In reference to 
gender:  
Individuals produce themselves as „gendered‟ by habitually engaging in the 
social practices of a community—i.e. in different communities of 
practice—that are practically and/or symbolically associated with a 
community‟s notions of masculinities or femininities (Ehrlich, 1999, p. 240).  
Group membership does not determine gender, but it is actively constructed. We can see 
that gender identities are thus emergent in social interaction with CofPs which entail 
particular conceptualizations of „masculinity‟ and „femininity.‟ For instance, Japanese 
middle-class femininity involves privileging the role of wife and mother in lieu of or at 
least before that of a career professional (see section 1.3). 
Approaching gender from the perspective of situated practice, social actions 
located within communities of practice, shifts the focus from studying „gender 
differences‟ and from deterministic ideas about gender being located in „males‟ and 
„females‟ to gender as fluid and emerging from embodied social actions. Eckert and 
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McConnell-Ginet (1999) do concede that men and women tend to participate in some 
CofPs more than others, but few CofPs are sex-exclusive. For example, women are 
more likely to be members of elementary-school staffs while men are more like to be 
members of physics faculties. Nevertheless, the multifarious ways that gender interacts 
with other identities cannot be overstated. For instance, Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 
(1999) suggest that women‟s „politer speech‟ may be due to the nature of many 
women‟s work and not their gender per se. The jobs which women have traditionally 
gained access to (e.g., flight attendant, nurse, customer service, and teacher) require 
attention to standard forms of language. Cameron (1992) is careful to distinguish 
between “gender differences” and “the difference gender makes” (p. 13). Gender can 
make a difference in, say, „masculinized‟ social institutions or face-to-face social 
interactions, for example, by individuals in that CofP who engage with and appropriate 
various discourses (see section 3.2.2) about „masculinity‟ or „femininity‟ as they 
construct their own and others‟ gender identities (see section 2.1.3).  
Messerschmidt‟s (2004) uses the term „disrupting difference‟ to illustrate that 
sex-based bodily differences are not always salient in a given social context. The 
significance of disrupting difference indicates that gender is not always the most salient 
feature affecting a particular social setting. Gender intersects with ethnicity, race, and 
36 
 
social class in specific interactional and social settings (Archer, 2001; Connell, 1995; 
Messerschmidt, 2004; Pyke & Johnson, 2003). In a study of adolescent violence, 
Messerschmidt (2004) found group membership was defined by engaging in physical 
violence on certain occasions, so girls and boys collectively took part in violence in 
order to protect their gangs. Gender was relevant, however, when girls were restricted 
from participating in robberies and burglaries. In any given social interaction, a variety 
of factors, including or even excluding gender, can potentially influence the social and 
linguistic behavior that individuals engage in.  
The strength of a social constructionist view of gender is that it sees gender as 
fluid and locally produced and avoids falling back on essentialist notions related to 
„gender differences.‟ Furthermore, a nuanced and social constructionist view of gender 
is strengthened by the concept of CofP, which emphasizes studying the specific ways 
that groups of people construct gender through their locally constructed „situated 
practices‟ or „embodied social actions‟ (Messerschmidt, 2000, 2004). 
2.1.3 Gender Identity 
The last section argued for a view of gender as fluid and locally situated in 
large part within specific communities of practice. This situated and „emergent‟ view of 
gender has implications for gender identity as well. Identity is one‟s sense of self, thus 
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gender is one aspect of an individual‟s identity. Bucholtz (1999) points out:  
Contemporary feminists view identities as fluid, not frozen; they note that, 
although identities link individuals to particular social groups, such links are 
not predetermined. Instead, identities emerge in practice, through the combined 
effects of structure and agency (p. 209).  
Bucholtz importantly points out that identities do not preexist individuals, but at the 
same time, there are constraints, „structure,‟ on the identities we construct. Importantly, 
Bucholtz also incorporates agency into her definition, emphasizing that individuals are 
not simply passive victims of repressive social systems. Similarly, from the perspective 
of discursive psychology, Weatherall (2002) reminds us that “…identities are 
progressively and dynamically achieved through the discursive practices that 
individuals engage in” (p. 138). So individuals construct various identities in social 
interaction (i.e., parent, spouse, professional) within specific CofPs (see section 2.1.2). 
Importatnly, identities are fluid and emerge in social interaction.  
Others play roles in our identity construction. Sunderland and Litosseliti (2002) 
argue that “identities also come from the attributions or ascriptions of others—though 
ascription may contribute to a resulting identity very different in nature to that intended 
by the ascriber” (p. 7). This suggests that identities are constructed through 
interpersonal relationships and that individuals can accept, contest, or reformulate 
identities which others ascribe to them. Significantly, identity is not simply 
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self-constructed, i.e. through agency, but shaped by other individuals in interaction, 
institutions, and the norms governing „masculinities‟ and „femininities‟ in specific 
communities of practice. 
2.1.4 Gender Performance 
 Erving Goffman (1959) likened the construction of gender and other social 
identities to an interactional „performance‟ or „self-presentation‟. Individuals engage in 
social actions which create and sustain a certain self-impression and underplay actions 
which contradict that impression. Therefore, a middle-class Japanese woman may 
conceal her part-time employment from her child‟s teacher because mothers are 
expected to fully devote themselves to their children, thus a working mother could be 
seen as neglecting her maternal duties (Allison 1991, 2000). Gender performances 
include those which legitimate, subvert, or even reformulate culturally and 
CofP-specific (see section 2.1.2) gender norms. For instance, a working class Japanese 
woman constructs her femininity through balancing factory work with the „second-shift‟ 
(Hochschild & Machung, 2003) of housework and childcare (see Roberts, 1994). A 
middle-class Japanese woman, on the other hand, constructs her femininity through 
performing in the role of professional housewife (see section 1.3). Both women create a 
positive self-presentation in line with class-specific norms governing femininity.    
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There are a number of important implications of performance theory. 
Individuals regulate their linguistic and non-linguistic behavior (in line with the gender 
appropriate performances defined by specific CofPs). These performances become 
ritualized and it is this which in turn creates „masculinity‟ and „femininity‟ (see section 
2.5). The far-reaching implications of performance theory are that gender is not natural 
but only appears that way because ritualized gender performances become naturalized 
and embedded in the fabric of social interaction through their repetition.  
 Both social constructionism and performance theory account for multiple 
configurations of gender. „Masculinities‟ and „femininities‟ are locally produced in 
CofPs as individuals engage in ritualized performances. These performances, in turn, 
„congeal‟ and naturalize gender in these CofPs. Despite the fluidity of gender, 
individuals are not „free‟ to perform gender any way they please. Individuals who 
choose to engage in non-normative performances may face stigmatization (Butler, 1999; 
Messerschmidt, 2004; Schippers, 2007; Sunderland, 2004). This stigmatization can 
come in the form of derogatory terms such as „sissy,‟ „fag,‟ „bitch,‟ „slut‟ (Schippers, 
2007; Pascoe, 2007) or physical violence (Connell, 1995). Nevertheless, social 
constructionism and performance theory demonstrate and explain how individuals can 
and do perform gender in a multitude of ways that may challenge, conform, or modify 
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normative, hegemonic conceptualizations of masculinities and femininities. 
 The above discussion of performance theory should not be confused with 
„performativity theory‟ (Butler, 1999). Butler‟s work has contributed greatly to the field 
of gender studies, but a proper discussion of her influential theory is beyond the scope 
of this thesis (see Brickell, 2005; McIlvenny, 2002).   
2.2 The ‘Gender Relations Approach’ (Connell 1987, 2002)  
In order to capture the sheer complexity of gender, we need a model that 
incorporates the social construction of gender while acknowledging how social 
structures restrict that construction. As discussed in section 2.1.1, gender is a form of 
„embodied structured action‟ (Messerschmidt, 2000, 2004). Connell‟s „gender relations 
approach‟ provides us with a model which incorporates the notion of multiple 
masculinities and femininities and at the same time acknowledges the structural 
constraints on gender (Connell, 1987; 2002). According to Connell (2002), “when we 
look at a set of gender arrangements, whether the gender regime of an institution or the 
gender order of a whole society, we are basically looking at a set of relationships—ways 
that people, groups, and organizations are connected and divided” (p. 54). Connell 
draws on West and Zimmerman‟s (1987) concept of „doing gender‟ and locates the 
formation of these relationships in the face-to-face interactions between people. When a 
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certain degree of consistency is found in these relationships between people, in 
socializing groups or social institutions, „social structures‟ are formed. So if institutional 
and conversational practices place men in positions of authority over women, then a 
„patriarchal structure‟ of gender relations results where women are subordinate to men 
(Connell, 2002, p. 55). Connell is careful to emphasize that these social structures only 
„endure‟ when an individual‟s everyday social interactions support them, and that 
gender is not permanent, but „accomplished‟ on a moment-to-moment basis within 
specific communities of practice (West & Zimmerman, 1987).  
The following sections detail the four components of Connell‟s approach. 
2.2.1 Power relations and dominance  
 Power is central to this thesis on hegemonic femininity because the relationship 
between hegemonic masculinity and femininity is one of dominance and submission. 
Connell (2002) sees institutionalized power as materializing in two forms. First, it is 
power as an oppressive force used by one group to dominate others. To illustrate, 
Connell cites the masculine bias common in many organizations which favors men. It is 
this form of power which became the basis for the far-sighted concept of „hegemonic 
masculinity‟ (see section 2.5.2). Second, she sees power in a post-structuralist sense:  
Especially it operates discursively, through the ways we talk, write and 
conceptualize. This diffuse but tenacious power operates close up, not at a 
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distance. It impacts directly on people‟s bodies as „discipline‟ as well as on 
their identities and sense of their place in the world (Connell, 2002, p. 59). 
In this sense, power is woven into the fabric of everyday life. For instance, women who 
subject themselves to relentless dieting regimes in order to embody hegemonic 
femininity. This view of power as implicit is an example of how gender hegemony 
works. Connell argues that power needs to be conceptualized in both senses. In addition, 
she proposes the necessity of incorporating the idea of resistance, as “a full account of 
power relations requires an account of the way power is contested, and countervailing 
power is mobilized” (Connell, 2002, p. 59). This definition conceptualizes power as a 
constraint on social practice, but as people having social agency to resist it.  
Connell‟s account of power however fails to incorporate how power is a 
positive resource for all individuals, in other words, „empowerment‟. In addition to 
conceptualizing power as a repressive force, post-structualism emphasizes that power 
does not only operate as a one-dimensional and oppressive force but is potentially 
omnidirectional (Baxter, 2003; Burr, 2003; Weedon, 1997). This is because individuals 
“are multiply positioned according to competing discourses, at times powerful and at 
other times as powerless” (Baxter, 2003, p. 183). For instance, a disruptive student 
could be located relatively powerless in a discourse of „teacher approval‟ but 
comparatively powerful in a discourse of „peer approval‟ (Baxter, 2003; see section 
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3.2.2). 
 A post-structuralist view of power sees it as both repressive and liberating 
depending on the social actors, social context, and relations between social actors. This 
is not to deny that, for example, a full-time housewife who is powerfully positioned 
within the domestic sphere is powerlessly positioned in the larger social order due to her 
financial dependence on her husband. Similarly, a post-structuralist account of power 
does not deny that the average income of women is less than men and that women still 
remain vastly underrepresented in top-level positions in corporations and other 
institutions (Burr, 1998; Connell, 2002). In sum, although people both position 
themselves and are positioned in multiple ways dependent upon the interactional setting, 
these positions, to use post-structuralist terminology, are always constrained by 
embedded institutional arrangements and articulated in „dominant discourses‟ (see 
section 3.2.2).  
2.2.2 Production relations (‘sexual division of labor’) 
The term „production relations‟ refers to the „sexual division of labor‟ or type 
of work that men and women do. In modern western societies, a common division of 
labor is between „work‟ and „home‟ (Connell, 2002). Work is done outside the home and 
incurs wages, a symbol that an individual has produced something worthwhile and has 
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thus positively contributed to society. Conversely, domestic work is not usually viewed 
as a job when performed by a wife or female partner but often as a „labor of love‟. This 
pattern is not uniform across all societies or generations and changes over time (Connell, 
2002), but is the case in that vast majority of modern societies where women are 
positioned as „caregivers‟ and perform most domestic work (Nemoto, 2008). 
 The result of this unequal division of labor is a „gendered accumulation process‟ 
(Connell, 1995), i.e., public labor is paid while domestic labor is unpaid, which creates 
a „patriarchal dividend‟ (Connell, 2002). Men accrue not only economic advantages 
from engaging in paid work but also other material advantages or „symbolic capital‟ 
(Bourdieu, 1977) since they hold powerful positions in major social institutions such as 
corporations, schools, government, and religious institutions. There is a clear interplay 
between power relations and production relations.  
 A further implication of this public/private gender division of labor is that it 
notably reflects but also influences constructions of masculinity and femininity. The 
significance of the male-dominated public sphere and female-dominated private sphere 
begins to emerge in adolescence. Working in the USA, Eckert (1993) documents a 
telling change in girls‟ behavior as they approach adolescence and enter what Eckert 
terms the „heterosexual market.‟ Girls replace physical activity with attention to their 
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appearance and talking about boys. Girls receive recognition through fashioning their 
bodies, engaging in heterosexual relationships, and building peer relationships. For boys, 
recognition comes from active participation in the public arenas of the classroom and 
organized sports. This study illustrates how masculinity, at least in the context of North 
America, is associated with active involvement in public arenas. Femininity, on the 
other hand, is seen as assuming a supportive role in more private contexts. A clear 
example of this is the cheerleader whose popularity depends upon her physical 
appearance, sex appeal, and supporting male athletes who take center stage. Thorne 
(1993) also found that adolescent girls‟ social status is dependent upon heterosexual 
relationships with boys.  
 The association of masculinity with the public realm and femininity with the 
private realm has implications for working women. Certain public but „pastoral‟ 
occupations are seen as compatible with femininity, such as flight attendants, nurses, 
home helpers, and teachers, women‟s supposed „natural‟ caregiving ability apparently 
making them more suited for these often underpaid human „service‟ professions. This 
justification is not based on scientific evidence (Burr, 1998; Connell, 2002), but I argue, 
illustrates the power of „gender differences‟ discourses (Sunderland, 2004) which 
construct social significance from reproductive differences between men and women 
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(Connell, 2002). The association between femininity and caregiving is also related to 
„emotional relations.‟  
2.2.3 Emotional relations (‘cathexis’) 
The association between femininity and caregiving is also related to „emotional 
relations.‟ Cathexis refers to the emotional attachments that form between people 
(Connell, 1987, 2002). This structure materializes in many western societies in the form 
of a distinction between heterosexual and homosexual—also coined „hegemonic 
heterosexuality‟ (Connell, 1987) or „compulsory heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980), where 
dominant discourses construct normative sexuality as heterosexual (Dasgupta, 2000; 
Roberson & Suzuki, 2003). Japanese society conforms to this pattern.     
The significance of emotional relations extends far beyond the privileging of 
heterosexuality to include an emotional division of labor. In post World War II Japanese 
society, women were increasingly positioned as possessing a „motherly‟ or „nurturing‟ 
instinct, making them optimally suited for both childcare and eldercare (Borovoy, 2005). 
Traces of these discourses surfaced in child-rearing books at that time and can still be 
found in these books, manuals, and magazines in Japan and beyond today (Borovoy, 
2005; Sunderland, 2000, 2004). As discussed in section 1.3, when children enter school, 
women become kyoiku mama („education mothers‟) who exert tremendous effort to 
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support their children‟s, particularly sons‟, academic success (Allison, 1991, 2000; 
Borovoy, 2005; White, 2002). As early as nursery school, schools expect a mother to 
assume an active role in her child‟s education. For example, she is expected to keep a 
detailed list of the activities that her child did during summer vacation, and much time 
and effort is spent preparing elaborate obento (boxed lunches) for children (Allison, 
2000). When children begin studying for competitive junior high school, high school 
and eventually university entrance examinations, mothers continue to assume an active 
role (see section 1.3). Caring may extend to „around-the-body care‟ of husbands. Lebra 
(1984) found that women managed almost all of their husbands‟ daily needs including 
laundry, preparing meals, scheduling appointments, and even laying out outfits for them 
to wear. These practices are all shaped by discourses surrounding hegemonic femininity.  
 What we might call this „nurturing instinct‟ discourse positions women as 
natural caregivers in the commercial sector as well. As I discussed in section 1.3, the 
vast majority of Japanese women who work outside the home in companies perform 
clerical duties and are often seen as „office wives‟ (Inoue, 2001; Ogasawara, 1998). 
Their bosses rely on them to fix paper jams, file important documents, serve tea when 
customers come, and arrange business trips (Ogasawara, 1998). Outside the office, 
women pursue careers in service-related professions such as social welfare, nursing, and 
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teaching in far greater numbers than in engineering, law, and medicine (Inoue, 2001).  
 The positioning of women as natural caregivers has implications for their place 
both in power relations and production relations. In Ogasawara‟s (1998) study, „office 
wives‟ had a certain degree of power over their bosses who depended on them to 
perform routine tasks. This is in accordance with a post-structuralist view of power as 
shifting and unstable (Baxter, 2003; Burr, 2003; Foucault, 1980; Weedon, 1997). The 
bosses even went so far as to buy these women gifts in order to curry favor with them. 
Nevertheless, these women did not receive the benefits of lifetime employment, 
seniority-based promotions, or benefits packages. The limited degree of power these 
women wielded was overshadowed by their relatively marginalized status in the overall 
gender regime in which they work for a few years, quit after marriage or pregnancy, and 
then resume part-time work once their children reach a certain age (Gottfried, 2003; 
Inoue, 2001; Iwao, 1993; Ogasawara, 1998). This reproduces a gender stratified 
division of labor where women largely perform unpaid domestic work and low-paid 
non-domestic work while men engage in paid non-domestic work and little or no 
domestic work.  
2.2.4 Symbolic relations 
Hegemonic femininity and masculinity can be seen as located in the symbolic 
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rather than material dimension of gender relations. Symbolic relations refers to the 
meanings that we assign to particular concepts (Connell, 2002). The meanings assigned 
to the categories of women/men and feminine/masculine respectively are variously 
situated in specific social and interactional contexts. As an example, the body-reflexive 
practices (Connell, 1995) engaged in by professional Japanese men include facials, 
eyebrow shaping, and body hair removal (Miller, 2003). From a western perspective, 
these social practices are very „feminine‟ and western men who aim to embody 
„hegemonic masculinity‟ (see section 2.5.2) tend to avoid them, though there may be a 
shift such as the use of moisturizers and cologne. While Japanese masculinity can be 
seen as becoming more „feminized‟, men maintain positions of power despite engaging 
in these practices. This example illustrates how „hegemonic masculinity‟ reformulates 
itself across time space and space so that men maintain powerful social positions 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Johnson, 1997). Japanese femininity, by contrast, is 
constructed around nurturing others which prevents women from attaining social and 
economic power and militates against most Japanese women attaining any sort of 
autonomy. These examples illustrate how an array of social practices converges to form 
a particular construction of masculinity that is located in a specific place and time.  
 Symbolic meanings attached to gender are also evident in discourse (see 
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section 3.2.2). In a secondary school, Edley and Wetherell (1997) identified two 
oppositional groups. One group, the „hard lads,‟ embodied aspects of „hegemonic 
masculinity‟ or the dominant form of masculinity in the gender regime of the school. 
Their exalted status from participation in rugby entitled them to a number of different 
privileges. The blazers they wore were outward signs of their superior sports ability and 
their overrepresentation in positions such as „head boy‟ signified their institutional 
power. Another group, the „non-rugby lads‟, positioned themselves in opposition to the 
dominant group. These lads faced the dilemma of embodying masculinity while at the 
same time distinguishing themselves from the „macho‟ masculinity the „hard lads‟ 
embodied. A strategy used to manage this dilemma was to establish a categorical 
difference between themselves and „the hard lads.‟ In group interviews, the non-rugby 
players made a distinction between physical strength and mental intelligence. The 
version of masculinity they constructed involved not only physical strength, but also 
self-control and mental savvy. This „pattern of accounting‟ constructed them as 
possessing physical strength, the self-discipline to refrain from physical violence, and 
mental astuteness to win verbal arguments with the „hard lads‟. For example, the 
non-rugby lads discursively constructed the decision to resort to physical violence as a 
„show of weakness‟ while „talking your way out of a situation‟ was constructed as 
51 
 
requiring self-control and evidence of mental strength. Interestingly, this account does 
not completely redefine masculinity but constructs a version of masculinity where 
verbal superiority is an overt display of masculinity: “The real hard men are those who 
do not need to dive on each other in an attempt to prove their masculinity” (Edley and 
Wetherell, 1997, p. 214). Superiority in some sense or the ability to dominate another 
group (however this is done) is a symbolically important indicator of masculinity and 
interestingly not associated with femininity or, if it is (e.g. caring), it is not in „valued‟ 
areas of life.  
Symbolic relations intersect with power relations, production relations, and 
emotional relations. The symbolic importance attached to dominance is evident in 
hegemonic masculinity. The success of corporate executives often rests upon their 
ability to outmaneuver other men in their quest for success in the corporate world 
(Connell & Wood, 2005). Japan‟s post-World War II „economic miracle‟ was due to the 
efforts of businessmen who were referred to as „corporate soldiers‟ and who toiled long 
hours in companies (Roberson & Suzuki, 2003). Their ability to devote most of their 
time and energy to work however resulted from production relations where their wives 
completely managed the household and raised the children, which provided 
unacknowledged support for these men to go out and do this (Ito, et al., 2007; Iwao, 
52 
 
1993). This was because women‟s domestic role as wives and mothers was „naturalized‟ 
and viewed as „common sense‟ (see section 1.3). Related to emotional relations, 
hegemonic forms of masculinity thus maintain their extolled position through the 
subordination of femininities (see section 2.5). Also evident here is the „tough‟ work 
done by men in the economic marketplace and more emotional work done by women at 
home or in the human service professions. Heterosexual men and women live together 
by choice, yet social norms contribute to the formation of asymmetrical emotional 
relations.  
In distinguishing these four levels of gender relations, Connell is not 
suggesting that they operate in isolation from each other. Quite the contrary, there is a 
large degree of overlap and intersection. The relations between these four dimensions 
form the basis of gender regimes of particular social institutions and the overall gender 
order of a society. These two concepts are taken up in the next section.  
2.3 Gender Regimes and the Gender Order 
In post-structuralist thinking, power operates through discourse in major social 
institutions such as corporations, schools, and hospitals (Baxter, 2003; Burr, 2003; 
Foucault, 1980; Weedon, 1997). The construction of gender is salient not only at the 
micro level of face-to-face encounters but also at the macro level. Connell (1987) 
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contends that “gender relations are present in all types of institutions” (p. 120). I will 
qualify this by acknowledging that while gender is an ever-present force in social 
institutions, its salience and relevance varies. Messerschmidt‟s (2004) finding that gang 
membership, not gender, was the reason for engaging in violence illustrates this point 
(see section 2.1.1). Fenstermaker, West, and Zimmerman (2002) similarly contend “the 
salience of gender cannot be determined apart from the context in which it is „done‟” (p. 
31). 
Connell‟s (1987) term for gender relations in a given social institution is a 
„gender regime‟. We can speak of gender regimes of the family, schools, corporations, 
and legal institutions. Gender regimes are formed based upon the interaction between 
relations of power, production, emotion, and have symbolic dimensions. The gender 
regimes in a particular society constitute its overall „gender order‟. The advent of 
globalization and consequently interaction between gender orders of societies has led 
Connell to extend this concept to the emerging „global gender order‟ (Connell, 2000, 
2002). The gender regimes of particular institutions usually dovetail the society‟s 
overall gender order, but this is not always the case.    
Globalization is contributing to increased interaction between gender orders of 
different societies. In Japan, which is of course part of the „global gender order‟, the 
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passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) was partly due to 
international pressure (see section 1.2).  
2.4 Gender Relations and the present study 
 Gender is not entirely discursively constructed because there are nondiscursive 
practices which are related to gender such as the accrual of wealth and institutional 
power (Connell, 2002). For this reason, the gender relations approach is crucial for this 
study because conceptualizing gender as entirely discursively constructed fails to 
acknowledge the material constraints on gender such as the higher salaries and social 
positions attained by men. Connell (2002) argues that gender operates on four different 
levels, i.e. power, production, emotional, and symbolic. This study‟s focus on the 
discursive construction of hegemonic and pariah femininities, locates it in the symbolic 
realm. By incorporating Connell‟s model into my study, I am acknowledging that the 
discursive construction of gender is just one aspect of gender relations.  
2.5 Femininities and masculinities 
 Judith Butler‟s (1999) concept of the „heterosexual matrix‟ provides a useful 
starting point for conceptualizing masculinities and femininities. Butler maintains that 
the current gender order is formed on the assumption of two dichotomous sex categories. 
Men and women who embody masculinity and femininity, respectively, are different 
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from each other, so a man performs masculinity by disavowing femininity. Masculinity 
and femininity exist in a relationship of dominance and submission. While „she throws 
like a boy‟ could be a compliment for girl the reverse is an insult for a boy.      
 ‘Femininities‟ and „masculinities‟ are „embodied social actions‟ 
(Messerschmidt, 2000, 2004) which are situated in specific CofPs (see section 2.1.2) 
that we define as „normative‟ behavior for men and women. The embodied social 
actions associated with „masculinity‟ include demonstrating authority, independence, 
competitive individualism, aggressiveness, and permissive heterosexuality 
(Messersccmidt, 2000). These social actions also exemplify the qualities which define 
„successful‟ corporate executives. Actions associated with femininity include adherence 
to authority, reliance on others, the ability to cooperate, and conservative sexuality.  
Despite the tendency to associate men with „masculinity‟ and women with 
„femininity‟, this is not always the case. Sex-category membership does not determine 
gender, so masculinities and femininities can be embodied by members of either sex 
(Connell, 1995; Messerschmidt, 2004; Halberstam, 1998; Schippers, 2007). 
Messerschmidt (2004) demonstrated how „Kelly‟ embodied masculinity through a 
masculine style of dress and engaging in assaultive violence with fellow gang members. 
In many ways she became „one of the guys‟, yet her biological sex ultimately prevented 
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her from participating in robberies and burglaries because the boys decided these 
„harder‟ forms of crime were „men‟s territory.‟ Furthermore, this is not to suggest that 
such gender „transgression‟ goes unnoticed or without punishment (Butler, 1999; 
Messerschmidt, 2004; Schippers, 2007; Sunderland, 2004). Kelly turned to the gang 
because her embodied masculinity that she expressed through style of dress and 
behavior led to her expulsion from the popular „preppy‟ group at school.   
„Femininities‟ and „masculinities,‟ used in the plural, emphasize that these 
concepts are each multiple, thus exist in a network, and are not dichotomous categories. 
Whitehead points out how various factors interact in the construction of masculinity: 
We can see that masculinities are plural and multiple; they differ over space, 
time and context, are rooted only in the cultural and social moment, and are 
thus, inevitably entwined with other powerful and influential variables such as 
sexuality, class, age and ethnicity (Whitehead, 2002, pp. 33-34).   
Whereas caring about one‟s appearance was not associated with masculinity in the past, 
the circulation of men‟s magazines today indicates that a shift has occurred. 
Whitehead‟s comments also apply to the construction of femininities. While current 
notions of western femininity may involve juggling a career with doing the majority of 
the housework, modern Japanese femininity is still very much centered around a 
domestic role. Similar to Butler‟s (1999) „heterosexual matrix‟, Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) remind us that “gender is always relational, and patterns of 
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masculinity are socially defined in contradistinction from some model (whether real or 
imaginary) of femininity” (p. 848; my emphasis). In practice, reflexively engaging in a 
fundamentally masculine „gender project‟ (Connell, 1995) involves distancing oneself 
from what has been called hegemonic femininity (Schippers, 2007; see section 2.5.3) 
and engaging in a fundamentally feminine gender project.  
 The relationship between hegemonic and subordinated forms of masculinity 
and femininity is the subject of the next section   
2.5.1 Hegemony and gender 
 The concept of „hegemony‟ originates with Gramsci (1971) who used it to 
describe the maintenance of power by the ruling class through consent rather than 
coercion. In a „civil society‟ a dominant social group establishes a state of hegemony 
when their ideologies infiltrate „commonsense‟ understandings and naturalize existing 
social arrangements. This type of society is different from a totalitarian „political society‟ 
where ruling is accomplished through force and coercion. The result of ruling through 
hegemony is that the current social order appears natural and non-oppressive.  
  The concept of civil society is also applicable to the subtle workings of gender 
hegemony. Gender hegemony is the dominance of one gender over another, as 
exemplified by the relationship between masculinity and femininity. A state of gender 
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hegemony exists when certain social practices become embedded in social institutions 
and thus normative. This is achieved not through brute force but through obtaining the 
consent of the populace. For example, a woman may accept her husband‟s few 
contributions to domestic work because the modern sexual division of labor has become 
ritualized. Gender hegemony is also at work in what Sunderland (2004) calls an 
„Incomplete woman‟ discourse, i.e. women are considered somehow incomplete until 
they enter into long-term partnerships with men. Accordingly, what has been called 
„Compulsory heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980) is very much a part of mainstream 
femininity. The pursuit of a long-term partnership, having and raising children then all 
become part of a quest that many women willingly engage in and perhaps associate with 
fulfillment, and are widely expected to do so.   
One site where traces of the two aforementioned discourses is apparent is 
mainstream media, particularly Disney films. Belle, the protagonist from Disney‟s 
Beauty and the Beast, is an example. Belle is labeled „odd‟ by the other villagers due to 
her interest in books, independence, and lack of interest in marrying Gaston, the local 
„heart-throb‟ who represents a recognizable form of „hegemonic masculinity‟. In one 
sense, Belle‟s rejection of the narcissistic Gaston and acceptance of the Beast appears to 
be a rejection of „hyper-masculinity‟ (Giroux, 1996). However, Belle‟s existence is 
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defined by instructing the Beast in „proper‟ etiquette and ultimately reforming him. 
Belle represents the traditional view that women civilize men. From this perspective, 
the film is not simply about Belle‟s desire for a more sensitive form of masculinity, but 
instead is constructing her existence around solving a man‟s problems (Giroux, 1996). 
By the end of the film, Belle is the prototype of a woman whose life has been 
„completed‟ by a heterosexual relationship, i.e. hegemonic femininity. Disney films are 
one example of how gender hegemony operates through media representations, which 
arguably contribute to constructing normative understandings of masculinity or 
femininity in particular CofPs (see section 2.1.2).  
Gramsci‟s (1971) concept of hegemony had a lasting influence on the field of 
gender studies, providing the basis for the concepts of hegemonic masculinity and 
hegemonic femininity (see sections 2.5.2-2.5.3), which are the central concern of this 
thesis.  
 Below I provide an overview of the path-breaking concept of hegemonic 
masculinity from which hegemonic femininity developed.  
2.5.2 ‘Hegemonic Masculinity’  
Connell‟s concept of „hegemonic masculinity‟ provides insight into the 
hierarchical but shifting arrangements of different forms of masculinity and is essential 
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to gain a full understanding of femininity. This is because hegemonic masculinity is “the 
configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the 
problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the 
dominant position of men and subordination of women” (Connell, 1995, p. 77). 
Dominance over other masculinities and femininities is a defining feature of hegemonic 
masculinity. Furthermore, hegemonic masculinity is a “historically mobile” and also 
geographically mobile relation (Connell, 1995, p. 77). Hegemonic forms of masculinity 
change from those emphasizing physical strength to technical expertise (Connell, 1995, 
2000). The „historical mobility‟ of hegemonic masculinity indicates that it reformulates 
over time in order to maintain its dominant position by subordinating women in 
different ways. Hegemonic masculinity‟s geographic mobility indicates that it has 
multifarious configurations depending on the particular society and CofP (see section 
2.1.2) in which it emerges (e.g. Dasgupta, 2000; Gutmann, 1996).   
The multifarious ways in which hegemonic masculinity manifests itself makes 
it tricky to define. Edley (2001a) defines it, for the UK context and somewhat 
tongue-in-cheek, as involving “watching football, drinking pints of beer at the pub and 
trying to get away from traffic lights faster than cars in the next lane” (p. 191). 
Hegemonic masculinity is here a set of social practices that is prototypically associated 
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with „macho‟ or „hard‟ masculinity (i.e. displaying physical strength, playing sports, 
consuming alcohol or other drugs, and not expressing emotions); however, Connell 
stresses that masculinities are not fixed, so hegemonic forms reformulate over time. 
They also vary by culture. In Japan, hegemonic masculinity is arguably embodied by 
the „salaryman‟ (Dasgupta, 2000), as in the emerging „world gender order‟, the 
hegemonic form, Connell (2000) claims, is „transnational business masculinity‟. This 
formulation of masculinity distances itself from „hard‟ masculinity that retains its 
position through physical force (e.g. violence against women) and replaces it with a 
hegemony that is built on technical competence and control over major political and 
corporate institutions. Women who occupy powerful positions in major social 
institutions are seen as „masculine‟ by men because they threaten the asymmetrical 
relationship between masculinity and femininity. But regardless of the form it takes, 
hegemonic masculinity is that which maintains dominance over other masculinities and 
femininities and entails not being homosexual because sexual desire for men is 
associated with femininity.   
 An important point about hegemonic masculinity is that while it may not be 
embodied by many men, it is the cultural ideal many strive for. Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) argue that “hegemony works in part through the production of 
62 
 
exemplars of masculinity (e.g., professional sports stars), symbols that have authority 
despite the fact that most men and boys do not fully live up to them” (p. 846). Despite 
the fact that such social embodiment is impossible for most men, these cultural models 
still exert an influence on the everyday „body-reflexive practices‟ (Connell, 1995) of 
many. We see evidence of this in toxic social practices such as participation in 
aggressive sports, excessive bodybuilding, and sometimes even steroid use (Connell, 
1995, 2000; Messner, 1992). In the process of constructing their masculinity, such men 
are reproducing hegemonic masculinity and emphasizing their distance from and 
superiority over femininity.   
Critiques have been directed at the notion of hegemonic masculinity 
(Demetriou 2001; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Whitehead, 2002). For example, Wetherell 
and Edley (1999) suggest the concept is theoretically vague. Similarly, Whitehead 
(2002) takes issue with who actually embodies hegemonic masculinity, “Is it John 
Wayne or Leonardo DiCaprio; Mike Tyson or Pele? Or maybe, at different times, all of 
them?” (p. 93). Surely, hegemonic masculinity is continually shifting over time within 
specific CofPs (see section 2.1.2).  
Shifting the theoretical focus back to femininities, I next devote attention to 
„hegemonic femininity‟ and its historical predecessor „emphasized femininity‟. I then 
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critique the ambiguities and tensions present in these concepts. 
2.5.3 ‘Emphasized Femininity’ and ‘Hegemonic Femininity’ 
Connell‟s (1987) concept of „emphasized femininity‟ constitutes an important 
theoretical underpinning to guide femininities research. Connell (1987) vaguely defined 
emphasized femininity as “compliance with this subordination [of women] and oriented 
to accommodating the interests and desires of men” (p. 183). Compliance materializes 
in the form of: 
…the display of sociability rather than technical competence, fragility in 
mating scenes, compliance with men‟s desire for titillation and ego-stroking in 
office relationships, acceptance of marriage and childcare as a response to labor 
market discrimination against women (Connell, 1987, p. 187)..  
Connell appears to be discussing a submissive form of „hyper-femininity‟, but a broader 
definition is necessary in order to make emphasized femininity a historically and 
geographically mobile relation like hegemonic masculinity. Messerschmidt (2004) 
defines it as “the culturally idealized form of femininity in a given historical and social 
setting” (p. 42). This definition is more comprehensive and could incorporate both the 
housewife who is financially dependent on her husband and the working professional 
woman who faces a „second-shift‟ (Hochschild & Machung, 2003), both forms of 
emphasized femininity in specific times and CofPs (see section 2.1.2).     
According to Connell, subjectivities outside emphasized femininity are 
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available for women who assume more resistant positions in relation to hegemonic 
masculinity. These other femininities “are defined centrally by strategies of resistance or 
forms of non-compliance. Others again are defined by complex strategic combinations 
of compliance, resistance and co-operation” (pp. 183-184). Ostensibly, lesbians, nuns, 
or women embodying „female masculinity‟ (Halberstam, 1998) provide examples of 
resistance or non-compliance since they minimize (versus „emphasize‟) their femininity. 
Connell (1987) adds, “Marilyn Monroe was both archetype and satirist of emphasized 
femininity” (p. 188), presumably because Monroe embodied both a compliant and 
resistant relationship with hegemonic masculinity. Monroe expressed confidence in her 
appearance and sexuality, but that sexual appeal was ultimately for the benefit of men. 
Despite acknowledging this complexity, unfortunately, neither Connell (1995, 2002), 
nor later Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), elaborate on this definition of „emphasized 
femininity‟, thus all that remains is the original and somewhat outdated 1987 definition. 
The definition remains somewhat obscure, beyond that it supports the “global 
domination of men over women” (Connell, 1987, p. 183).  
Recognizing that this original definition of gender relations was overly 
deterministic, in their later work, Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) formulate a less 
static definition of „gender hierarchy‟:  
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…our understanding of hegemonic masculinity needs to incorporate a more 
holistic understanding of gender hierarchy, recognizing the agency of 
subordinated groups as much as the power of dominated groups and the mutual 
conditioning of gender dynamics and other social dynamics (p. 848).   
This reformulated notion of gender hegemony is less static and a more dynamic 
conceptualization of power as it incorporates the notion of agency (Baxter, 2003; Burr, 
2003; Foucault, 1980; Weedon, 1997). However, Connell and Messerschmidt‟s focus on 
hegemonic masculinity disregards the specific ways and contexts in which women are 
oppressed and empowered. Furthermore, whereas cultural icons such as movie stars, 
sports figures and corporate executives are cited as archetypes of hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005), comparable models of emphasized 
femininity are not provided. Questions remain such as who actually embodies 
emphasized femininity and what compliance with hegemonic masculinity actually 
entails. In sum, Connell‟s (1987) formulation of emphasized femininity is both 
inadequately operationalized and the relationship between masculinity and femininity as 
one of dominance and subordination is left oversimplified. More recently, Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) acknowledge that this original theorization failed to incorporate 
the notion of agency (see the above quote), yet once again it was left underdeveloped. 
Consequently, emphasized femininity remains theoretically vague and hence difficult to 
empirically investigate.  
66 
 
A further issue with Connell‟s (1987) definition of emphasized femininity is 
that it fails to incorporate hierarchical relations among femininities. In fact, Connell 
maintains relationships of dominance and subordination are absent from the 
construction of femininities (in terms of women‟s relations with other women): “the 
concentration of social power in the hands of men leaves limited scope for women to 
construct institutionalized power relationships over other women” (Connell, 1987, p. 
187). For Connell, the overall subordinated status of femininity in relationship to 
masculinity means that femininity is not in a position to establish dominance over other 
forms of femininity. Connell argues that dominance is less inherent to the construction 
of femininity as to that of masculinity: “power, authority, aggression, technology are not 
themselves in femininity at large as they are in masculinity” (Connell, 1987, p. 187). 
This implies that women focus more on creating egalitarian versus hierarchical 
relationships among themselves. While this may be true, recent research has 
demonstrated it is not always the case. For example, in the UK classroom context, 
Judith Baxter (2005) has demonstrated that girls and boys both compete to gain access 
to the floor in classroom interactions. In workplaces, female managers have been shown 
to combine features from „masculine‟ and „feminine‟ interactional styles such as giving 
directives and expressing interest in their employee‟s lives as they construct their 
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workplace identities (Baxter, 2008; Holmes, 2006). These examples illustrate that power, 
authority, and aggression can be at play in the construction of femininities. Depicting 
women as somehow inherently less focused on hierarchical relationships than men runs 
the risk of falling back into essential and appealing notions of „gender differences‟.  
Pyke and Johnson‟s (2003) study of Asian-American femininities represents one 
attempt to develop the concept of hegemonic and subordinated femininities. In contrast 
to Connell, they see the relationship between different forms of femininity as 
hierarchical. Accordingly, they apply Connell‟s (1987, 1995) framework of the 
relationship between hegemonic and subordinate masculinities to femininities. In Pyke 
and Johnson‟s formulation, controlling images promoted by the media represent white 
femininity as hegemonic (i.e. confident and strong) and Asian femininity as 
subordinated (i.e. passive and weak). These media-based representations were 
confirmed in interviews with Korean and Vietnamese women who constructed Asian 
cultural settings as patriarchal and gender-oppressive and American (white) cultural 
settings as more egalitarian. Pyke and Johnson (2003) however emphasize that while the 
„exalted‟ status of white femininity over Asian femininity mimics hegemonic 
masculinity, the two cannot be conflated: “Whereas hegemonic masculinity is a 
superstructure of domination, hegemonic femininity is confined to power relations 
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among women” (p. 51). Pyke and Johnson maintain, like Connell, that women are 
collectively subordinated by men. While this is generally true, women can occupy 
superior positions to men such as female bosses.  
The important contribution of Pyke and Johnson is that they incorporate power 
relationships among femininities. Nevertheless, there are some points of caution 
regarding their conceptualization and framework. Schippers (2007) notes that locating 
the relationship between Asian and white femininities along a single axis of dominance 
and subordination obscures the contribution and interplay of race, ethnicity, and class 
dynamics. Accordingly, Asian femininities do not align on a level playing field, so it is 
quite feasible that hegemonic and subordinate forms exist within this category. For these 
reasons, Schippers contends that racial as well as gender hegemony is operating in Pyke 
and Johnson‟s study. With these objections in mind, Schippers observes that:  
We are still in need of a theoretical framework for multiple femininities that can 
account for the cultural hierarchy established between white women and Asian 
women as identified by Pyke and Johnson and can explain the role of 
femininities and masculinities in ensuring relations of domination that benefit 
men as a group (p. 89).   
Schippers is correct in her observation that we need a model which encompasses power 
relations between femininities, but does not ignore the overall subordinate status of 
femininity in relation to masculinity in the current gender order. Schippers then offers a 
model that captures the dynamic relationship between race, class, and gender, and offers 
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much promise for the future of femininities research. In order to more fully comprehend 
the workings of hegemony, she claims, the relationship between masculinity and 
femininity needs to be more clearly articulated. Schippers (2007) does this by utilizing 
Judith Butler‟s (1999) concept of the „heterosexual matrix‟ (see section 2.5) which 
assumes heterosexuality as the „structuring agent‟ for gender and the relationship 
between masculinity and femininity. In the „heterosexual matrix‟, gender and 
heteronormativity work to construct men and women as two distinct classes of people. 
Certain activities, behaviors, and patterns of consumption tend to correspond to each 
category and consequently define masculinity and femininity. The relationship between 
masculinity and femininity, then, is one of difference and complementarity because the 
differences between masculinity and femininity are complemented by heterosexual 
desire which fuses men and women together. Hegemony is maintained through 
constructing complementary but asymmetrical relational differences between men and 
women. For example, the importance of men‟s emotional strength is dependent upon 
and feeds off women‟s relative emotional weakness, thus men control their emotions 
and comfort women. This situation assumes a heterosexual relationship as normative. 
Of greater importance, however, is Schippers‟ point that the relationship between 
masculinity and femininity thus extends beyond difference to one of dominance and 
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submission.  
As the above discussion has suggested, the relationship between masculinity and 
femininity is not only one of difference but also the asymmetricality of domination and 
submission. Schippers (2007) builds on Connell‟s (1987) notion that hegemonic 
masculinity is constructed through its domination of femininity. She conceptualizes 
hegemonic masculinity as articulating a complementary and hierarchical relationship to 
femininity. Hegemonic masculinity is “the qualities defined as manly that establish and 
legitimate a hierarchical and complementary relationship to femininity and that, by 
doing so, guarantee the dominant position of men and subordination of women” (p. 94). 
Hegemonic femininity, accordingly, “consists of the characteristics defined as womanly 
that establish and legitimate a hierarchical and complementary relationship to 
hegemonic masculinity and that, by doing so, guarantee the dominant position of men 
and the subordination of women” (p. 94).  
This reformulation of hegemonic masculinity and femininity clarifies some of 
the ambiguities present in Connell‟s original definition of hegemonic masculinity. The 
earlier somewhat vague “configuration of gender practice” (Connell, 1995, p. 77) is 
now more clearly defined as specific characteristics which are viewed as „manly‟ or 
„womanly‟. Schippers is referring to the „quality characteristics‟ of each gender category 
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such as men‟s physical strength and women‟s physical vulnerability. Nevertheless, 
quality characteristics are not restricted to the level of face-to-face interaction but also 
exist on the social and institutional level, for example, the „masculinist‟ culture found in 
many corporations (Connell, 2002; Fletcher, 1999) and media representations of 
exemplary athletes and movie stars (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).  
Schippers‟ conceptualization incorporates multiple manifestations of 
masculinities and femininities dependent upon specific sociocultural contexts and the 
passage of time. For example, working-class men in Mexico reportedly participate in 
childcare which in no way infringes on their sense of „masculinity‟ (Gutmann, 1996). 
Economic changes triggered men‟s increased participation in childcare and 
consequently the symbolic meaning of fatherhood also changed. In contrast, for 
Mexican men of higher classes, childcare is still very much a „feminine‟ practice. In this 
culture, „masculine‟ and „feminine‟ quality characteristics are stratified by social class.  
Theorizing the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and emphasized 
femininity not simply as the “the global dominance of men over women” (Connell, 
1987, p. 183) but as both hierarchical and complementary articulates a more dynamic 
view of power in line with principles of poststructuralism (Baxter, 2003; Burr, 2003; 
Weedon, 1997). For example, „Office Ladies‟ willingly quit their jobs not necessarily 
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due to family-related responsibilities but because the job itself is unstimulating. 
However, men may attribute this to a „maternal instinct‟ or unsuitability for the harsh, 
„masculinist‟ corporate culture. Therefore, the „complementary‟ relationship between 
masculinity and femininity implies domination through consent and not force, i.e., 
hegemony. Given that men and women normally live together, certainly more often than 
members of different social classes and ethnic groups, they are „supposed‟ to 
„complement‟ each other.  
A conceptualization of hegemonic femininity remains incomplete without 
considering non-hegemonic forms of femininity. By non-hegemonic forms of femininity, 
I am referring to single women of marriageable age, homosexual women, and women 
involved in occupational fields deemed „masculine‟ such as law enforcement and the 
military, that is, women who somehow challenge traditional notions of femininity. 
Non-hegemonic femininities were not specifically incorporated into Connell‟s (1987) 
concept of emphasized femininity, yet she maintained that emphasized femininity 
prevents other forms of femininity (i.e., „spinsters‟, „lesbians‟) from gaining cultural 
articulation. In order to extend Connell‟s model, Schippers (2007) proposes the notion 
of „pariah femininities‟.  
2.5.4 ‘Pariah Femininities’  
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„Pariah femininities‟ refers to women who embody „manly‟ characteristics or 
aspects of hegemonic masculinity which include erotic desire for women, explicit 
sexual promiscuity, physical strength and assertiveness. Schippers (2007) proposes the 
term „pariah‟ in lieu of „subordinated‟ femininities in order to emphasize not so much 
their inferior status, but their perceived and actual potential to „contaminate‟ the 
hegemonic relationship between masculinity and femininity. Once again, masculinity 
and femininity exist in a relationship exemplified by difference and complementarity 
organized around a „heterosexual matrix‟ (Butler, 1999).  
„Female masculinity‟ (Halberstam, 1998) refers to women who embody 
masculinity such as „tomboys‟ or „butch‟ women. The significance of this concept is that 
it captures how masculinity (and presumably femininity) can be embodied regardless of 
biological sex. However, the concept ignores women who neither embody hegemonic 
femininity nor „masculinity‟, e.g. nuns. Pariah femininities, by contrast, could 
incorporate these femininities and is thus a more theoretically sophisticated concept. 
While variation among pariah femininities exists, a similarity is that they are sanctioned 
for their „deviant‟ behavior. Discursive sanctioning is incurred in the form of derogatory 
terms such as „bitches‟ to describe authoritarian women, „lesbians‟ or „dykes‟ to describe 
homosexual women, and „slags‟ to describe permissive women. Non-discursive forms 
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of sanctioning including sexual harassment and physical violence.  
Pariah femininities challenge the exalted status of hegemonic masculinity both 
because they enact an alternative to hegemonic femininity and do not assume a 
subordinate position in relation to hegemonic masculinity. On the contrary, this form of 
femininity embodies and enacts aspects of hegemonic masculinity. Schippers (2007) 
cites the example of Tina from Messerschmidt‟s (2004) insightful work on adolescent 
violence and gender. Tina is a working-class girl who originally embodied hegemonic 
femininity because of her attention to appearance and style of dress; consequently, she 
possessed membership of a popular clique at school. However, her decision to engage in 
physical violence led to her expulsion from the popular or „preppy group‟ and 
recruitment by the „badass group‟. The badass girls participated in physical violence and 
dressed provocatively. The „manly‟ characteristics of violence and permissive sexuality 
threatened the position of the hegemonic femininity (preppy girls) and ultimately the 
status of hegemonic masculinity (the relationship between preppy boys and girls). The 
consequences of embarking on this pariah femininity gender project were that Tina was 
initially ridiculed by members of the preppy girls, ridicule which eventually ceased once 
she entered the badass group because of this group‟s threat of physical violence. 
The example of Tina illustrates multiple configurations of hegemonic and pariah 
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femininities which emerge differently in specific communities of practice (see section 
2.1.2). Within the CofP of this particular school, preppy femininity is the hegemonic 
form and badass femininity the pariah one.  On the street, by contrast, badass 
femininity is hegemonic and preppy femininity pariah. Thus, a particular form of 
femininity can be simultaneously hegemonic in one CofP and pariah in another. The 
extent to which hegemonic forms of femininity and masculinity vary cannot be 
overemphasized.  
The example of „badass‟ femininity as the hegemonic form of femininity on the 
street does not, however, challenge the notion of hegemonic masculinity. While badass 
girls expressed their sexuality more explicitly than preppy girls, the heterosexual matrix 
(see section 2.4) was still the structuring agent for gender relations within the gang. 
Girls still expressed their femininity through dressing provocatively, wearing makeup, 
and ultimately by forming heterosexual relationships. At the same time, they 
participated in assaultive violence and crime, but only to a certain degree; the „harder‟ 
crimes such as robberies and burglaries were exclusively performed by boys, thus 
gender relations within the gang were unequal. Although „badass‟ hegemonic femininity 
adopted some of the social practices of „badass‟ hegemonic masculinity, it never 
challenged the exalted status of hegemonic masculinity.              
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Before leaving the topic of non-hegemonic femininities, I would like to make 
some final comments about the terms „pariah femininities‟ and „female masculinity‟. 
Following Schippers (2007), I prefer „pariah femininities‟ to „female masculinity‟ 
(Halberstam, 1998), as female masculinity fails to capture the whole range of 
non-hegemonic forms of femininity that exist. Female masculinity is limited to women 
who embody and enact masculinity such as „butch‟ women and „tomboys‟. Nevertheless, 
as I argued earlier in this section, pariah femininities should be extended to encompass 
both women who embody aspects of hegemonic masculinity and women who do not 
embody hegemonic femininity, but are not necessarily „masculine‟ such as nuns, single 
women, or working professionals. My expanded conceptualization of pariah 
femininities opens up more conceptual and theoretical space for researchers to identify 
and empirically analyze a greater range of femininities.   
Particularly important to this thesis is the potential for cross-cultural variation in 
the construction of hegemonic femininity. To reflect this, Schippers (2007) suggests 
viewing racial and class-based variation in masculinity and femininity not as different 
masculinities and femininities altogether but as masculinity and femininity refracted 
through the lenses of race and social class. This framework perceives the 
complementary and hierarchical relationship between masculinity and femininity as 
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fundamentally the same across cultures, i.e. the heterogeneous configurations of 
masculinities and femininities found within various CofPs (see section 2.1.2) are not 
different masculinities and femininities per se, but variations in the embodiment of 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity. We also need to acknowledge that Schippers is 
privileging gender over race and class. There are social contexts and occasions when 
gender is overshadowed by race, ethnicity, or social class. For instance, male and female 
gang members collectively participate in certain forms of violence and concomitantly 
construct gang member identity (see section 2.1.2). In this CofP (see section 2.1.2) 
women are not performing masculinity, but a „badass‟ femininity.  
Schippers‟ claim that masculinity and femininity exist in a complementary and 
hierarchal relationship can be investigated through further research into hegemonic and 
pariah femininities, such as this study. Schippers‟ formulation of hegemonic femininity 
thus paves the way for further investigation of the construction of these constructs 
within specific CofPs.     
Masculinities and femininities are located in the symbolic realm of gender 
relations (see section 2.2.4). The strength of locating hegemonic masculinities and 
femininities in this symbolic realm clarifies some of the empirical ambiguities in the 
original concept of hegemonic masculinity, e.g. theoretical vagueness and hegemonic 
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relationships among women (see section 2.5.3). This is not to suggest that gender 
relations are entirely symbolically constructed because disparate salaries, sexual 
harassment, and domestic violence are material consequences of asymmetrical gender 
relations; nonetheless, gender is at least partly constructed through discourse. For 
instance, Japanese hegemonic femininity has been socially constructed as involving the 
roles of „good wife and wise mother‟ (see section 1.3). However, the main issue with 
hegemonic masculinity is how can a symbolic form of masculinity that applies to a 
minority of men attain a symbolically dominant position in society? Theorized as a 
symbolic construction, the notion of hegemonic masculinity explains why this still 
remains the aspirational goal of many men. Most men cannot achieve the physical 
„perfection‟ of professional athletes or movie stars; nevertheless, these idealized images 
of masculinity exert an influence on people‟s day-to-day practices, such as the rigorous 
body-reflexive practices that actual men engage in like bodybuilding. Most women 
cannot attain the hegemonic femininity represented by supermodels and movie stars, but 
many attempt to do so through rigorous dieting and exercise. In addition, the discursive 
construction of femininity as „weak‟ and subordinate to masculinity accounts for how 
certain culturally ascribed „feminine‟ behaviors such as empathy and interdependence 
are undervalued and „get disappeared‟ at the workplace despite the pivotal role they play 
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in supporting corporations‟ success (Fletcher, 1999). In addition to symbolically 
defining masculinity and femininity, we also need to keep in mind the original sense of 
hegemony. 
 In conclusion, in order to adequately develop a conceptualization of hegemonic 
femininity, we need to remember that hegemonic ideologies attain their privileged status 
through popular consent and not coercion (Gramsci, 1971; Edley 2001a, b). The media, 
then, is one realm where images of hegemonic masculinity and femininity circulate 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Individuals, in turn, have the agency to elevate their 
exalted status or decrease it. Nevertheless, the popularity of certain media images 
suggests that individuals are accepting these images as exemplars of hegemonic 
masculinity and femininity. Sarah Jessica Parker (“Carrie Bradshaw”) in Sex and the 
City is a good example of a popular media image of hegemonic femininity for the 1990s 
and 2000s and heterosexual matrix in extremis. Although Bradshaw appears to 
challenge hegemonic femininity (through assertiveness), she simultaneously embodies 
and enacts it (through male-dependence). She is simultaneously a „modern woman‟ with 
a career, self-confidence, and financial and sexual independence; however, these are 
undermined by her continual search which drives her for a fulfilling heterosexual 
relationship. „Having it all‟ requires „having a man.‟ To shift the discussion to the 
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workplace, hegemonic masculinity is not only reflected in the „masculinist‟ culture or 
management style dominating many organizations. Far from an overwhelmingly 
„masculinist‟ culture, „hegemonic feminine‟ ways of doing business are essential for 
corporations to function but unacknowledged (Fletcher, 1999), which is an indirect form 
of subordination. The media images and so-called „masculinist‟ corporate culture 
discussed above illustrate that hegemony operates in subtle ways.     
2.6 The current study: Hegemonic femininity and critical discursive psychology 
A major goal of this study is to make an original contribution to gender theory 
by empirically investigating the theoretical construct of hegemonic femininity (see 
section 2.5.3). I do this from the perspective of critical discursive psychology (see 
section 3.4). I seek to investigate how a group of Japanese women discursively 
construct hegemonic and pariah femininities. Furthermore, the study investigates the 
various positions (resistant, complicit) these women assume in relation to these 
femininities, the symbolic construction of hegemonic and pariah femininities, and the 
multiple ways this group of women orients to them. Hegemonic femininity has been 
theoretically operationalized (Schippers, 2007), but empirical research has yet to 
demonstrate how it is displayed in discourse. I will do this through the analysis of these 
women‟s interview data.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I distinguished gender from sex and discussed two concepts 
central to this thesis: hegemonic femininity and pariah femininities (see sections 
2.5.3-2.5.4). I also traced the development of hegemonic masculinity from its early 
conceptualization (1987) to a more recent reformulation (Schippers, 2007) and its 
relationship to hegemonic femininity as well as to other masculinities and femininities. 
While I am concerned with the discursive and thus symbolic construction of hegemonic 
and pariah femininities, I take as given that gender relations are multidimensional and 
involve power, production, emotional, and symbolic relations. In order to reflect this, I 
discussed Connell‟s (2002) model of gender relations I have relied heavily on the work 
of Connell in this chapter, but she is an important figure in the field of gender studies 
and originally developed the key concepts of hegemonic masculinity and emphasized 
femininity.  
In the next chapter I provide an overview of the methodology for this study, 
discursive psychology. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology Part 1: Discursive Psychology 
3.1 Qualitative Research 
 To investigate the discursive construction of hegemonic and pariah femininities 
in Japan, I chose to adopt a qualitative approach from the onset because of its arguably 
greater compatibility with a social constructionist view of gender as a situated 
accomplishment than a quantitative approach would have been (Mason, 2002; Rubin & 
Rubin, 2005; Silverman, 2005). Qualitative interviews served as an appropriate data 
elicitation technique to elicit individuals‟ discursive accounts of gender relations. I then 
utilized critical discursive psychology (see section 3.4) to analyze these accounts 
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because I felt the methodology‟s concern with how individuals use language to perform 
various aspects of their social identities was appropriate to address my research 
questions (see section 3.5). Discursive psychological research typically draws on 
qualitative materials (i.e., news reports, telephone conversations) and interviews as data. 
(Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  
3.1.1 Qualitative Interviewing 
 I used semi-structured interviews as my data-collection methodology. 
Semi-structured interviews are loosely structured interviews which involve the 
preparation and use of an interview schedule or „interview protocol‟ (Rubin & Rubin, 
2005), but these questions serve more as general guidelines than a stringent schedule 
that must be strictly adhered to. With this in mind, I attempted to design questions 
which were general and open enough to encourage the participants to discuss their 
specific experiences and views related to gender (see Appendix A). Despite my efforts 
to create a comfortable and „natural‟ setting, the resulting interaction is still the product 
of an interview situation which is different from „natural‟ interaction, i.e. spontaneous 
conversation or telephone call.   
Although qualitative interviews provide a rich resource, this data is not 
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naturally-occurring talk, but rather generated or elicited (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The 
data would not have „occurred‟ without the researcher. An interview is not a „natural‟ 
context, in the sense that the researcher presets the topics and controls the flow of the 
„conversation‟ to some extent. In other words, the turn-taking rights are unequally 
distributed. With these concerns in mind, what we have is a specific type of social 
interaction which is nevertheless analyzable in its own right. In line with Schiffrin 
(1994), I would like to argue that interviews are a speech event that individuals have 
participated in, so it is different than, say, data from a completely controlled and thus 
„artificial‟ laboratory setting. Rubin and Rubin (2005) even suggest the term 
„conversational partners‟ to emphasize interviewees‟ active role. Preempted by this, I 
made a concerted effort to view the interviewees as active participants in the interaction 
and did not position myself as an „expert‟ but as someone there to learn from them. One 
way I attempted to position myself as a conversational partner was by informing them 
of my status as a doctoral student studying men‟s and women‟s roles in Japan, and 
expressing that their insights were a crucial element of my research project.  
 I would also like to critically and reflexively assess the role of my ethnicity and 
gender on the data. My ethnicity worked both as a constraint and resource in conducting 
the interviews. My status as non-Japanese located me in a unique position which helped 
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to rebalance any power inequalities present. For example, when interviewing younger 
women, where I was powerfully positioned in terms of age, they were powerfully 
positioned in terms of language and cultural competence. I conducted the interviews in 
Japanese in order to create an environment where interviewees could most fully express 
themselves. My status as a cultural „outsider‟ may have resulted in more open and 
explicit disclosure than if a Japanese had conducted the interviews. On the other hand, 
the interviewees may have been more comfortable and consequently more open with a 
Japanese interviewer. At times my ethnicity located me in a position of relative power, 
while at other times it located me in a position of relative powerlessness. 
 As regards the potential effect of my gender on the interview, research suggests 
that even in mixed gender interviewers, rapport can be established with the interviewees 
(Messerschmidt, 2004; Williams & Heikes, 1993). Although gender was a pervasive 
topic throughout the course of the interview, I attempted to play down the salience of 
my gender within the context of the interview. As much as possible, I turned the floor 
over to the participants and assumed the position of active listener. At the same time, I 
could not assume an entirely passive role, so I disclosed some of my own experiences 
and views and readily answered any questions posed to me. In retrospect, I do not regret 
my decision to conduct all of the interviews, but in fact welcome the unique interactions 
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that evolved. Finally, one goal of third-wave feminist research (Heywood & Drake, 
1997) is to deconstruct traditional boundaries (e.g., Bucholtz, et al., 1999; Hall & 
Bucholtz, 1995), so we should encourage research designs where males interview 
females or vice versa. 
3.2 Social and Discursive Psychology 
3.2.1 Social Psychology 
 Social psychology concerns the interaction between the individual and 
society—specifically, the study of how an individual‟s perceptions, attitudes, or 
behaviors are influenced by the presence of others (Gilbert et al., 1998). The discipline‟s 
beginnings are traceable to post World War II where social psychologists studied the 
United States military‟s use of persuasion and propaganda.  
 Social psychologists study both intrapersonal phenomena and interpersonal 
phenomena, that is, an individual‟s attitudes, perceptions, or stereotypes of others and 
other social groups, e.g. other races, and the ways in which group membership 
influences collective action or attitudes. For example, Tajfel (1982) suggests that a 
salient feature of group membership is accentuating intergroup differences and 
emphasizing intragroup similarities. In the process of creating strong in-group and 
out-group distinctions, individuals construct social identities (see section 2.1.3). Group 
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affiliation and the construction of these social identities become the basis for 
comparison with other groups and can result in intergroup conflicts. Discursive 
psychologists do not disassociate „individual‟ from „social‟ or „group-based‟ identities. 
Identities are seen as constructed in the process of social interaction with others (Edley, 
2001a; Edley & Wetherell, 2008). 
Methodologically, social psychologists tend to conduct their research in 
laboratory settings or use surveys and questionnaires (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; 
Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). Discursive psychologists criticize this because they view 
displayed attitudes and identities not as stable and easily elicited by the researcher, but 
as performed in specific interactional contexts. 
Before extending my discussion of discursive psychology, I first define 
„discourse‟.    
3.2.2 Discourse 
Purely linguistic definitions see discourse as “language above the sentence” 
(Schiffrin, 1994, p. 23) or “units of language production (whether spoken or written) 
that are inherently contextualized” (Schiffrin, 1994, p. 41). While these definitions are 
useful, post-structuralists (see section 3.3.2), which includes discursive psychologists, 
conceptualize discourse in a slightly different manner.  
 The term discourse as used in post structuralism has two dimensions. First, a 
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discourse is a group of statements which represents or discusses a topic in a certain way 
(Foucault, 1972). This has been referred to as „descriptive discourse‟ (Sunderland, 2004). 
Discourse extends beyond language to include “a whole range of different symbolic 
activities, including style of dress, patterns of consumption, ways of moving, as well as 
talking” (Edley, 2001a, p. 191). Examples of this include „medical discourse‟, 
„academic discourse‟, „legal discourse‟ and so on. There are certain context-specific 
conventions that govern academic discourse such as active engagement in whole class 
discussions and adhering to certain standards when writing. On another level, discourse 
“is producing and maintaining certain identities and power relations” (Scollon & 
Scollon, 2004, p. 5), which has been referred to as „interpretive discourse‟ (Sunderland, 
2004).  
In this second sense, language is a form of social action (Scollon & Scollon, 
2004) or „practice‟ (Edley, 2001a). The multifarious ways that people speak or write 
about a certain topic are performing an action, e.g. legitimating or subverting a 
normative social order. Lazar (2000) incorporates this social order dimension in her 
definition of discourse as “a set of related statements that produce and structure a 
particular order of reality, and which within that reality makes available specific subject 
positions” (p. 376). Although discourse may make available certain subject positions 
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(see section 3.4.3), social actors have a measure of agency to accept, resist, or even 
reformulate these subject positions. 
Lazar identifies and names two interpretive discourses in her study of a 
Singaporean national advertising campaign to encourage pregnancy: a dominant 
discourse of „conservative gender relations‟ and a counter discourse of „egalitarian 
gender relations.‟ In the counter discourse, parenthood was represented as equally 
important for both men and women. Contrary to a traditional division of labor, men are 
actively involved in parenting and women are actively involved in the pursuit of their 
careers.  
In the dominant discourse, by contrast, a very traditional division of labor was 
represented. For example, the father‟s role largely centered around fun and physical play, 
which has also been identified as a „Father as baby entertainer‟ discourse (Sunderland, 
2004). In addition, the twin pursuits of career and family were not portrayed as 
dilemmatic for men as they were for women. Motherhood was represented as 
foregrounding the needs of others. Lazar terms this „Other-centeredness‟ (see also 
section 1.3) and defines it:  
women‟s acute consciousness (or consideration) of their husbands and their 
children in the enactment of their own motherhood identity. The implication to 
be drawn from this is that women derive self-fulfillment indirectly through the 
happiness and fulfillment of others (p. 388).  
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For example, the birth of another child was not portrayed as a personally fulfilling 
endeavor for mothers themselves but as a “precious gift” for their other children. 
Furthermore, the combination of a career and family was deemed problematic for 
women, requiring them to “balance” these dual pursuits, with priority given to 
motherhood.  
Lazar‟s study illustrates how discourse has both a representational and 
constitutive function. (Sunderland & Litosseliti, 2002). The discourses she identified are 
both parenthood discourses. As with the academic discourse example above, certain 
socioculturally based assumptions are entailed in these discourses. The assumptions 
embedded in the discourse of conservative gender relations and egalitarian gender 
relations are quite different and can thus both be seen as a form of social action. 
Through the portrayal of parenthood in specifically gendered ways, individuals have 
available certain subject positions they can assume in relation to these discourses. The 
discourses provide subject positions for men whereby they can easily combine their 
father and professional identities. Women, by contrast, have a much narrower range of 
subject positions. For them, the combination of motherhood and career involves 
balancing the dual identities, with priority given to motherhood. This discussion 
illustrates that discourse is more than just spoken or written interaction and should be 
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seen as “a system which structures the way we perceive reality (Mills, 2007, p. 55). 
Discourses, then, are “practices that systematically form the object of which they speak” 
(Foucault, 1972, p.49).    
 Discourses do not exist in isolation but draw on other discourses. The interplay 
between different discourses is termed „interdiscursivity‟ (Kristeva, 1986). These 
different discourses may „come together‟, for a time, to form a „discursive formation‟ 
which constitutes knowledge about a certain topic (Foucault, 1977). For example, the 
discursive formation constituting „normative sexuality‟ as „heterosexual‟ or „compulsory 
heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980) can be found in various texts and social practices. 
„Linguistic traces‟ (Talbot, 1998) of this discourse could emerge in religious doctrinal 
texts condemning homosexuality, psychiatric texts classifying it as „deviant‟, 
anti-sodomy legislation, and the policing of homosexuals. As the „normative sexuality‟ 
discourse example illustrates, discursive formations do not exist on a level playing field.  
 Certain discursive formations that are legitimized by social institutions sustain 
a „regime of truth‟ or knowledge about a certain topic (Foucault, 1980). In reference to 
the previous example, other discursive formations around „sexuality‟ exist, but they lack 
the authority of the hegemonic „normative heterosexuality‟ discourse and some such as 
homosexuality are even considered „deviant.‟ Marriage discourses are prime examples. 
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In most contexts, the regimes of truth constructing „marriage‟ define it as a union 
between a man and a woman. Alternative discourses that define marriage differently 
circulate but lack force and consequently do not sustain a regime of truth. Therefore, 
discursive struggles exist where alternative marriage discourses compete to regulate 
knowledge, which therefore is constantly changing. 
 Discursive psychologists take a performative view of both descriptive and 
interpretive and discourses. Individuals perform actions such as attributing blame or 
justifying decisions when they speak or write about a certain topic. The „action 
orientation‟ (Hertitage, 1984) of discourse is of central importance in discursive 
psychology, which is not the case for other social psychological research as I show. 
3.2.3 Discursive Social Psychology 
Discursive social psychology is the study of how people construct and perform 
psychological phenomena, „mental states‟, in social interaction (Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Traditionally, social psychology views the display of 
attitudes or expression of emotions as cognitive processes which reside within the 
individual and drive behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). 
Discursive psychologists, by contrast, see these psychological phenomena as 
constructed for specific social interactions. For example, an individual may attempt to 
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construct a neutral attitude in order to avoid the attribution of being seen as a racist 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Psychological phenomena, then, for discursive psychology, 
are constructed in response to how we want others to view us.  
Discursive psychology represents a reworking of the view traditionally taken by 
psychologists that language expresses cognitive processes of the mind (Edley, 2001a; 
Horton-Salway, 2001). Rather, for discursive psychology, it is through language that 
individuals perform social actions such as making justifications, expressing views, and 
attributing blame (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Therefore, 
discursive social psychology is very much concerned with the „action orientation‟ 
(Heritage, 1984) of discourse. The view of language taken by discursive social 
psychologists thus sharply diverges from that taken by other social psychologists.  
As indicated, traditional social psychological research often uses questionnaires 
and surveys to uncover individual‟s „underlying mental states‟ (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 
1976; Zimmerman & Pollner, 1971). Within this research tradition, a researcher may for 
example „elicit attitudes‟ by having participants select a documented attitude from a set 
number of choices—categories elicited by the researcher. This is problematic from a 
discursive social psychologist‟s perspective because it sees a neat correspondence 
between categories constructed by the researcher and the participants‟ indicated 
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underlying mental entities, especially if these are seen as fixed and stable. In contrast, 
discursive social psychology sees the display of attitudes, evaluations, emotions, and 
remembering as constructed for specific interactional contexts and thus „action oriented‟ 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, an individual may 
„remember‟ an event in a certain way to construct a „self-presentation‟ (see section 
2.1.4) as a „responsible person‟. Discursive social psychologists have thus 
reconceptualized the conventional social psychological view of language as an 
expressive medium of stable, underlying states to a flexible resource individuals draw 
on to perform actions. Reported attitudes, memories, descriptions, and the like are seen 
as „accounts‟. Because discursive accounts are „action oriented‟ versus static, discursive 
psychologists use qualitative interviews (one-to-one and focus groups) in lieu of 
questionnaires or surveys (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).    
In contrast to the view that researchers can access participants‟ attitudes and 
underlying mental states and indeed that there are underlying mental states, discursive 
psychology is anti-cognitivist (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
Within cognitive psychology, individuals‟ accounts are viewed as representations of 
their mental states (Bubenzer & West, 1993; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Duck, 1993). 
Discursive psychology, in contrast, is not concerned with people‟s knowledge (e.g., the 
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factual accuracy of a memory) or elicitation of attitudes but how „knowledge‟ and 
„attitudes‟ are used in interaction.  
 Edwards (1994, 1995) illustrates how, for discursive social psychology, 
cognitive entities (descriptions of mental life) are strategically deployed with his 
concept of „script formulations‟. Script formulations are used by a speaker to construct 
an event or a speaker‟s disposition as following a predictable pattern or „script‟ which 
helps bolster the description and protect against refutation. This assumes that 
description is what is happening. Similar to a „rhetorical commonplace‟ (Billig 1987), it 
is „rhetorically self-sufficient‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and „stands alone‟ to explain a 
particular phenomena, e.g. „present generations cannot be blamed for the mistakes of 
past generations‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 177). The rhetorical effect of script 
formulations is that the account is constructed as unmotivated by a speaker‟s „stake‟ or 
„interest‟ and is thus unbiased. Script formulations are an example of what Potter (1996) 
calls an „externalizing device‟ where an action or event is constructed as occurring 
independent from the describer. Through distancing oneself from the event or action, the 
account is given more corroboration because it is constructed as „neutral‟ and not 
motivated by the describer‟s own interests. For example, a participant in a marriage 
counseling session produced a description of her husband as „jealous‟ (Edwards, 1995). 
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The woman constructed her husband‟s „dispositional jealousy‟ as the reason why he 
misconstrued her „sociability‟ as „flirtatiousness‟. By producing a description of his 
actions as following a predictable script, the speaker was able to blame her husband for 
various marital difficulties while at the same time present her own conduct as blameless. 
This example of script formulation illustrates how an emotion such as jealousy is not 
seen simply as a mental entity, but is discursively constructed in order to perform a 
particular function such as the attribution of blame. This non-cognitivist stance is 
consistent with an „action oriented‟ (Heritage, 1984) conceptualization of discourse.  
The theoretical roots of discursive psychology can be traced back to the 1980s 
with the publication of Potter and Wetherell‟s (1987) seminal work, Discourse and 
Social Psychology, which foregrounds discourse as the topic of study. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) directly challenged social psychological research on attitudes. 
Whereas attitudes researchers had attested to a high degree of coherence within 
individual‟s questionnaire responses (Ajzen, 1991; Marsh, 1976; Zimmerman & Pollner, 
1971), Wetherell and Potter (1992), in their interviews with Pakeha (white) New 
Zealanders, demonstrated that variability was normative within and across individuals. 
This variation directly challenges (but does not disprove) attitudes researchers‟ claims 
that „attitudes‟ are stable mental entities. 
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In order to study „mental‟ phenomena, Potter and Wetherell (1987) outline a 
form of discourse analysis which draws variously on the tools of „conversation analysis‟ 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Sacks, 1995), „membership categorization devices‟ (Sacks, 
1995; see section 5.3), and the concept of „interpretative repertoires‟ (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987). Conversation Analysis (CA) is concerned with the local-organization of 
conversations and has developed terminology to explicate this. Researchers who adhere 
to the principles of CA are more concerned with micro-oriented analysis, e.g. the 
salience of a pause. Those researchers who draw on the concept of interpretative 
repertoires, culturally specific ways of discussing certain topics, are however also 
interested in macro-level analysis, i.e. the relevance of a particular social context on the 
interaction. Accordingly, the field has split into those scholars who remain faithful to the 
principles of CA and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1995; Sacks, 
Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and those who follow a more post-structuralist influenced 
branch and draw on the concept of interpretative repertoires (Edley, 2001a; Edley and 
Wetherell, 2008) and discourses. These two branches of discursive social psychology 
are explored in greater depth below.    
The field of discursive social psychology has been heavily influenced by 
Michael Billig‟s (1987) work on rhetoric, notably his concept of „rhetorical 
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commonplaces‟, e.g. culturally specific terms or phrases that construct something as 
beyond question. When invoking them they function as being „rhetorically 
self-sufficient‟ (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and thus are effective devices to „manage 
accountability‟ (attribute responsibility for an action). For example, the phrase „you 
can‟t turn the clock backwards‟ often functions to reduce Pakeha New Zealanders‟ 
accountability for past injustices inflicted on the Maori people, and may form the basis 
for an argument against compensating Maori people for such injustices (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992).  
A further contribution to discursive social psychology was Edwards & Potter‟s 
(1992) „Discursive Action Model,‟ in which the concepts of „action,‟ „fact and interest‟ 
and „accountability‟ were introduced. „Action‟ follows Potter and Wetherell (1987) who 
view „psychological‟ phenomena such as „remembering‟, „describing‟, and so on as 
discursive acts which perform actions like denying responsibility or placing blame, as 
shown above. „Fact‟ and „interest‟ refer to individuals‟ „stake‟ or personal investment in 
making certain claims. If a speaker is seen as having such a „stake‟ or „interest‟, the 
account is in part undermined because it is no longer viewed as neutral (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992). Accordingly, individuals are often caught in a „dilemma of stake or 
interest‟ of how to produce „neutral‟ accounts while managing their self-interest. In 
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order to manage this dilemma, individuals produce accounts where an attributional 
action such as blaming is done implicitly, so as not to undermine their accounts and 
reduce their own accountability.    
 Edwards and Potter (1992) further locate „accountability‟ at two different, yet 
interrelated, levels. First, in the process of constructing an account, a speaker is making 
claims about who is responsible for certain events or actions. In particular, when the 
speaker is a participant in that account, his or her personal and relative responsibility for 
certain actions or events is also being constructed: within the „story world‟ of the 
account, the speaker is managing his or her own accountability. The speaker‟s 
accountability in the story world has implications for the type of „self-presentation‟ 
(Goffman, 1959) she or he is constructing in the current interactional context (e.g. 
interview, courtroom testimony). The version of self constructed in the story world 
encourages the listener to form a certain impression of the teller, e.g. someone who 
believes in racial or gender equality. Speakers design their accounts in accordance with 
these two levels of accountability: within the story-world and current interactional 
context.   
These two seminal works, Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Edwards and Potter 
(1992), have provided the foundation of the field of discursive social psychology. They 
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also formed the basis for the theoretical division that has occurred in the field. Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) have heavily influenced post-structuralist or „critical discursive 
psychology‟ (hereafter CDP; Edley, 2001a; Edley & Wetherell, 2008); in contrast, the 
approach advocated by Edwards and Potter (1992) draws on the principles of CA 
(hereafter CADP; Antaki, 1988, 1994; Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & Stokoe, 
2006; Speer, 2001, 2005). In the next sections, I outline the main principles of and 
differences between CADP and CDP.  
3.3 Branches of Discursive Psychology  
Discursive psychology can be divided into two main branches: CADP (see 
Benwell & Stokoe, 2006) and CDP (Edley, 2001a; Edley & Wetherell, 2008). Those 
working within CADP are committed to the principles of CA, thus they do not make 
claims about the larger social context the social interaction occurred unless it is directly 
traceable to the data (see Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). In CA terminology, unless the 
participants „make relevant‟ or „orient to‟ the larger social context. Antaki and 
Widdicombe (1998) are careful to point out that to „orient to‟ something does not always 
involve specifically naming it. A recipient can orient to a speaker‟s utterance as if it 
were a question or statement, or, rather differently, as a father, successful 
businessperson and so on.  
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CDP researchers, who are more concerned with social issues such as gender 
hegemony, see discourse as inseparable from the larger social context even if the 
participants do not specifically reference that context (Edley, 2001a; Edley and 
Wetherell, 2008). For example, the construction of non-racist views reflects a social 
climate where the expression of explicitly racist views in unacceptable (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992). Although discursive psychology has been seen as falling into these two 
branches (see also McIlvenny, 2002), some scholars such as Jonathan Potter have 
worked in both „camps‟ (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) while 
others discourage this theoretical separation and instead propose a more synthetic form 
of analysis which utilizes the „tools‟ from both branches (e.g., Kamada, 2008; Edley & 
Wetherell, 2008; Reynolds, 2008; see section 3.3.4).    
 I discuss the two branches in greater detail below. 
3.3.1 Conversation Analysis-Based Discursive Psychology 
 Conversation analysis is the study of the organization of „mundane‟ or 
everyday conversation and also institutional interaction (see Drew &Heritage, 1992; 
Thornborrow, 2002). The founders of CA set out to detail the „local organization‟ of 
naturally-occurring conversation (Sacks, 1995; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff et al., 
1977), i.e. the rules that individuals follow which make conversation „orderly‟. In doing 
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so they developed a specialized „tool kit‟ (see Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Wooffitt, 
2005). For example, „adjacency pairs‟ are a common feature of conversation, e.g. 
questions are usually accompanied by answers (Sacks, et al., 1974) and invitations by 
acceptances. Responses differ in that they can be classified as „preferred‟ and 
„dispreferred‟ (Pomerantz, 1984). The „preferred‟ turn is the kind of response that a 
question invites. The „preferred‟ response to an invitation is an acceptance while the 
„dispreferred‟ response is a refusal. „Preferred‟ responses are recognizable by a minimal 
amount of delay, brevity, and lack of mitigation (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
„Dispreferred‟ responses are indicated by delay and an account indicating why the 
person say cannot accept the invitation. Individuals orient to or exploit the normative 
features of conversations in order to perform certain actions such as acceptances and 
refusals. CA is not interested what is going on in individuals‟ heads, but what they are 
doing in conversation.  
 Prior to discussing the differences between CADP and CDP, I first look at the 
similarities between the two branches. Both branches of discursive psychology treat 
discourse as situated in three ways (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Potter & Hepburn, 
2007). First, utterances are situated in relation to each other as CA has demonstrated 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Sacks, 1995; Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff et al., 1977), e.g. 
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greetings are usually followed by greetings. Second, much discourse is situated in 
particular institutional contexts with specific norms (e.g. courtrooms, therapy sessions, 
workplaces). One feature of certain institutional contexts is asymmetrical speaking 
rights (Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). For example, in a counseling session the longer 
turn-taking rights allocated to clients are normative whereas in „ordinary conversation‟ 
an extended turn by one party would violate the „turn-taking system‟. Therapists usually 
ask questions that would normally breach rules of etiquette. Therefore, the 
conversational norms of particular institutional contexts impact social interactions 
which occur within those contexts. Third, individuals‟ discourse is situated rhetorically 
in order to avoid the accusation of personal investment in creating a certain account. For 
example, when calling a child abuse helpline, an individual identifies herself as a „very 
close friend‟ of the victim to prevent being seen as a „snitch‟ (Potter, 2003). By placing 
herself in the category of friend, expressing concern for the child is a normative activity, 
thus she presents herself as „concerned‟ and not intruding on someone‟s privacy.   
 CADP and CDP also both view discourse as constructed and constructive 
(Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Potter, 2003; Potter & Hepburn, 2007). Discourse is 
constructed from various resources (words, membership categories, rhetorical 
commonplaces, interpretative repertoires). Subsequently, constructed discourse 
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functions to create different versions of the world. To illustrate, an individual can 
account for missing a meeting as due to traffic problems (Potter, 2003). This 
individual‟s account constructs his/her lateness as due to external circumstances which 
she/he could not control. In this account, the individual is self-constructed as intending 
to arrive at the meeting on time, but external circumstances prevented him/her. This 
constructed reality presents the individual as conscientious. The example also 
demonstrates the rhetorical nature of discourse in that the individual has a stake or 
interest (see section 3.2.3) in constructing an account where he/she positively presents 
her/himself (Goffman, 1959). 
If discourse is constructive, then where does that leave the role of the material 
world? When addressing the question of the relationship between social construction 
and the material world, both branches of DP takes a relativist view of social 
construction (Burr, 2003; Wetherell, 2001). That is, „truth‟ exists only in relation to the 
discursive context where it is constructed. Potter (1996) comments on the relationship 
between descriptions and the material world: “descriptions are not just about something 
but they are also doing something; that is, they are not merely representing some facet 
of the world, they are also involved in that world in some practical way” (p. 47). Potter 
is proposing that descriptions are occasioned or situated in social interaction which 
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works to construct different versions of reality. The question remains, then, if truth is 
discursively constructed what role does material reality play? Edley (2001c) gives the 
example of the city of Nottingham as existing due to a text (i.e., by royal decree) and 
that its boundaries were negotiated and agreed upon, but does not dismiss the material, 
i.e. literally bricks and mortar. Edley reminds us that the material and symbolic realms 
are inextricably related. Discursive psychologists suggest that the „symbolic‟ act of 
constructing an account has material consequences because it constructs one particular 
version of the world, but they privilege discourse (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
In the next section, I discuss the post-structuralist influenced branch or „critical 
discursive psychology‟.  
3.3.2 Post-structuralist-Based Discursive Psychology: Critical Discursive 
Psychology  
CDP‟s broader view of „orientation‟ is evident in research on the stigmatization 
facing single women (Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003), racism (Wetherell 
& Potter, 1992) and hegemonic masculinity (Wetherell & Edley, 1999). For these 
researchers, analysis which integrates contextual information is a crucial component of 
conducting empirically rigorous discourse analysis.  
The temporary and fluid nature of both meaning and subjectivity is a 
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fundamental tenet of post-structuralism (e.g., Barthes, 1973; Baxter, 2003; Derrida, 
1987; Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1980; Kristeva, 1986; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Weedon, 
1997). This idea is built on the assumption that the meaning constructed from any text 
or social interaction is inseparable from the broader context. The implication for 
post-structuralist-driven discursive psychology is that discourse (see section 3.2.2) is 
highly and profoundly situated and researchers must integrate the broader social context 
into their analysis.  
Similar to their CADP counterparts, post-structuralism-influenced discursive 
psychologists are also concerned with the „action orientation‟ (Heritage, 1984) of talk, 
but take a much broader view of discourse. As Edley and Wetherell (1999) eloquently 
state: “people are both the products and the producers of discourse; the masters and the 
slaves of language” (p. 182). This perspective acknowledges that there are multiple 
ways of understanding the world, but at the same time certain understandings are more 
culturally dominant or hegemonic than others (Edley, 2001a). CADP, by contrast, does 
not engage in macro-level analysis unless the participants themselves „orient to‟ the 
larger social context.  
CDP analysis tends to focus on identifying „interpretative repertoires‟ (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), i.e. socio-culturally shared understandings about certain topics, look 
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for their discursive functions, and make claims about gender hegemony, racism, and so 
on through analyzing the workings of these repertoires (Edley, 2001a; Edley and 
Wetherell, 2008; Reynolds, 2008; see section 3.4). An example will more clearly 
illustrate this point.  
In a seminal CDP study, Edley and Wetherell (1999) identified the workings of 
hegemonic masculinity in interviews with men. Some participants constructed accounts 
where they were „gender rebels‟; one such individual presented himself as comfortable 
partaking in the „feminine‟ pursuits of knitting and cooking. What is striking, however, 
in this seemingly „rebellious‟ account, is that it can be seen as drawing on traditional 
features of hegemonic masculinity such as autonomy, self-confidence, and superiority 
(Connell, 1987; Schippers, 2007). In this „gender non-conformist‟ account, what is 
being celebrated is arguably not only this man‟s ability to knit and cook, but his courage 
as a man to engage in these „risky‟ feminine pursuits. Thus, we see the workings of 
hegemonic masculinity (see section 2.5.2) within this „gender non-conformist‟ account. 
The two branches of CADP and CDP have resulted from tensions between their 
different intellectual and epistemological underpinnings. These tensions include both 
the level at which analysts restrict their analysis and the data they analyze. In the next 
section, I discuss these tensions and possible resolutions.  
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3.3.3 Theoretical tensions between the two branches   
As indicated, participants‟ „orientations‟ is a key point which divides CADP 
and CDP researchers. In contrast to CADP, CDP researchers approach their data from 
the perspective that certain ways of talking about the world already exist (Edley, 2001a; 
Edley and Wetherell, 2008). Accordingly, speakers often draw on these „interpretative 
repertoires‟ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Interpretative repertoires are deployed for 
rhetorical purposes, e.g. working up a self-presentation as a „gender rebel‟ who is in 
touch with his emotional side (Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Nevertheless, this repertoire is 
built on the very characteristics (e.g. individualism and self-confidence) which define 
hegemonic masculinity. What appears to be a „New Man‟ form of masculinity is in fact 
a reformulated version of hegemonic masculinity. In the process of deploying such 
repertoires, participants are constructing their identities (Weatherall, 2002; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992).  
Although a range of interpretative repertoires exists about a certain topic (e.g. 
racism), they do not align on a level playing field. Certain understandings about the 
world are culturally dominant or hegemonic (Edley, 2001a; see section also 2.5.1). CDP 
researchers thus often focus their attention on the workings of these interpretative 
repertoires within local interactional contexts while making claims about the workings 
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of power or ideology. For example, the inclusion of marriage into what constitutes a 
„normal life cycle‟ means that „single woman‟ is a „marked‟ social category (Reynolds, 
2008; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003). Accordingly, interpretative repertoires which 
denigrate singleness, e.g. „singleness as personal deficit‟, dominate those which 
celebrate it, e.g. „singleness as independence and choice‟. In many western societies 
marriage and motherhood are accordingly central tenets of femininity (Reynolds, 2008; 
Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003).  
The issue of how „participants‟ orientations‟ are demonstrated by the researcher 
has generated a long-standing debate (Billig, 1999a, b; Schegloff, 1997; Schegloff, 
1998; Schegloff, 1999a, b; Wetherell, 1998) and is the main point of division between 
the two branches of discursive social psychology. The CA claim that the researcher does 
not approach the data with any prior theorizations or research agenda (Schegloff, 1997) 
has in particular generated criticism. In response to the CA justification of „positive 
naiveté‟, Billig (1999a, b) and Edley (2001b) maintain that while CA researchers have 
no problem integrating the technical terminology from their field into their analysis (e.g., 
adjacency pairs, extreme case formulations, and three-part lists), they nevertheless attest 
they are studying participants‟ talk „in its own terms‟. As Billig (1999a) critically states, 
“the „naïve methodology and epistemology‟ allows conversation analysts to claim that 
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they are not „imposing‟ categories: they are merely labeling what actually exists and can 
be observed to exist” (p. 547). Billig‟s important point, with which I concur, is that CA 
terminology is not therefore value free but indicative of the points in the participants‟ 
talk the analyst is focusing on. In this way, it is not so different from the claims about 
ideologies that CDP researchers make (Edley, 2001b).           
 The CA focus on „participants‟ concerns‟ is methodologically sound in that it 
encourages close textual analysis and discourages over-interpretation. Nevertheless, as 
Edley (2001b) argues, “in attempting to maintain „participants‟ orientations,‟ 
conversation analysis (CA) renders itself particularly unsuited to researching questions 
of hegemony and ideology” (p. 137): CA researchers cannot make claims about the 
workings of gender hegemony or ideology unless the participants orient to it. This is 
paradoxical because the touchstone of gender hegemony is that power is maintained 
through consent versus explicit coercion (Edley, 2001b). As Edley (2001b) claims, “a 
state of hegemony exists when a particular cultural understanding or practice comes 
close to achieving that aim; when it becomes widely taken for granted or common sense” 
(p. 137). Thus, individuals are not always critically aware of hegemony, and it is 
precisely on those occasions when gender hegemony is not explicitly oriented to that 
analysts need to and can point to its covert workings. For analysts who wish to study the 
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subtle workings of gender hegemony, CADP may not be the most suitable methodology.  
Closely related to this tension is the issue of how analysts generate data for 
analysis. CADP researchers tend to use naturally-occurring material such as 
conversations, telephone calls, news interviews, meetings, and online discussions 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007). CDP researchers, 
on the other hand, tend to rely heavily on individual and group qualitative interviews 
(Edley, 2001a; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), i.e. elicited data. CDP‟s use of qualitative 
interviews to generate data has been criticized by CADP researchers (Potter & Hepburn, 
2005; Hepburn & Wiggins, 2007; Speer, 2004). Potter and Hepburn (2005), for example, 
note that the interviewer is often deleted from the transcripts, so readers are only 
provided with the interviewees‟ responses. In addition, they maintain that researchers 
often have a stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in certain findings, which potentially 
influences the interview, and that researchers‟ own agendas can affect question 
construction. 
Potter and Hepburn (2005) thus argue that interviews are not always treated as 
interaction, and accordingly that, although extracts from the interviewees‟ responses are 
presented, the interviewer‟s questions and responses to the interviewees are often not 
given adequate attention. Clearly, the ways in which original and follow-up questions 
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are constructed and posed to interviewees exert an influence on the interaction. This is 
closely tied to the notion of the researcher‟s and participant‟s respective stake or interest 
in the topic. For example, the interviewer‟s investment may be indicated by expressing 
an affiliative or disaffiliative response. For these reasons, Potter and Hepburn (2005) 
suggest that naturalistic records (versus elicited data) might be a more fruitful 
„epistemological site‟ (Sunderland, 2004) for generating data and conducting analysis.   
The issues raised by Potter and Hepburn (2005) are valid and require 
addressing in a CDP study such as mine. A researcher can provide the interview 
schedule and include interview questions alongside participant responses to address the 
„interviewer‟ issue. The questions of the interviewer‟s personal investment in the topic 
and the interviewee‟s involvement in „impression management‟ (Goffman, 1959) are 
also resolvable. Weatherall (2000) makes the important point that research is rarely 
value free and thus calls for greater reflexivity. Certain „invested‟ formulations by the 
researcher, such as „loaded questions‟, agreement, or disagreement, which could 
indicate the researcher‟s stake in a particular response, need to be integrated into the 
analysis as do the ways the interviewees respond to them. For example, an interviewee 
might refuse to answer a question or orient away from a particular topic and indeed the 
interviewee‟s personal investment in managing positive self-presentation (see section 
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2.1.4) is a topic of study on its own. Discursive psychological research has 
demonstrated how participants‟ manage their accountability due to their „stake‟ or 
„interest‟ in constructing a positive self-presentation in various interactional contexts 
(Edwards, 1995; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).  
As long as the important concerns raised by Potter and Hepburn (2005) are 
addressed, I concur with Edley (2001a) and Wetherell (1998) that interviews remain a 
fruitful epistemological site for data elicitation. However, the CA-discursive 
psychologist, Speer (2004), raises further specific issues related to the use of interviews.  
Speer‟s (2004) case against interviews interestingly draws on her own previous 
work with interviews (Speer, 2002). She was interested in accessing views about men 
and women engaging in activities considered „inappropriate‟ for their sex. She originally 
thought the use of visual prompts of people engaging in „gender-inappropriate‟ activities 
(e.g., men doing ballet) would elicit „gendered‟ views but instead these generated a 
whole set of other issues. Contrary to what Speer hypothesized, some participants 
resisted producing „gendered‟ views. For example, they did not react with surprise or 
disdain to men doing ballet or women playing rugby. Speer contends that the 
participants were very aware of and thus resistant to producing the „gendered‟ views she 
was expecting to elicit. This resistance may come as no surprise, with certain social 
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groups of respondents, given that many people today overwhelmingly present 
themselves as supporters of gender equality (Edley & Wetherell, 1999; 2001; Gough, 
1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell, et al., 1987) and are sophisticated „resistors‟ 
of gender stereotyping, at least in what they say. 
Speer is very clear that she had a vested interest in eliciting stereotypically 
gendered views, which affected her selection of prompts, question design, and responses 
to her interviewees‟ remarks. For example, a picture of a male ballet dancer was shown 
to the participants, and the moderator asked, “Do you think that it breaks stereotypes at 
all?” The participant responded negatively, which prompted the moderator to press him 
further, “I mean some people would say he‟s a „poof‟ or something”. He answered 
“some people would” but contended that he would not. Despite the interviewer‟s two 
attempts, the interviewee failed to express the „gendered‟ views she was trying to elicit, 
and Speer apparently approached the interview with a predetermined agenda.     
We need to heed Potter and Hepburn‟s (2005) advice and treat Speer‟s 
interviews as a specific form of situated interaction with the researcher‟s vested interest 
in eliciting stereotypically gendered views and participants‟ potential interest in not 
being seen as „sexist‟ or „homophobic‟. At the same time, the participants‟ resistance to 
Speer‟s positioning is noteworthy because it arguably illustrates critical awareness of 
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the potential stigma attached to explicitly expressing gendered views. Instead of using 
these issues as reasons to discredit qualitative interviews, issues of accountability and 
stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) can be studied as long as the researcher is open and 
reflexive about the specific form of interaction that occurs. I would contend that Speer‟s 
findings should not serve as evidence to abandon the use of qualitative interviews but 
rather as illustrative of the issues that arise in this type of interaction. 
3.3.4 Possible resolutions between the two branches of DP 
 Wetherell (1998) attempted to bridge the gap between the more narrow 
definition of context adapted by CADP researchers and broader conceptualization taken 
by CDP researchers by calling for a more integrated and synthetic form of discourse 
analysis: 
My aim was not to endorse this division of labor—conversation analysis then 
ethnomethodology then post-structuralist analysis or ethnography of 
communication or critical discourse analysis—but to suggest that for social 
psychological discursive projects a more synthetic approach is required focused 
on the development of analytic concepts which work across some of these 
domains such as, for instance the notion of positioning, interpretative 
repertoires, ideological dilemmas, and so on (p. 405).    
Despite the tensions between the two branches of DP, Wetherell‟s position is that a 
resolution is indeed possible. Wetherell is not advocating strict adherence to either CA 
or post-structuralist principles, but instead is advocating a more integrative form of 
discursive psychology which combines the rigorous, turn-by-turn analysis advocated by 
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CA practitioners with analysis of the broader, culturally available „interpretative 
repertoires‟ that individuals draw on as they construct the world and their subjectivities. 
I will demonstrate how researchers can perform more synthetic discourse analysis by 
discussing Speer‟s (2001) study of masculinity where she criticizes Edley and 
Wetherell‟s (1999) study of hegemonic masculinity (see section 2.5.2) on the grounds 
that the category is not oriented to by the participants; however, I argue that the implicit 
nature of hegemony ensures that participants do not explicitly reference it.   
Speer (2001) conducted semi-structured interviews with men investigating the 
construction of gender in talk about sports and leisure. She identified the ways in which 
a group of men constructed masculinity, i.e. „masculinity as extreme‟. One of her 
participants, David, constructed the „laddish‟ activities of being „out on the pull‟ and 
excessive alcohol consumption as „extreme‟. He thus produced an account of a 
particular form of masculinity, but then distanced himself from that construction. 
According to Speer, David manages the „ideological dilemma‟ (see section 3.4.2) of 
constructing a masculine identity while at the same time not presenting himself as a 
conformist to a traditional image of masculinity. David maintained that he did not 
always go „out on the pull‟, drink excessive amounts of alcohol, and was not 
competitive in sports. The crux of Speer‟s argument is that the identity „hegemony‟ and 
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„hegemonic masculinity‟ are not participants‟ categories, but instead masculinity is 
contingent, constructed in different ways dependent upon specific interactional contexts. 
In this case, David is managing his accountability as „masculine‟ and simultaneously as 
a „non-conformist‟ to traditional masculinity. Speer contends that a participant‟s 
construction of any type of masculinity functions to manage interactional accountability, 
and therefore cannot be taken as evidence of its existence. Therefore, even if a 
participant orients to an identity we can gloss as hegemonic masculinity, this is not 
evidence that hegemonic masculinity actually exists.   
The „extreme‟ form of masculinity that David distances himself from is not 
specific to this data. As discussed in 2.2.4, Edley and Wetherell (1997) found a similar 
construction of masculinity in their group interviews with adolescents. These 
participants displayed antipathy toward the „hard lads‟ who were members of the school 
rugby team. They faced an ideological dilemma, i.e. to remain accountably „masculine‟ 
while at the same time to distance themselves from the „hard lad‟ masculinity. In order 
to manage this dilemma, they established a categorical difference where the „hard lads‟ 
were constructed as violent and lacking in individuality. By contrast, the non-rugby 
players constructed themselves as capable of engaging in physical violence but 
self-disciplined enough not to. Similar to Speer‟s (2001) participant, David, a 
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hegemonic form of masculinity was reconstructed in order to manage an ideological 
dilemma.  
Speer‟s (2001) claim that hegemonic masculinity is not a participants‟ category 
here is indeed correct; nevertheless, this does not mean that what it describes is absent 
from talk (Edley, 2001b). Granted, it is unlikely participants will reference hegemonic 
masculinity in any explicit way, just as they do not refer to phenomena such as 
„adjacency pairs‟ (Sacks et al., 1974) and „preference structure‟ (Pomerantz, 1984). But 
just as the analyst refers to such terms, not used by conversationalists, we can also make 
claims that participants are implicitly orienting to a hegemonic form of masculinity.  
Speer is also correct in her assertion that not only do participants‟ alignments 
with certain constructions of masculinity change, but so do definitions of masculinity 
themselves (see section 2.5). CDP research has demonstrated that variation, not 
consistency, is a normative feature of participants discourse (Edley, 2001a; Reynolds, 
2008). Accordingly, the same participant aligns himself with different constructions of 
masculinity in order to manage the rhetorical demands of that interactional moment 
(Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). Therefore, a participant may shift 
between constructing himself as „hyper-masculine‟, „ordinary‟, or „gender 
non-conformist‟ within the same interactional context (Wetherell & Edley, 1999).  
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CDP research has demonstrated that when researchers engage integrate micro 
and macro levels of analysis, the workings of ideologies can become apparent (Edley, 
2001a, Reynolds 2008; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The above discussion illustrates how 
a micro versus macro level of analysis need not be a point which divides researchers. 
On the contrary, researchers can combine different levels of analysis in order to 
strengthen their claims. It is critical to acknowledge that individuals are positioned by 
interpretative repertoires, yet they also actively assume positions in relation to them 
(Edley and Wetherell, 2008; Wetherell, 1998, 2007). For example, we can extend 
Speer‟s usage of the „inference-rich‟ nature of „membership categories‟ (see section 5.3) 
to point out that David resists constructing an identity around „hegemonic masculinity‟ 
in order to manage his accountability in the interview. In addition, as CDP research has 
demonstrated that individuals present themselves as in favor of gender equality (Edley 
& Wetherell, 1999; 2001; Gough, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell, et al., 
1987), David‟s construction of „hard masculinity‟ as „extreme‟ is by no means unique to 
his interview. Another interpretation is that David is drawing on the image of the „New 
Man‟ (Benwell, 2002) as he reconstructs hegemonic masculinity. Despite Speer‟s 
insistence on restricting analysis to categories that participants „orient to‟, and CDP‟s 
refusal to do this, I concur with Edley (2001b) that “there is even less of a difference 
120 
 
between our approaches than Speer seems to imagine” (p. 136). 
In the next section, I discuss CDP in greater detail which is the central 
methodology of my study.   
3.4 Critical discursive psychology  
Post-structuralism-influenced analysts working in the tradition known as CDP 
typically draw on three key analytic concepts: „interpretative repertoires‟ (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), „ideological dilemmas‟ (Billig et al., 1988), and „subject positions‟ 
(Harre & Davies, 1990; Hollway, 1998; Weedon, 1997). I draw on all three of these 
concepts in conducting data analysis for this study (see chapters 6-8).  
3.4.1 Interpretative repertoires 
Interpretative repertoires (IRs; see section 3.3.3) are the preexisting discursive 
resources social actors draw on when they talk about objects and events (Edley, 2001a; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). So when people construct their 
versions of the world, they normally do so largely with terms provided to them by 
history (Edley, 2001a). Potter and Wetherell (1987) define interpretative repertoires as 
“basically a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterize and 
evaluate actions and events” (p. 138). Because IRs are so familiar to members of a 
given community: “only a fragment of the argumentative chain needs to be formulated 
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in talk to count as an adequate reference and for the participants to jointly recognize the 
routine that is developing” (Edley & Wetherell, 2001, p. 443). For the purposes of this 
study, I am defining interpretative repertoires as common themes which emerge in 
individuals‟ discourse and index culturally-shared ways of understanding certain topics 
or events. To illustrate, the „liberal feminist repertoire‟ positions feminists as desiring 
equality and was identified by Edley and Wetherell in interview transcripts by lexical 
references to „equality‟. Although repertoires are suggested by “particular images, 
metaphors, or figures of speech” (Edley, 2001a, p. 199) or “familiar clichés, anecdotes 
and tropes” (Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003, p. 496), they tend to be identified and named 
thematically by researchers. For example, studies have identified and named a 
„progressive view of history‟ or „times are changing‟ repertoire which rests on the 
assumption that society is continually improving, albeit at a slow rate, toward a „golden 
age‟ (Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Reynolds, 2008; Wetherell et 
al., 1987). Repertoire names are sometimes specifically articulated, or suggested, by 
participants, but are more usually implied. For example, what Edley and Wetherell 
(2001) call a „times are changing‟ repertoire is suggested by the phrase „you can‟t have 
women managers overnight‟. The issue of how interpretative repertoires are identified 
will be taken up again in section 3.4.4.  
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In the process of constructing their identities and managing accountability, 
people arguably draw on multiple interpretative repertoires (Edley, 2001a; Reynolds & 
Wetherell, 2003; Wetherell, 1998). Variation is a key feature of people‟s discourse 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Reynolds, 2008). Sets of repertoires do not usually feed off 
each other in a complementary or longitudinal fashion, but instead are often fraught 
with tensions and contradictions which can create „ideological dilemmas‟ (Billig et al., 
1988) for individuals. I explain this below.   
3.4.2 Ideological dilemmas 
„Lived ideologies‟ consist of the beliefs, values, and practices of a given society 
or culture. Billig et al. (1988) argue that, far from exhibiting coherence, lived ideologies 
are fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions. A simple example is that the 
proverbs „too many cooks spoil the soup‟ and „many hands make light work‟ contradict 
each other (Billig et al., 1988). The variation inherent in lived ideologies however 
makes them invaluable resources for a multitude of rhetorical purposes. For example, 
woman‟s purported compassion can be used to construct them as effective lawyers; 
however, the same alleged quality can construct them as „overemotional‟ and thus 
unsuitable for the job (Marshall & Wetherell, 1989).  
The contradictory nature of lived ideologies can contribute to the formation of 
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ideological dilemmas, i.e. “the contradictory beliefs and ideas that constitute our 
common-sense understanding of the world” (Weatherall, 2002, p. 90). For example, a 
„femininity changes the law‟ repertoire, constructs women as contributing to 
humanizing a cold, „masculinized‟ legal profession. A „femininity as lack‟ repertoire, on 
the other hand, constructs women as unqualified for a profession where the 
„masculinized‟ qualities of emotional disassociation, and bravado are characteristics of 
successful lawyers (Marshall & Wetherell, 1989). The noteworthy point about 
interpretative repertoires is that the same individual may draw on several, often 
contradictory repertoires within the same speech event (Edley, 2001a; Marshall & 
Wetherell, 1989; Reynolds, 2008).    
As an example, Wetherell et al. (1987) interviewed university students about 
women‟s employment opportunities. The contradiction between an „equal opportunities‟ 
and a „practical considerations‟ repertoire lead to the formation of ideological dilemmas. 
The equal opportunities repertoire is built on the assumption that people are 
fundamentally equal and equally able, thus it is up to the individual to demonstrate his 
or her capacity for a particular job. However, the practical considerations repertoire, as 
shown by comments that women might quit their jobs due to childbirth and childcare, 
contradicts the equal opportunities repertoire and may inhibit women‟s actual equal 
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employment opportunities. It was common in Wetherell et al.‟s study for respondents to 
draw on both repertoires, and to do so in order to manage the ideological dilemma of 
endorsing gender equality, while legitimizing the status quo, i.e. current hiring practices 
are constructed not as sexist, but as responding to the reality that women may quit.  
Managing ideological dilemmas is a reason why variation is a key feature of 
individuals‟ accounts (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003). 
Accounts are also highly variable because they are used for multiple rhetorical purposes 
such as attributing blame or responsibility elsewhere in order to manage personal 
accountability, where accountability refers to the personal investment individuals have 
in managing a positive „self-presentation‟ (see section 2.1.4), such as endorsing gender 
or racial equality (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell et al., 1987). In the previous 
example (Wetherell et al., 1987), an employer attributed responsibility for not hiring 
women to the likelihood of their premature resignation. Thus, although he positively 
presents himself earlier as endorsing gender equality, he also says that he is unable to 
hire women because they are a „risk not worth taking‟. The rhetorical effect of this on a 
hearer may be that responsibility for not hiring women is attributed to women‟s 
reproductive role, which is beyond one individual‟s control.  
3.4.3 Subjectivity and Subject positions 
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The above discussion of interpretative repertoires indicates that certain ways of 
talking about ourselves are provided to us by a particular society or culture, with a 
discursive history. In the process of drawing on various interpretative repertoires within 
social interaction, „subjectivities‟ are constructed. Interpretative repertoires can be 
accepted, contested, or even reformulated. For Weedon (1997), subjectivity refers to 
“the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the individual, her sense of 
herself and her ways of understanding her relations to the world” (p. 32). Since 
subjectivities are fluid, individuals‟ thoughts and emotions are not stable, but constantly 
shifting within specific interactional contexts. The ways in which individuals 
understand themselves is suggested by the various „subject positions‟ (Davies & Harré, 
1990; Hollway, 1998; Weedon, 1997) they assume in relation to interpretative 
repertoires („subject position‟ is discussed below). For example, a woman can 
self-position herself as a „good mother‟ by accepting a „marriage and motherhood as 
ultimate fulfillment‟ repertoire. Weedon emphasizes the crucial role of discourse in the 
process of subjectivity construction, certain discursive „fields‟ offering the individual “a 
range of modes of subjectivity” (Weedon, 1997, p. 34). Edley (2001a) professes that 
„discourses‟ and „interpretative repertoires‟ are similar theoretical concepts as both 
index commonsense ways of understanding the world. Weedon‟s comments can also be 
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applied to interpretative repertoires. Further, certain interpretative repertoires and 
consequently subjectivities are arguably not equally „appropriate‟ in a particular culture. 
That is, certain interpretative repertoires and consequently subjectivities become 
„hegemonic‟ (Gramsci, 1971).  
Reynolds and Wetherell‟s (2003) study of single women is an example of the 
hegemonic nature of some subjectivities (see section 3.3.3). The influence of 
„compulsory heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980) in many western societies constructs women 
and men in domestic partnerships, thus „single woman‟ is a „troubled‟ identity (difficult 
to align with; see section 8.2). The stigma toward „single woman‟ made it difficult for 
women to exclusively draw on repertoires which celebrated singleness, i.e. „singleness 
as self-development and achievement‟. Instead, they drew on repertoires which 
celebrated singleness, but at the same time articulated how other, more denigrated 
repertoires did not apply to them. So „singleness as personal deficit‟ did not apply to an 
individual because, she said, she had three marriage proposals which she rejected. The 
fact that these women constructed themselves as not „desperate‟ indicates the overall 
social stigma toward single women. Despite the availability of different interpretative 
repertoires, repertoires which celebrate the institutions of marriage and motherhood 
remain hegemonic. 
127 
 
A „subject position‟ (Hollway, 1998; Davies & Harre, 1990; Weedon, 1997) is 
the identity we construct within social interaction by drawing on, resisting, or 
reconfiguring interpretative repertoires. Taylor (2005) defines a subject position as “a 
temporarily occupied coherent identity with its own „vantage point‟ or perspective” (p. 
253). Subject positions are temporary because we draw on multiple IRs in the same 
interactional context in the process of constructing our subjectivities or identities (see 
section 2.1.3) which are fluid. I see „vantage point‟ as applicable to both interpretative 
repertoires and subject positions. Interpretative repertoires are not neutral, but infused 
with a culture‟s „lived ideologies‟ (see section 3.4.2). Similarly, assuming a subject 
position in relation to a repertoire is not a value-free endeavor, but suggests a certain 
view of self and others. For instance, a „canonical‟ „singleness as personal deficit‟ 
repertoire (Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003) is heteronormative in that it presupposes 
women desire marriage. By taking up a resistant subject position in relation to this 
repertoire, a woman could construct an identity such as „independent woman‟. The 
association between „woman‟ and „independence‟ is far from automatic in a culture that 
continues to be heavily influenced by the „heterosexual matrix‟ (see section 2.5), which 
constructs women as dependent on men (Reynolds, 2008). Although a woman may 
positively position herself as „independent‟, from another person‟s vantage point she is a 
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„spinster‟ who was never chosen by a man. Like the singleness as personal deficit 
repertoire itself, each subject position is infused with lived ideologies and indicates a 
particular world-view.     
The above discussion has demonstrated how identities are constructed through 
specific ways of talking (Edley, 2001a; see section 3.4.1). Davies and Harre (1990) 
point out that individuals position others in the course of social interaction, and people 
are positioned by interpretative repertoires. As an example, a heterosexual man in a 
particular context individual could draw on a „permissive sexuality‟ (Hollway, 1998) 
discourse or repertoire and position a woman and self as engaging in „consensual sex‟ 
(Lea & Auburn, 2001). In addition, one could adopt a resistant subject position of 
oneself in relation to the interviewer. This was the case in Speer‟s (2004) study (section 
3.3.3) where participants resisted the interviewer‟s attempt to elicit their „gendered‟ 
views and to position them as „sexist‟, thus positioning themselves as accepting of men 
engaging in the „feminine‟ pursuit of ballet. These examples highlight the point that 
people shift between positions in accordance with the rhetorical demands of different 
interactional contexts. The process of assuming different subject positions in relation to 
interpretative repertoires and others‟ positioning are resources individuals use to 
construct their subjectivities in multiple ways.   
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The interrelated concepts of interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas, 
and subject positions are the main analytical tools critical discursive psychologists and I 
draw on. In sum, because tensions and contradictions are inherent in different 
interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas can develop as individuals shift between 
different subject positions in the process of constructing their subjectivities. These three 
concepts have laid important theoretical groundwork. In the next section I discuss the 
role of critical discursive psychology in this study.   
3.4.4 Critical discursive psychology and the present study 
 The current study draws on CDP in order to critically examine the workings of 
the notions of hegemonic and pariah femininities (see sections 2.5.3-2.5.4), specifically 
in the Japanese context. With this goal in mind, I aim to identify interpretative 
repertoires related to both types of femininities and their functions in discourse. 
However, the way in which interpretative repertoires are identified and actively 
deployed in discourse represents a gap in the CDP literature and will thus benefit from 
additional clarification. With this in mind, a further goal is to contribute to CDP 
research by operationalizing the concept of interpretative repertoires in terms of specific 
discursive features. This theoretical contribution deliberately further blurs the 
distinction between „micro‟ and „macro‟ levels of analysis and moves toward a more 
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synthetic form of discourse analysis, as recommended by Edley and Wetherell (2008) 
and Wetherell (1998, 2007). 
In the next section I take the role of language in critical discursive psychology 
as my point of departure.  
3.4.5 The role of language in critical discursive psychology 
 As discussed, the focus of much CDP research is to analyze how interpretative 
repertoires function in discourse. Contradictions between different interpretative 
repertoires are common (see e.g. Reynolds, 2008) and can lead to the formation of 
ideological dilemmas, which participants are left to discursively resolve. However, as 
indicated, the exact way in which interpretative repertoires are identified in discourse by 
analysts is not clearly indicated and thus remains somewhat vague. To elaborate on this, 
some discussion of the discursive features associated with different interpretative 
repertoires is necessary.     
 The original definition of interpretative repertoires has remained largely 
unchanged (Potter & Wetherell, 1987); however, there are some important additions in 
later definitions regarding associated discursive features. In the original formulation, 
interpretative repertoires are “basically a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors 
drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 
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p. 138). The discursive devices indicated here are „lexicon or register or terms‟ and 
„metaphors‟. In a more recent definition, repertoires are “broadly discernable clusters of 
terms, descriptions, and figures of speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid 
images” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90). „Vivid images‟ are thus added. Reynolds and 
Wetherell (2003) define them as “the recognizable routines of arguments, descriptions 
and evaluations found in people‟s talk often distinguished by familiar clichés, anecdotes 
and tropes” (p. 496). In this more recent formulation, we have the additional features of 
„clichés‟, „anecdotes‟ and „tropes.‟ Key to all three definitions is the argumentative and 
descriptive function of interpretative repertoires. Accordingly, individuals use 
interpretative repertoires as discursive resources to make accusations, attribute blame 
and responsibility, and manage accountability (Edley, 2001a; Reynolds & Wetherell, 
2003; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). The discursive devices which suggest 
and constitute interpretative repertoires have thus already been laid out as the above 
definitions indicate. Nevertheless, much discursive psychological research tends to 
focus on thematically identifying interpretative repertoires and connecting them to 
broader issues of power and ideology in lieu of specifically referencing discursive 
features such as clichés, lexical items, metaphors, and tropes.  
 More recent research is however moving toward the more integrative micro 
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and macro levels of analysis that Edley and Wetherell (2008) and Wetherell (1998, 
2007) call for, hence closer linguistic analysis. Sheriff and Weatherall (2009) for 
example conducted a critical discursive analysis of popular-press accounts of 
post-maternity. In their analysis of newspaper articles, the authors identified specific 
lexical items and an „empty nest‟ metaphor which suggested interpretative repertoires. 
Notably, the „empty nest‟ metaphor was „gendered‟ (Sunderland, 2004) in that it was 
absent from accounts of post-paternity. A major strength of Sheriff and Weatherall‟s 
study is that their claims about the workings of gendered ideologies are grounded in 
specific discursive features, e.g. metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), idiomatic phrases 
(Drew & Holt, 1989, 1998) and extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986). This 
study illuminates how multi-level analysis is further strengthened by identifying 
discursive features such as metaphors which suggest interpretative repertoires and their 
functioning in discourse. 
 The identification of the workings of power and ideology through interpretative 
repertoires provides insight into how „lived ideologies‟ (see section 3.4.2) are very much 
a part of our daily lives. Therefore, the claims that critical discursive psychologists 
make could arguably be further corroborated and/or made more robust by identifying 
interpretative repertoires in part in terms of specific discursive features. This would 
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place critical discursive psychologists in a more advantageous position to discredit the 
accusation that their claims are not based on categories participants „make relevant‟ 
(Schegloff, 1997; Speer, 2001), or that their research is a form of content analysis (Mills, 
2007).  
 In order to assist with the task of identifying interpretative repertoires, 
rhetorical devices such as those identified by CADP can be drawn on. These include 
script formulations (Edwards, 1994, 1995), extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 
1986), externalizing devices (Potter, 1996), and shifts in „footing‟ (Goffman, 1981). We 
can also draw on the more linguistic „metaphors,‟ clichés,‟ „anecdotes,‟ „tropes,‟ and 
„figures of speech‟ referenced above. In addition, I am suggesting reported speech, the 
Japanese discourse marker yappari, and membership categorization devices (see 
sections 5.2-5.4) because they surfaced in my data. My analysis will link these 
discursive devices to specific interpretative repertoires and make a contribution to the 
linguistic turn in the social sciences (see Wodak & Meyer, 2005). Consequently, broader 
claims about gender hegemony in relation to interpretative repertoires are more firmly 
grounded in discourse. If analysts will perform more detailed and nuanced analysis, 
accusations that they are approaching the data with a preset theoretical agenda can be 
more easily refuted (Schegloff, 1997; Speer, 2001). They will be better able to address 
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the issue of how particular repertoires are identified (Potter & Hepburn, 2007; Wooffitt, 
2005) and more firmly grounded in discourse. Claims from the critical study of social 
psychological issues can thus be further substantiated.   
 In the next section I discuss the research questions which frame this study.  
3.5 Research Questions 
1. What interpretative repertoires do participants draw on as they discursively 
construct (a) hegemonic femininity and (b) pariah femininity?  
As I discuss in 2.5.3-2.5.4, „hegemonic‟ and „pariah‟ femininity have been 
theoretically conceptualized but not yet empirically investigated. Using critical 
discursive psychology (see section 3.4), I have identified repertoires which suggest that 
participants are constructing hegemonic and pariah femininity subjectivities.  
Research question one can be further broken down into the following 
sub-questions: 
1(a). What discursive features are associated with interpretative repertoires constituting 
(a) hegemonic femininity and (b) pariah femininity?  
I discuss how the concept of „interpretative repertoires‟ (see section 3.4.1) can 
be strengthened by identifying them in terms of specific discursive features (see section 
3.4.5). I have identified „reported speech‟, „membership categories‟, and yappari (see 
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sections 5.2-5.4) as specific discursive features. Accordingly, this study seeks to 
contribute to a small but growing body of research that is beginning to identity 
interpretative repertoires through specific linguistic features (e.g., Sheriff and 
Weatherall, 2009) and contributing to multi-perspectival discourse analysis (e.g., 
Kamada, 2008, 2009).     
1(b). What subject positions (self and other) do participants take up in relation to 
interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity and (b) pariah 
femininity? 
Individuals are not simply passive victims who are positioned by repertoires 
but also possess agency to accept, contest, or even reformulate repertoires (see section 
3.4.3). Therefore, I was interested in how participants discursively positioned self and 
others in relation to these repertoires and thereby constructed hegemonic or pariah 
femininity subjectivities.   
2. Is there evidence of ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions between 
different interpretative repertoires in participants‟ discourse? 
Discursive psychological research (see chapter 3) has demonstrated how 
contradictions between interpretative repertoires can lead to the formation of 
„ideological dilemmas‟ (see section 3.4.2). For example, repertoires which position 
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women as „mothers‟ and „working professionals‟ can contradict one another because 
motherhood is considered a full-time endeavor within some Japanese „communities of 
practice‟ (see section 2.1.2). Accordingly, participants can face an ideological dilemma 
when they attempt to draw on contradictory repertoires and construct subjectivities 
which bridge domestic and non-domestic realms. Therefore, I was also looking for the 
presence of contradictions in participants‟ discourse which could suggest the presence 
of ideological dilemmas. 
3. What discursive features are associated with ideological dilemmas generated from 
contradictions between interpretative repertoires in participants‟ discourse?  
After identifying the presence of ideological dilemmas, I wanted to exemplify  
how they were displayed in terms of specific discursive features. In doing so, I can 
identify the presence of ideological dilemmas in terms of specific discursive features 
which further strengthens my claims.   
 In sum, the aims of this study are to make a contribution to both gender theory 
and critical discursive psychology. I want to investigate the concepts of hegemonic and 
pariah femininities and contribute to conducting more „synthetic‟ discourse analysis, as 
suggested by Edley and Wetherell (2008) and Wetherell (1998, 2007) (see section 
3.3.4). 
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I outlined the methodological framework employed in this 
study: discursive psychology. I provided a historical overview of how discursive 
psychology emerged as a discipline in response to traditional social psychological 
research. I then discussed the CA-based and post-structuralist-based braches of DP, 
including the theoretical tensions and possible resolutions between them. Following 
Wetherell (1998) and Edley and Wetherell (2008), I suggested that these two branches 
can be combined, resulting in more integrated and synthetic discourse analysis. 
Following that, I discussed the analytic concepts interpretative repertoires, ideological 
dilemmas, and subject positions, which are used in CDP, the methodological framework 
for this study. Then, I discussed the role of language in CDP and suggested that 
discursive devices such as reported speech and MCDs (see sections 5.2-5.4) could assist 
analysts with identifying and analyzing the workings of interpretative repertoires. 
Finally, I discussed the research questions which frame this study.  
In the next chapter I discuss my data collection and analysis process. 
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Chapter 4: Data, Data collection, and preparing data for analysis 
4.1 Introduction: Aims and objectives of the study revisited 
 The main purpose of this study is to investigate the discursive construction of 
hegemonic and pariah femininities (see sections 2.5.3-2.5.4), within the specific context 
of Japan. I am drawing on critical discursive psychology. I am particularly interested in 
the interpretative repertoires (see section 3.4.1) that my female participants draw on to 
discursively construct these femininities and the multiple ways these female participants 
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position (see section 3.4.3) themselves and other women in relation to these IRs. 
 The second purpose of the thesis is to explicate the discursive devices 
participants draw on as they discursively construct femininities. In other words, I want 
to identify and describe the discursive features that indicate participants are drawing on 
particular IRs as they discursively construct hegemonic or pariah femininities. I also 
aim to analyze the discursive function of reported speech, membership categories and 
discourse marker yappari (see sections 5.2-5.4) in relation to the construction of 
femininities.   
4.2 Data needed 
 In order to obtain accounts of hegemonic and pariah femininities, data was 
generated and not naturally-occurring. Discursive psychologists reject the use of 
questionnaires because they fail to capture the „performative‟ nature of individual‟s 
discourse (see section 3.2.1), so I used individual and group interviews as my data 
elicitation technique. 
 I selected women participants because my aim was to investigate the discursive 
construction of femininities. This is not meant to suggest that „sex‟ and „gender‟ always 
align (see section 2.1.1); however, „gendered‟ repertoires (Sunderland, 2004) circulating 
in Japanese society position women as accountable to „femininity‟ and men accountable 
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to „masculinity‟ (see section 1.3). My focus, then, was on the various subject positions 
these women assumed in relation to these repertoires as they constructed their gendered 
subjectivities.       
Since gender is „done‟ differently (Fenstermaker & West, 2002) within specific 
communities of practice (see section 2.1.2), a diverse group of participants is ideal to 
investigate my topic. A heterogeneous population would allow me to investigate the 
gendered repertoires which are salient within specific CofPs (see section 2.1.2), which 
vary by age and marital status. For example, is the dated „good wives, wise mothers‟ 
ideology (see section 1.3) appropriated into any repertoires currently circulating in 
Japanese society? If so, are the repertoires only salient within certain social groups and 
not others? In order to address these questions, I interviewed a diverse group of women 
in terms of age, educational and occupational background, and marital status (see 
section 4.4). 
Discursive psychological research does not aim to generate and analyze large 
samples of data, but instead conducts an in-depth analysis on a relatively small sample 
of participants (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003). Interpretative 
repertoires participants draw on, subject positions they assume, and ideological 
dilemmas which emerge (see sections 3.4.1-3.4.3) are present even in a relatively small 
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sample. Further,   
Because a large number of linguistic patterns are likely to emerge 
from a few people, small samples of a few interview are generally 
quite adequate for investigating an interesting and practically 
important range of phenomena. For discourse analysts the success of a 
study is not in the least dependent on sample size (Potter & Wetherell, 
1987, p. 161). 
In the same vein, the success of this study is not dependent upon the size of the sample, 
but on performing close analysis on the data collected.   
 In addition to investigating this diverse pool of participants, I decided to apply 
diverse data elicitation techniques. While critical discursive psychologists tend to draw 
on either individual or group interviews (e.g., Edley, 2001a; Reynolds, 2008), I chose to 
combine both semi-structured individual interviews and group interviews. This allowed 
me to investigate femininity construction in two different interactional contexts. In 
individual interviews, participants may be more oriented to the interviewer and 
performing in the role of interviewee. On the other hand, this provides a context where 
they might disclose private information. In group interviews, participants may be more 
oriented to each other thus enabling a more „natural‟ interaction. At the same time, the 
presence of peers may inhibit some of them from disclosing certain views. Combining 
methods allowed me to investigate the research topic from different angles.  
Using two different data collection methods to interview a relatively small 
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number of carefully chosen participants with diverse backgrounds, would, I thought, 
yield close to what might be considered „ideal‟ data for a CDP study.    
4.3 Data collection: interviews and group interviews 
4.3.1 Individual interviews 
 Qualitative interviews were used as the method for data collection. The 
interviews were semi-structured meaning that a provisional interview schedule was used 
(Appendix A). This provided some topical consistency, but I viewed it more as a set of 
general guidelines. Topics were not solely pre-determined, but also naturally emerged 
from the interview itself. I followed the principles of „responsive interviewing‟ (Rubin 
& Rubin, 2005) which involves treating the participants as „conversational partners.‟ 
Participants did not always orient to my pre-selected topics and sometimes introduced 
additional topics, which I encouraged them to pursue.  
 Conducting individual interviews proved to be a useful technique for eliciting 
interpretative repertoires, subject positions participants assumed in relation to them, and 
ideological dilemmas which emerged from tensions or contradictions between the 
repertoires. 
4.3.2 Group interviews 
 In addition to semi-structured, individual interviews I also conducted group or 
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„multi-person interviews‟ (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) using broadly the same interview 
schedule. This type of interview is common in critical discursive psychological research 
(see Edley, 2001a; Kamada, 2008).  
 Kamada (2008), for example, conducted interviews with a group of 
multi-ethnic, Japanese-Caucasian adolescent girls. Since social conformity and 
homogeneity are honored values in Japan, these girls‟ ethnicity posed a dilemma for 
them. On the one hand, they were disempowered by repertoires of „homogeneity‟ and 
„conformity‟, but simultaneously empowered by a repertoire of „Western female 
attractiveness‟. The dilemma posed by „ethnic embodiment‟ became apparent in the 
interviews as the girls constructed accounts where they desired a Japanese appearance, 
yet at the same time their „exotic‟ appearances made them attractive. In group 
interviews participants draw on interpretative repertoires and discursively position self 
and others. Group interviews are a particularly fruitful epistemological site as they 
create an environment where participants can and often do collectively draw on 
interpretative repertoires, discursively position self and others, and manage emergent 
ideological dilemmas.   
In group interviews, even more so than in the individual interviews, the 
interview schedule was a starting point from which group participants often moved 
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beyond, even introducing new topics. This was important because the purpose of my 
schedule was to give some overall topical consistency to the interviews, but at the same 
time incorporate flexibility so that we could pursue other topics and themes which were 
salient to specific groups. At times, they oriented more towards each other than me and 
thus a more „natural‟ interaction occurred. 
 In line with focus group research (Kreuger, 1994; Litosseliti, 2003), I was 
interested in the interaction that occurred in these sessions, not simply the content of the 
responses. However, the multi-person interviews administered differed from „focus 
groups‟ (Krueger, 1994; Litosseliti, 2003) in a number of ways. First, the moderator‟s 
role in executing the focus group is to maintain the group‟s focus on a particular topic 
(Litosseliti, 2003). In contrast, in my interviews, although we were „focusing‟ on the 
broad topic of men‟s and women‟s social roles, our discussions often transcended these 
topics, and when this happened, as the interviewer, I did not refocus their attention on 
the interview schedule. Instead, we pursued topics which emerged in the course of the 
interview. In this way, I was not simply eliciting accounts about pre-selected topics, but 
creating a context where we were co-participants and a more „natural‟ interaction 
developed. Second, proponents of focus group research discourage the use of „loaded 
questions‟ because the participants can become defensive (Kreuger, 1994; Litosseliti, 
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2003). In contrast to this principle but in line with other discursive psychological 
research (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), some of my questions could be considered „loaded‟ 
(e.g., questions about social pressure) and I did not hesitate to ask follow-up questions 
which might generate argument. Actually, these questions produced some of the most 
interesting responses or non-responses. For example, in response to question 10 („do 
you think that women face social pressure today to do certain things‟), participants 
hesitated to formulate accounts about „social pressure‟ (see Chapter 6). It was 
conceivable that this resistance was related to the type of self-presentation (see section 
2.1.4) they were managing, in the sense that they did not want to present themselves as 
agentless victims, assuming that they saw „social pressure‟ in this light. If I had 
restricted myself to less provocative questions, I would never have accessed some of the 
most interesting responses.  
Similar to individual interviews, group interviews were a useful 
epistemological site for eliciting interpretative repertoires, subject positions, and 
ideological dilemmas. The discursive devices that the participants repeatedly drew on 
when interacting with others versus with me were more apparent because they were not 
orienting to an „outsider‟ but to their peers.  
4.3.3 Ethical considerations 
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 As regards ethical considerations involved in the research process, in my 
design and implementation, I made a concerted effort to follow the British Association 
for Applied Linguistics (BAAL) „Recommendations on Good Practice in Applied 
Linguistics‟ (2006). 
 The participants in my study were all consenting adults; however, I felt that the 
ethical issues varied slightly vis-à-vis whom I was interviewing, i.e. students or 
non-students. The main issue in relation to the non-students was respecting their privacy. 
To address this, I assured them that our interviews were confidential and that 
pseudonyms would be used when presenting the results of the research. Since I did not 
associate with them on a daily basis (e.g., at work), there was a low probability that any 
shared acquaintances would even discover they had been interviewed. The student 
participants, by contrast, were from the university I am affiliated with, so we share some 
mutual acquaintances. To address this, I assured them that other students or faculty 
members would not be informed of their cooperation with my research endeavor.  
In line with the BAAL guidelines, I took several steps to ensure that 
participants‟ confidentiality was respected. First, in line with guideline 2.2, I obtained 
written informed consent (Appendix B). I informed my participants of both my status as 
a PhD student and research objectives in broad terms: the investigation of men and 
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women‟s changing social roles, thus the general purpose of my study was disclosed to 
them and they were no deceived (BAAL: 2.5). Second, I assured my participants of my 
confidentiality and their anonymity by explaining that pseudonyms would be used when 
drawing on the data for academic research reports or conference presentations (BAAL 
2.4). Furthermore, the participants were informed that they could withdraw their 
permission for me to use the data upon completion of the interview (BAAL 2.3). This 
request was never made. Finally, participants who wanted to see the results of this study 
were encouraged to provide me with their contact information (BAAL 2.6).  
4.3.4 The reflexive researcher 
 In the design and execution of this study, I made a conscious effort to maintain 
reflexivity about the entire research process. Yancey Martin (2003) contends that “to be 
reflexive means to mediate or engage in careful consideration; it also means to ruminate, 
deliberate, cogitate, study, or think carefully about something” (p. 356). I attempted to 
maintain reflexivity during the design, delivery, execution, and data analysis phases of 
this study. In the course of selecting a research methodology, I chose CDP after 
carefully considering Feminist Post-Structuralist Discourse Analysis (Baxter, 2003), 
which I rejected because I felt the concepts of interpretative repertoires, ideological 
dilemmas, and subject positions (see sections 3.4.1-3.4.3) were the most suitable „tools‟ 
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to address my research problem: the discursive construction of femininities. The critical 
discursive psychological social constructionist view of discourse that there are 
culturally-specific ways of talking about the world, but some are more legitimized and 
thus „hegemonic‟ than others, was consistent with my view of subjectivities. The 
concept of ideological dilemmas, which FPDA does not draw on, foregrounds how 
inconsistencies between interpretative repertoires pose dilemmas as individuals 
discursively construct their „gendered‟ subjectivities also seemed analytically 
appropriate for the study of subjectivities. Critical discursive psychology‟s social 
constructionist view of subjectivities coupled with these three analytically useful 
concepts discussed above are the main reasons why I selected this approach over FPDA.  
I planned to rely solely on semi-structured individual interviews as a data 
elicitation technique, but my supervisor advised me to at least pilot and potentially use 
group interviews. This was sound advice because the group interviews resulted in 
interactionally-richer data in that the women were drawing on and positioning others in 
relation to interpretative repertoires. The individual interviews, by contrast, did not have 
this added interactional element, but they did provide an arguably „safer‟ environment 
where participants could construct accounts away from others.   
In the process of carrying out the interviews, I realize that my gender and 
149 
 
ethnicity positioned me in multiple ways in relation to the participants which resulted in 
a unique interaction, or „situational truth‟ (Goetting, 1999; Messerschmidt, 2000, 2004). 
The „reality‟ constructed from this interaction resulted from the interaction between the 
participants which occurred at a specific time and was situated in the „epistemological 
site‟ (Sunderland, 2004) of an interview, stemming also from the interaction and in an 
interview (see also section 3.3.3). Therefore, analytical claims must remain faithful to 
this „situated reality‟. Accordingly, a different „situated truth‟ would have emerged 
between different participants.   
Personally conducting the interviews provided me with the status of „insider‟ 
when eliciting and analyzing the data. On the other hand, my involvement arguably 
disadvantaged me in that and accordingly I needed to try to separate myself from the 
data to engage in properly rigorous analysis. Following Baxter (2003), however, I 
concur that “any interpretation of data must explicitly acknowledge that it is constructed, 
provisional, perspectival, and context-driven” (p. 59). My claims come from the 
perspective of critical discursive psychology and arguably another research 
methodology would produce other claims. The analyzed data represent my own 
interpretations of the „situated reality‟ of the interview which were conducted upon the 
completion of the interview data. This cyclical process of reflecting and acting on my 
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reflections is how I conducted the entire research process.  
4.4 The participants 
The participants in this study were a diverse group of 17 Japanese women 
(Appendix C). The criteria for participation in this study were that the participants be 
female and of Japanese ethnicity. Beyond these, I did not specify any further 
stipulations. The interviews were all conducted in Japanese and lasted on average ninety 
minutes, but ranged from one to two hours. I conducted ten interviews: five individual 
interviews, and five group interviews with two to three participants. The participants 
were recruited from my network of acquaintances (e.g., former colleagues and students) 
and through „snowballing‟ (Reynolds, 2008) where interviewees provided me with 
contact information for other potential participants. I recruited students through a 
posting on the campus announcement board. The result was a pool of interviewees who 
ranged from 19 to 60 years old. They were homogenous in terms of social class (middle 
class), but heterogeneous regarding age, educational background, occupational 
background, and marital status. I interviewed students, professional homemakers, 
clerical workers, self-employed, and working professionals. Prior to the interviews, I 
told candidates that we were going to have an informal discussion about social roles. 
Beyond this they were not given any specific information about the content of the 
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interview. Contextualizing the study in this way is in concert with BAAL‟s (2006) 
guideline: “the information given at the outset of the project should cover the objectives 
of the research, its possible consequences, and issues of confidentiality and security” (p. 
4). Participants who wanted to learn more about the research and results were 
encouraged to provide their contact information. The research was carried out in 
different locations around the greater Nagoya area, a major city located in central Japan 
(see section 4.5).      
4.5 Data Collection: Recorded Sessions 
 Early on in the data collection, the issue arose concerning where to conduct the 
interviews. Individual and group interviews with students were conducted at my 
university; the individual interviews with non-students were conducted elsewhere. The 
sessions with students were conducted in empty classrooms where we sat facing each 
other around a table. Students were „rewarded‟ with an informal English conversation 
lesson following the interview. Given that the non-student participants agreed to take 
time out from their busy days to assist me, I did not want to further inconvenience them 
by asking them to come to my university. Since Japanese tend to regard their homes as 
very private places (Davies & Ikeno, 2002; Sugimoto, 2003), it was also unfeasible for 
me to meet them there. Therefore, we met at locations around Nagoya which were 
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convenient for them such as coffee shops, restaurants, or the local community center. 
Beyond a cup of coffee or tea, the participants were not given any financial 
compensation for their cooperation. Nonetheless, my impression of both types of 
interviews was that the participants thoroughly enjoyed discussing gender-related issues. 
This impression is based upon the fact that our discussions extended beyond my 
prepared interview schedule. I also felt that the interviews progressed smoothly and we 
had little trouble discussing these issues.  
 I learned early on in the research process the importance of selecting an 
appropriate time and location to conduct the interviews. I made every effort to select 
relatively quiet venues which would result in higher-quality recordings. In the early 
evenings or on weekends, shops became very crowded, making it difficult to conduct 
the interviews in these noisy environments. During these times, we met at restaurants or 
coffee shops which were less crowded. In any event, my experience was that once they 
became involved in discussing these issues, they were not distracted by the surrounding 
environment.  
4.6 Transcription and translation 
Transcription of interview data is necessary in order to produce transcripts 
which reflect speech which can be reviewed and analyzed. The particular transcription 
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convention system a researcher selects depends upon the level of detail he or she wishes 
to convey, which is informed by the selected research methodology (Taylor, 2001). So 
the system adopted by a CA analyst (Speer 2001, 2002), for example, is more detailed 
than that adopted by a critical discursive psychologist.  
My transcription system is standard for critical discursive psychological 
research (e.g., Reynolds, 2008; see Appendix D). However, the fact that a transcription 
system has been standardized in a discipline is insufficient basis for adopting it, as it 
needs to reflect the research goals of the study (Reynolds, 2008). Accordingly, I adopted 
this system because it reflects my research goals: the discursive construction of 
hegemonic and pariah femininities and the discursive devices associated with 
femininities repertoires (see section 2.5). These discursive devices of membership 
categorization devices, reported speech, and yappari (see sections 5.2-5.4) are located at 
the phrasal level of conversation, so this system is adequate.  
I transcribed my interviews from the Japanese recordings into Japanese 
orthography. The data categorization and analysis was then conducted on these Japanese 
transcripts. The issue of my Japanese proficiency may thus require discussion.             
 I would evaluate my overall Japanese ability as quite high. I have been living in 
Japan for several years and have become orally proficient and literate in the language 
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and knowledgeable about the culture. My job demands that I fully participate in the 
university culture, which in addition to teaching and advising students, involves 
attending meetings and serving on committees. These responsibilities have contributed 
to the development of my proficiency with Japanese academic discourse. I can now for 
example easily read the newspaper and memos which circulate around the university.  
I conducted the original data analysis on the Japanese transcripts, in response to 
Fairclough‟s (1999) call to perform discourse analysis in the source language: “In my 
opinion, discourse analysis papers should reproduce and analyze textual samples in the 
original language, despite the added difficulty for readers” (p. 186). On the few 
occasions when I was unable to decipher part of the recording, I called on the assistance 
of a Japanese native speaker.  
Only after the data was transcribed, categorized, and analyzed in Japanese did I 
translate the relevant data extracts into English, which were also proofread by a 
bilingual Japanese native speaker. Translation was the final stage of the research process 
in an effort to remain faithful to the original Japanese.    
 I present English translations of the interviews for the sake of readability, to 
reach a larger audience. When the nuances of lexical items or phrases cannot be 
captured by the English translation, I use the Japanese original in the body of the thesis, 
155 
 
e.g. yappari.    
4.7 Categorization and analysis of the data  
 I followed two general guidelines throughout the data categorization and 
analysis process, which reflect the overall goals of my study: the thematic identification 
of interpretative repertoires and identification of discursive features which suggest that 
participants are drawing on and assuming subject positions in relation to those 
repertoires. I was also looking for discursive evidence of ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between repertoires 
   I used Potter and Wetherell‟s (1987) definition, “a register of terms and 
metaphors drawn upon to characterize and evaluate actions and events” (p. 138) as a 
general guideline to identify interpretative repertoires. When I initially listened to and 
then later when I transcribed the data, read and reread it, it seemed to me that something 
like a „gender differences‟ repertoire (Sunderland, 2004) was in evidence. I therefore 
decided to look at this more systematically by identifying „gendered‟ lexical references 
(e.g., „mothers‟, „fathers‟), and what participants were doing with those „register of 
terms‟ (e.g., justifying a conventional sexual division of labor). Participants were using 
gendered categorical references and category-bound activities (see section 5.3) to 
construct men and women as performing in different roles, hence, I hypothesized, they 
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were drawing on a „gender differences‟ interpretative repertoire (Sunderland, 2004). 
 The second theme that I noticed when conducting the analysis was that 
participants were constructing femininity in polarized ways, i.e. as a constraint at times 
and source of freedom at others. For example, while women‟s career choices were often 
limited to clerical-type work, marriage was an attractive option once this work became 
mundane. After reading about the highly situated „bounded masculinity/unbounded 
femininity‟ discourse (Sunderland, 1995) (i.e. „fag‟ is almost always a derogatory term 
while „tomboy‟ is not necessarily) and studying my data, I hypothesized that femininity 
is „privileged‟ in certain contexts, „bounded‟ in others.  
 The third theme that I noticed was that an ambitious single woman was 
articulating concern about how her various interests may in fact reduce her chances of 
securing a heterosexual partnership and a married women was working up „guilty 
feelings‟ about her inability to properly manage domestic responsibilities in addition to 
her career. In the discursive psychology literature, I came across the concept of 
„troubled‟ identity (Wetherell & Edley, 1998), i.e a category that is difficult to align with, 
and hypothesized that single „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ are „troubled‟ 
subjectivities for some of my participants.  
 Contradictions and inconsistencies between interpretative repertoires can lead 
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to the formation of ideological dilemmas which participants are left to resolve (see 
section 3.4.2). Ideological dilemmas were suggested in the accounts of participants 
whose status as career women and superwomen „troubled‟ the normative gender order 
which positions women in domestic or when participants puzzled over the 
contradictions between different repertoires, i.e. „privileged‟ and „bounded‟ femininity. 
For example, a woman‟s „freedom‟ to dabble in clerical work for a few years rests upon 
the assumption that she will one day marry and become economically dependent on her 
husband.    
 The whole time I was listening to and transcribing the recordings, and 
rereading the transcripts, I also noticed that the women were frequently drawing on the 
voices of others, „membership categories‟ and the discourse marker yappari (see 
sections 5.2-5.4). This led me to read about the various discursive functions of these, 
which I could then relate to specific repertoires.  
While I am presenting the thematic categorization of interpretative repertoires 
and identification of discursive features as discrete processes, in reality they were not. 
Rather, I shuttled between both processes. After I identified the discursive features, I 
returned to the data, this time not looking at the content of the accounts, but the 
discursive features in order to find additional examples of interpretative repertoires and 
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their functions. The discursive devices became a „tool kit‟ for making a systematic link 
between thematically identified repertoires and language. 
 The discursive devices which I identified could now be systematically linked to 
interpretative repertoires. Accordingly, I can make the claim that hegemonic femininity 
(see section 2.5.3) is discursively constructed through accepting the subject positions 
offered by gender differences repertoires, i.e., a wife and mother. While constructing a 
gendered subjectivity in line with hegemonic femininity may be „privileged‟ in some 
contexts, ultimately a woman remains „bound‟ to the domestic realm, which is 
suggested by a discursive dilemma in some participants‟ accounts. Women who 
discursively resist the subject positions offered by „gender differences‟ repertoires, 
construct „troubled‟, pariah femininities subjectivities. These repertoires, ideological 
dilemmas and subject positions are traceable to the discursive features of membership 
categories, reported speech and yappari (see sections 5.2-5.4). Therefore, I am able to 
point to specific discursive features when I reference interpretative repertoires. 
The recursive process of thematically identifying repertoires and looking for 
discursive devices which suggest participants are drawing on those repertoires resulted 
in my being able to answer research question one: „What interpretative repertoires do 
participants draw on as they discursively construct (a) hegemonic femininity and (b) 
159 
 
pariah femininity ?‟ and research question 1(a): „What discursive features are associated 
with interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity and (b) pariah 
femininity?‟ The participants‟ use of discursive devices also suggests that they were 
assuming subject positions in relation to these repertoires, thus I was able to answer 
research question 1(b): What subject positions (self and other) do participants take up in 
relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity and (b) 
pariah femininity?‟ Finally, I was also able to answer questions two: „Is there evidence 
of ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions between different interpretative 
repertoires in participants‟ discourse?‟ and research question three: „What discursive 
features are associated with ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions 
between interpretative repertoires in participants‟ discourse?‟  
4.8 Conclusion 
 This methodological chapter has discussed the data collection and analysis 
process. A conscious effort was made to collect a diverse set of data through 
interviewing participants with dissimilar backgrounds in order to investigate whether or 
not women from different groups draw on similar interpretative repertoires as they 
construct their subjectivities. At the same time, consistency was maintained in terms of 
gender, ethnicity and social class so the data was also relatively homogenous. Individual, 
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semi-structured interviews and „multi-person‟ interviews were used to collect the data. I 
viewed my participants as „conversational partners‟; therefore, we all had participant 
roles in the context of the interview. Clearly, my role was more active in the interviews, 
although in the group interviews there were occasions when the participants oriented 
more toward each other than me and I assumed a more receptive role. Finally, the data 
analysis was performed on the original Japanese and translation of Japanese into 
English was the final part of the process. 
 In the next chapter, I discuss existing research about the discursive features 
reported speech, membership categories, and yappari (see sections 5.2-5.4).     
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Methodology Part 2: Discursive Analytical Features 
5.1 Introduction: Discourse analytic features in this study 
 During the interviews I was struck by participants‟ frequent usage of reported 
speech, membership categories, and yappari. It seemed to me that participants were 
using reported speech and yappari to assert claims and membership categories to 
161 
 
construct gender appropriate or „inappropriate‟ activities. These informal observations 
and hypotheses prompted me to pay closer attention to the frequency and discursive 
function of these features during the data analysis process. A closer analysis confirmed 
that while participants did use other discursive features such as ellipsis, mitigation, and 
backchannels, their frequency paled compared with reported speech, membership 
categories, and yappari. After drawing this conclusion, I read existing literature about 
these discursive features which I outline below (see sections 5.2-5.4).   
 I hypothesized that investigating the discursive functions of reported speech, 
membership categories, and yappari would allow me to meet a central goal of this study 
which is to link the critical discursive psychological concepts of interpretative 
repertoires, subject positions, and ideological dilemmas to specific discursive features 
(see section 2.6). By doing so I am further blurring the distinction between „micro‟ and 
„macro‟ levels of analysis and answering Wetherell (1998) and Wetherell and Edley‟s 
(2008) call to perform more „eclectic‟ discourse analysis. 
5.2 Reported Speech 
5.2.1 Reported Speech 
Discourses are not isolated from, but are interspersed with and related to other 
discourses, referred to as „intertextuality‟ (Kristeva, 1986). The influential work of 
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Kristeva (1986) and Bakhtin (1981; 1986) has contributed to our understanding that our 
talk is interspersed with the words of others, thus it is intertextual. Bakhtin‟s (1981) 
concept of „polyphony‟, or the multiple voices which coexist within a given text, is an 
example of intertextuality. For example, Lazar (2000) found the competing discourses 
of „Egalitarian gender relations‟ and „Conservative gender relations‟ in the same 
advertising campaign encouraging marriage and childbirth (see section 3.2.2). By 
conducting an intertextual analysis across several advertisements, Lazar found that 
while there was a tension between combining a career with parenthood in 
representations of women; this same tension was absent from representations of men. 
Whereas striking a „balance‟ between career and family was lexically present in 
advertisements targeting women, „balance‟ did not appear in advertisements aimed at 
men. This „discursive absence‟ (Sunderland, 2004) was detectable by doing a 
comparative analysis of advertisements targeting men and women. This advertisement 
positions women but not men as responsible for domestic work, thus it is intertextually 
related to a „Women as domestic discourse‟ (Sunderland, 2004). 
Lazar‟s (2000) study illustrates how the multiple voices dispersed throughout a 
text can compete with one other to construct meaning in a certain way, a phenomenon 
Bakhtin (1981) calls „heteroglossia‟. „Polyphony‟ and heteroglossia both index the 
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co-existence of multifarious voices; however, heteroglossia foregrounds the discursive 
struggle between voices to permanently fix meaning and is thus tied to power. The 
discourses of conservative and egalitarian gender relations compete to define men‟s and 
women‟s social roles and thus masculinity and femininity in certain ways. The discourse 
of conservative gender relations positions women and men in the traditional roles of 
caregiver and breadwinner respectively, while the discourse of egalitarian gender 
relations positions the pursuits of career and family as important to both women and 
men. These advertisements can be seen as heteroglossic because they portray a struggle 
between two competing discourses over how to construct masculinity and femininity. 
The discourse of conservative gender relations represents a more „retrogressive‟ version 
of masculinity and femininity, while the discourse of egalitarian gender relations 
portrays a more „progressive‟ form. 
 It is necessary to mention that discourses are not however always easily 
classifiable as „competing‟ or „complementary‟. Lazar makes the careful observation 
that the discourse of egalitarian gender relations is far from subversive. For example, 
one advertisement targeted at women proclaimed that it is easier than in the past to 
combine a career and motherhood. The assumption embedded within this advertisement 
is that women desire motherhood. Significantly, this more „progressive‟ discourse is 
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constituted by these intertexual traces of another more „conservative‟ discourse which 
positions women as mothers. Lazar‟s study demonstrates that even within an apparently 
transgressive discourse there are heteroglossic traces of other more hegemonic 
discourses. Language use can be seen as a „site of struggle‟ to fix meaning (Bakhtin, 
1981).  
Bakhtin‟s (1981, 1986) work represents an important contribution to our 
understanding of what is commonly, but more narrowly, referred to as „reported speech‟ 
(Baynham, 1996; Buttny, 1997, 1998; Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt, 1996, 2000; Holt 
& Clift, 2007; Semino et al., 1999; Shuman, 1993; Tannen, 2007). Reported speech is 
the conversational phenomenon where a speaker quotes or „reports‟ the speech of self or 
another within the current conversational framework. Reported speech is characterizable 
as „direct‟ or „indirect‟. Direct reported speech involves „voicing‟ someone else within 
the current interactional framework and is an example of „manifest intertextuality‟ (e.g., 
she said, „I‟d love to come‟). „Manifest intertextuality‟ (Fairclough, 1992) is the 
verbatim transfer of words from one text or conversation to another. „Indirect‟ reported 
speech is a summarization with entailed grammatical changes of another‟s words (e.g., 
she said that she would love to come).  
Reported speech can assume many forms such as self-quoting, or quoting the 
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speech of an individual, conversation, aggregate (e.g., „people say‟), or prototypical 
group member, e.g. „I‟ve heard a lot of white people say‟, or an indirect quote, e.g. „she 
said to meet at 6:00‟ (see Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt & Clift, 2007).     
Researchers have however taken issue with the nomenclature „reported speech‟ 
because speakers do not simply recite previously uttered speech in another interactional 
context (Baynham, 1996; Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt & Clift, 2007; Tannen, 2007), 
but rather manipulate words to fit the rhetorical needs of the current interactional 
context. The disputability of „accurate‟ reported speech is underpinned by research 
which has demonstrated that both content and form of speech can be altered in the 
„reporting context‟ (Clark & Gerrig, 1990; Lehrer, 1989; Mayes, 1990). This makes 
reported speech a discursive resource which speakers use to accomplish specific 
discursive actions in the current reporting context such as to convey the central point of 
a narrative, provide evidence to support a claim, make a complaint, all of which can be 
tied to managing one‟s accountability (see sections 5.2.2-5.2.5). Since reported speech 
is far from „verbatim recall‟ but designed to perform specific interactional functions, 
Tannen (2007) prefers „constructed dialogue‟ to capture that recontextualized nature of 
reported speech. Building on Bakhtin‟s (1981) early observations, Tannen (2007) 
maintains that “the construction of dialogue represents an active, creative, transforming 
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move which expresses the relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of 
talk but rather the quoting party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered” (p. 
111). Tannen rightly points out that the act of reporting speech is thus more oriented to 
the current interactional context rather than providing an accurate rendition of that 
speech. Hence, journalists report only part of an utterance or remove an utterance from 
its original context in order to construct a speaker in an unfavorable manner. Tannen 
(2007) claims that speech is not „reported‟ for two main reasons. First, much of what is 
constructed as „reported speech‟ was never actually uttered but instead is constructed as 
dialogue in order to serve particular rhetorical purposes, such as those outlined above. 
Second, the act of reporting utterances that originated in another context changes the 
meaning of that utterance. The current context involves a new set of participants with 
different relationships who are creating a unique interaction at that very moment. 
Therefore, a journalist uses reported speech in order to slander a famous person and in 
the process establishe credibility with his or her readership as a good journalist.  
Tannen has raised a legitimate concern regarding the „constructed‟ nature of 
reported speech; however, she does not look at how reported speech is intertextually 
related to wider discourses or interpretative repertoires. Reported speech is more than 
dialogue transferred to another interactional context in order to perform a particular 
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rhetorical function, e.g. justify one‟s lateness. Reported speech may also be used in the 
articulation of what can be seen as interpretative repertoires (see section 3.4.1) 
circulating in a particular culture, context, or community of practice. For instance, one 
of my own participants, Mayumi, „voiced‟ her friend in order to corroborate her claim 
that the dual pursuits of a career and motherhood are incompatible (see section 6.2.1; 
Extract 4). In the process of utilizing reported speech, Mayumi can also be seen as 
drawing on and assuming a complicit subject position in relation to a „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ repertoire because she is using the speech to justify a conventional division 
of domestic labor. Therefore, reported speech involves not only recontextualizing 
another‟s purported words within another context but also, in using it, drawing on and 
assuming subject positions in relation to particular interpretative repertoires. For this 
reason, „reported discourse‟ (Sunderland, 2004) more accurately captures how „reported 
speech‟ is intertextually related to interpretative repertoires. 
I now discuss the functions of reported speech reported in previous research. 
These studies are CA-based, so they take a more restrictive view of reported speech, i.e., 
they do not take into account the larger social context surrounding the reported speech 
unless that context is „oriented to‟ by the participants. These researchers are not 
concerned with the relationship between reported speech and interpretative repertoires 
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or the concept of interpretative repertoires at all. Nevertheless, they are important 
because they demonstrate the various functions of reported speech such as conveying 
the central point of a narrative, evidencing claims, making assessments, managing 
speaker accountability, and shifting footing.  
5.2.2 Conveying the central point of a narrative 
Reported speech is sometimes used to actively convey the central or a crucial 
point of a narrative (Buttny & Williams, 2000; Couper-Kuhlen, 2007; Schiffrin, 2002). 
For example, Couper-Kuhlen (2007) demonstrated how a woman, Margy, called Edna 
to apologize on behalf of her husband, Bud, who had failed to return a power tool on 
time and Margy gave an account explaining why. She frames both her own reminder to 
Bud and his subsequent reassurance to her that there is no rush to return the tool within 
reported speech. In addition to accounting for Bud‟s mistake, she thus also assigned 
blame to him and managed a positive self-presentation (Goffman, 1959) as a 
responsible individual. Since the story‟s main point is constructed within reported 
speech, we can gain insight into what the speaker is „doing‟ in the account by looking at 
the reported speech. 
5.2.3 Evidential function  
 The evidential function of reported speech (see Holt & Clift, 2007) occurs 
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when the current speaker invokes another‟s purported speech in order to corroborate his 
or her claim. For example, reported speech serves as evidence for witnesses during 
cross-examination in courtrooms in that the defensive nature of testimonies makes 
reported speech an effective resource to bolster a claim (Galatolo, 2007). For instance, a 
witness could deploy reported speech as evidence during testimony as against an 
accused murdered, i.e. I heard the criminal say, „I‟m going to kill so and so‟. Evidence 
is necessary in order to establish a witness‟s credibility and authenticate a disputable 
claim such as the guilt or innocence of a defendant. In effect, reported speech provides 
evidence that a person has the „category entitlement‟ (see section 5.3) or status of 
„witness‟ because he or she experienced the events and thus can comment on them with 
a certain degree of authority.  
Another example which attests to the evidential function of reported speech is 
Wooffitt‟s (1992) study of people‟s reports of paranormal experiences. Wooffitt found 
that reported speech was used to establish the factuality of the description and their 
category entitlement as „sane individuals‟. The reported speech of deceased individuals 
served as evidence they had made contact with the dead. „Working up‟ this category 
entitlement was particularly important for these individuals due to the questionable 
nature of the events they were describing. Nevertheless, providing evidence through 
170 
 
reported speech is not simply reproducing a prior locution, but is using a version of that 
speech to construct evidence within the current interactional context. Reported speech 
allows an individual to construct a witness identity or identity as a „sane individual‟. 
These examples illustrate how reported speech can be a form of „fact construction‟ 
(Potter, 1996) or constructing a situated truth.   
5.2.4 Assessment function 
 Reported speech is also strategically utilized to achieve an implicit assessment 
or evaluation (Buttny, 1997; Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt, 2000), e.g. complain about 
someone‟s behavior. To achieve this, reported speech is invoked to invite the hearer to 
evaluate someone else‟s utterance or behavior in a particular way. In this way, explicit 
assessment is generated by the hearer and the speaker maintains his or her „neutrality‟.   
Holt (2000) looked at the assessment function of reported speech within the 
specific speech event of making complaints. In her corpus of naturally-occurring 
telephone conversations, Holt found that reported speech was used to elicit an implicit 
evaluation or assessment from the listener which the speaker then concurred with in the 
next turn. For example, Lesley complained to her friend Joyce about an incident that 
occurred when she was shopping at a sale at a vicarage sale. Before relating the incident, 
Lesley stated that there was something she was „broiling about‟, which framed the story 
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as a complaint because „broiling‟ metaphorically signals a strong reaction. Apparently, 
Lesley was browsing when an acquaintance approached her and said, “still trying to buy 
something for nothing”. Joyce oriented to the „complainable‟ nature of this person‟s 
reported comment by responding, “isn‟t he dreadful”. Lesley then more directly 
assessed his comment with “I cannot stand him”. By providing contextual information 
prior to the reported speech, Lesley conveyed the reprehensible nature of his comment 
to Joyce. Furthermore, the sequential position of Lesley‟s explicit assessment is 
significant because it appears to be an affiliative response to Joyce‟s assessment. 
However, by first framing the utterance as a complaint („broiling about‟), Lesley 
implicitly guided Joyce to that assessment. Therefore, Lesley did not „neutrally‟ report 
the utterance, but presented it in such a way so that Joyce would judge its 
reprehensibility and thus concur with Lesley‟s assessment. Reported speech allowed 
Lesley to position her assessment following Joyce‟s, which reduced her own 
accountability to the assessment and increased Joyce‟s, who initially produced the 
assessment.  
As regards sequencing, although speaker assessments proceeded the reported 
speech in Holt‟s corpus, Buttny (1997) and Buttny and Williams (2000) found 
assessments sequentially positioned prior to, embedded in, or following the reported 
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speech. For instance, in Buttny‟s (1997) investigation of the use of reported speech in 
group discussions about racism, when relating experiences of racism, some participants 
directly assessed the incident as “the worst experience of my life” prior to invoking the 
reported speech. In a follow-up study (Buttny & Williams, 2000), participants were 
found to implicitly convey the racist subtext of an utterance. One participant discussed 
how Caucasian salespeople often give too much attention to their African-American 
customers, drawing on prosody to mimic a prototypical Caucasian salesperson‟s voice, 
“oh can I help you with anything”, which suggested a subtext of surveillance. Similar to 
Holt‟s (2000) findings, the teller is not only reporting but also assessing speech.  
The sequential positioning of reported speech is significant because it is also 
tied to the issue of speaker accountability to a claim.  
5.2.5 Speaker Accountability 
Reported speech can also be seen as a device which speakers use to manage 
their accountability. Speakers are accountable to the veracity or „factuality‟ of the claims 
or attributions they make within their accounts (see section 3.2.3). Therefore, an explicit 
assessment or evaluation increases speaker accountability and risks the attribution of 
having a „stake‟ or „interest‟ in an assessment which would undermine the overall 
account (see section 3.2.3). In the previous example, Lesley provided contextual 
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information (i.e., „I‟m broiling about something‟) leading up to the utterance, „still 
trying to buy something for nothing‟ in order to elicit a direct assessment from Joyce 
which Lesley could then concur with. Therefore, in Holt‟s (2000) data, the hearer‟s 
explicit assessment of the reported speech bolstered the reporter‟s account by reducing 
his or her accountability to the claim. The hearer was given access to the „original 
utterance‟ and „invited‟ to assess its reprehensibility. In Buttny‟s (1997) and Buttny and 
Williams‟ (2000) findings, by contrast, the assessments were positioned prior to the 
actual reported speech. For example, “it was ridiculous the way the White students 
reacted” was articulated prior to the reported speech of these students (Buttny, 1997). 
This sequential positioning increases the speaker‟s accountability and also leaves the 
speaker open to the charge of having a personal investment in the claim. One possible 
reason for this „rhetorically risky‟ sequential positioning is that the severity of the 
reported offense was much greater than in Holt‟s (2000) data. In Holt‟s data the 
participants were complaining about everyday matters, while in Buttny (1997) and 
Buttny and Williams‟ (2000) data, they were formulating accounts about racism. In 
other words, their accounts were indisputably concerning racism, and thus the reporting 
speaker was not likely to be seen as having a personal investment in producing an 
account about racism. A complaint, by contrast, is harder to categorize because it is 
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dependent upon the reporting speaker‟s interpretation of the event in question. 
Therefore, the reporting speakers had to formulate the account in such a way that the 
hearer would recognize the „complainable‟ action and assess it as such. 
Assessments of reported speech can thus be tied to the notion of speaker 
accountability—but reported speech itself can also be seen as a device which speakers 
use to manage their own accountability. In Holt‟s (2000) study, for example, contextual 
information („broiling about‟) which preceded Lesley‟s reported speech („still trying to 
buy something for nothing‟) suggested that she was about to formulate a complaint 
about someone. I previously suggested that Bakhtin‟s (1981) concepts of polyphony and 
heteroglossia imply that language itself is „multivocal‟, and that reported speech is 
geared more toward accomplishing rhetorical purposes within the current interactional 
context rather than reconstructing an „accurate‟ report (see section 5.2.1). Therefore, 
Joyce did not have access to the „original‟ utterance but only Lesley‟s reconstruction of 
that purported utterance, which was ostensibly altered so that Lesley could formulate a 
complaint about the person who accused her of being stingy. Joyce did not explicitly 
question Lesley‟s motives for reproducing that utterance (e.g., she is angry with him) or 
the context surrounding the reported speech (e.g., he was making a joke), but instead 
immediately denounced the accused party. Therefore, Lesley was able to implicitly 
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formulate a complaint against this man through his reprehensible reported comment, 
which served as evidence to legitimize Lesley‟s apparent displeasure over his comment 
(see section 5.2.3). At the same time, she was not accountable to this utterance because 
it was formulated as originating with him, thus she presented herself as a „neutral‟ 
„animator‟ (see section 5.2.6) or messenger, which allowed her to avoid the charge of 
having a stake or interest in criticizing him.   
5.2.6 ‘Footing’ shifts 
Reported speech also signals a change in „footing‟ (Goffman, 1981), i.e. “a 
change in the alignment we take up to ourselves and the others present as expressed in 
the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (p. 128). Alignment is 
the „projected self‟ or subjectivity that a speaker constructs with interlocutors, i.e. 
solidarity or distance. For instance, a speaker may use reported speech to mimic 
someone else as a rhetorical device to induce laughter from his or her audience and thus 
build solidarity with them. Goffman (1981) rightly maintained that a model of 
communication which assumes that meaning is constructed between an aggregate of 
speakers and hearers is „oversimplified‟ because it fails to capture the dynamic nature of 
conversation. Goffman partitions the „speaker‟ into three different but interrelated 
„production formats‟: „animator‟, „author‟, and „principal‟. The animator is the person 
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who actually articulates the utterance. The „author‟ is the party responsible for 
constructing that utterance and those whose views it represents is the „principal‟. To 
take a simple example, an official leader performs the „animator‟ and „principal‟ roles 
by delivering a speech to the public, which was written by a speech writer who is the 
„author‟. If the leader could not deliver the speech, then a proxy would serve as the 
„animator‟ of a speech that was „authored‟ by a speech writer, but represents the leader‟s 
views (who is therefore the „principal‟). A single speaker could assume all three of these 
production formats or purposely blur the distinction between them for a certain 
rhetorical purpose, i.e. to attribute responsibility away from self. By assuming a 
particular production format, a speaker shifts footing and thus constructs different 
subjectivities.  
 Shifts in footing are particularly relevant to (the study of) reported speech. 
Reported speech allows an individual to assume the footing of „neutral animator‟ who is 
simply voicing the words of another „principal‟ or „author‟. In this way, the speaker 
potentially has no stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in making a claim because he or 
she is simply reproducing a previous locution. However, the above discussion suggests 
that speakers never simply report the speech of others but use it as a discursive device to 
perform different functions in conversational interaction, for example, to elicit an 
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evaluation or assessment from the hearer (Buttny, 1997; Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt, 
2000). The notion of „neutral animator‟ is yet another way reported speech can be 
strategically deployed to perform specific functions within interaction. 
5.2.7 ‘Reported thought’ 
 In addition to reporting the speech of others, speakers also construct thought 
(Couper-Kuhen, 2007; Haakana, 2007; Semino et al., 1999). Reported thought is the 
conversational phenomenon where a speaker quotes or „reports‟ the thoughts of self or 
another within the current conversational framework to serve particular rhetorical 
functions such as conveying the main point of a narrative, providing evidence, and 
making an assessment (see Holt & Clift, 2007). 
In my data, participants constructed the thoughts of an aggregate in order to 
criticize that group‟s way of thinking (i.e., „men think that women should do 
housework‟) or in an attempt to elicit an assessment of that reported thought from other 
speakers. The rhetorical effectiveness of reported thought lies in the fact that although it 
was never ostensibly „uttered‟, nevertheless it constructs the „normative‟ thinking of a 
particular group. One way to construct an event as more than an isolated incident is to 
invoke a summary quote, i.e. „I‟ve heard many men say that women should do 
housework‟ (see Buttny & Williams, 2000). Reported thought, i.e. „men think that 
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women should do housework‟ performs a similar function by constructing this particular 
way of thinking as representative of the „normative‟ thoughts of men as an aggregate 
and thus bolsters a speaker‟s claim, i.e. men are sexist.  
Similar to the critical function of reported thought, Haakana (2007) found that 
reported thought is used to construct complaints. In one of Haakana‟s extracts, Juha is 
complaining to his brother about a domestic incident. According to Juha, he and his 
wife, Leena, were just about to have dinner when the she remembered that she forgot to 
let her cat inside (the cat is in a different, distant apartment). In Juha‟s account, although 
Leena assures him that she is fit to drive, he knows that she is drunk, necessitating that 
he go and let the cat out. Leena reportedly assures him, „I can still drive, yeah‟ but Juha 
constructs his disbelief and thus criticizes her when he sarcastically utters, „I thought 
that yeah, yeah, yeah‟.  
Haakana‟s example exemplifies a slightly different function of reported thought 
from that of my data. In Haakana‟s example, Juha constructs self-reported thought to 
make a „silent criticism‟ of his wife‟s request. The common pattern in my data was to 
invoke other-reported thought of an aggregate in order to criticize that group‟s purported 
line of thought, i.e. „men think that women should do housework‟ (see section 6.3.3), as 
I show. Both data sets illustrate that reported speech can be used to criticize actions or 
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ways of thinking. 
„Habitual thought‟ (Couper-Kuhlen, 2007) is another variation of reported 
thought. Habitual thoughts are invoked to account for hic-et-nunc actions or lack thereof 
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2007). In my data, Akiko (see section 8.2.2), a working professional, 
used habitual reported thought to simultaneously account for her inability to do the 
housework and present herself as struggling to balance domestic and non-domestic roles 
(„I think “it‟s my fault” when the house needs cleaning‟). Habitual thought allowed her 
to construct this struggle as continuous and present herself as a „good wife, wise mother‟ 
(see section 1.3).  
5.2.8 Hypothetical reported speech and thought  
„Hypothetical‟ reported speech or thought is the discursive phenomena where a 
speaker „reports‟ speech or thoughts that were apparently never uttered (Buttny & 
Williams, 2000; Myers, 1999; Semino et al., 1999), i.e., „he never said, “I‟m sorry”‟. 
This frames such „unreported‟ speech as „marked‟ because the speaker explicitly 
constructs speech or thought which did not occur, but arguably should have. In the 
example above, the speaker is not simply commenting on the absence of an apology, but 
conveying that an apology was necessary.  
In Buttny and Williams‟ (2000) focus-group sessions with African-Americans 
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concerning their experiences of racism, one participant discussed a service-encounter 
situation where he or she felt unfairly treated by a salesperson. The participant 
reportedly asked the salesclerk for assistance once she was finished waiting on another 
customer; however, after the clerk finished with the first customer, she reportedly 
ignored the African-American customer and instead waited on a different customer. 
When the African-American customer brought this „oversight‟ to the clerk‟s attention, 
she reportedly responded, “well you have to wait your turn” (Buttny & Williams, 2000, 
p. 123). In addition to reporting the speech of the salesperson, the African-American 
also invoked hypothetical reported speech in order to convey the racist subtext of the 
clerk‟s remark, “she was like telling me, well you just have to wait till I get finished and 
when I get finished with them [White customers], I‟ll take care of you” (Buttny & 
Williams, 2000, p. 123). By combining reported and hypothetical reported speech, the 
participant was able to convey what the clerk reportedly said and the implication behind 
that utterance.  
 Hypothetical reported speech and thought has the rhetorical function of 
expressing the implication of a reported utterance, while simultaneously allowing the 
current speaker to remain „detached‟ from that utterance (Myers, 1999). In the previous 
example, although the salesperson did not make an explicitly racist remark, the 
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African-American customer conveyed the racist undertones of her remark through 
hypothetical speech („she was like telling me…‟). Framing the implied meaning of this 
utterance within hypothetical reported speech versus a direct evaluation, i.e. „she treated 
me unfairly‟, allows the speaker to convey what she saw as the racist subtext of the 
reported speech without directly evaluating or even identifying it. Making an explicit 
evaluation is more rhetorically risky because the speaker could be charged with having 
a personal investment in making such an assessment, i.e., here, a grudge against 
Caucasians.  
Similar to reported speech, hypothetical reported speech and thought can be 
tied to the notion of speaker accountability (see section 5.2.5). A speaker reduces her or 
his accountability to a claim such as „the salesclerk‟s remarks were racist‟ by invoking 
hypothetical reported speech to convey the racist subtext, while simultaneously 
distancing self from that claim. Granted that reported speech is „constructed‟ and may 
never have been uttered (see section 5.2.1), „hypothetical‟ reported speech and thought 
is even less „authentic‟ because it is a constructed interpretation of what was reportedly 
meant, i.e. „she was like saying X‟. Hypothetical reported speech and thought, then, do 
not have the same evidential function as reported speech (see section 5.2.3). 
Nevertheless, hypothetical reported speech and thought allows the speaker to indirectly 
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make an attribution, by taking up the position of a „neutral‟ animator who voices the 
speech of another „principal‟ (see section 5.2.6).  
Reported discourse‟s multiple discursive functions include conveying the 
central point of a narrative, serving as evidence, assessing or evaluating actions, footing 
shifts, and can also be tied to the notion of managing speaker accountability.   
I discuss the second discursive analytical device related to this study, 
membership categories, in the next section. 
5.3 Membership categories 
 In his work at the Suicide Prevention Center in Los Angeles, Harvey Sacks 
(1995) provided the insight that the categories interlocutors use in conversational 
interaction carry with them certain assumptions about normative actions or behaviors. 
Sacks‟ work formed the basis for the discipline and analytical approach known as 
„membership categorization analysis‟ (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & Stokoe, 
2006; Schegloff, 2007), which discursive psychologists also draw on (Antaki & 
Widdicombe, 1998; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Membership categorization 
analysis (MCA) is concerned with members‟ strategic use of these categories to perform 
certain actions. „Members‟ are individuals from the same society who possess shared 
understandings about particular shared categories and activities. For example, members 
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of many western societies associate the categories of „husband‟ and „wife‟ with 
„monogamy‟ (at least ideally). Therefore, in a counseling session, a husband‟s 
downgrading of his wife‟s categorization of his extra-marital relationship as an „affair‟ 
to a „bit of a fling‟ (Edwards, 1998), constructs the extra-marital relationship as 
short-term and thus implicitly not the major source of their marital problems, which he 
claimed were ongoing. Through categorizing the extra-marital relationship as a „fling‟, 
the husband attributed their marital problems elsewhere. 
MCA and CA reject the view of cognitive psychology that language is a 
reflection of individuals‟ underlying mental states or attitudes and instead focuses on the 
„action orientation‟ (Heritage,1984) of discourse (see section 3.2); however, they also 
differ in important ways. Whereas CA focuses on the turn-by-turn analysis of 
conversation, MCA is “concerned with the organization of common-sense in terms of 
the categories members employ in accomplishing their activities in and through talk” 
(Francis & Hester, 2004, p. 21). CA is more concerned with the local organization of 
talk such as how individuals accomplish refusals (e.g. since refusals are „dispreferred‟, 
they are often prefaced by a statement of regret and account explaining why the 
individual cannot accept the invitation: see section 3.3.1). MCA is concerned with the 
ways categories and their associated activities are deployed in discourse, i.e. invoking a 
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certain category to manage speaker accountability. In the counseling-session example 
above, the husband attributed blame for their marital troubles to his wife, which reduced 
both his own accountability and the severity of his affair. This husband‟s use of „fling‟ 
versus „affair‟ is related to socio-culturally available knowledge which largely 
condemns extra-marital affairs. CA in contrast would not claim the husband is drawing 
on sociocultural knowledge denouncing extra-marital affairs unless he specifically 
„oriented to‟ that knowledge in the conversation.  
 The reason members of a society are able to associate categories of people with 
certain actions is due to, relatedly, what Sacks refers to as a „membership categorization 
device‟ (hereafter, MCD), a definitive feature of which is that categories are organized 
into collections. Individuals classify others with „membership categories‟ such as 
„student‟, „child‟, „doctor‟, „feminist‟. Doctor, lawyer, and professor, for example, are 
part of the collection which forms the MCD „professional occupation‟. Some MCDs 
such as age and sex are applicable to everyone. 
Categories are „inference-rich‟ because members of a particular community of 
practice (see section 2.1.2) possess knowledge of typical actions and behaviors that 
members usually engage in (Sacks, 1995; Schegloff, 2007), and can make meaningful 
inferences about. Speakers can attempt to counter an inference which could result from 
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category membership and thus deny that membership. In Sacks‟ (1995) data from the 
suicide prevention center telephone calls, a man answers a question about his age but 
immediately claims that he looks much younger, presumably attempting to counter the 
counselor‟s knowledge about the appearance of men in his age category.  
Another type of inference that categories carry relates to activities which 
members engage in. Category membership entails associated „category-bound activities‟, 
which form part of individuals‟ knowledge about category membership. Therefore, 
membership in the occupational category „doctor‟ is associated with the category-bound 
activities of diagnosing patients and prescribing treatment. Category membership is 
defined through category-bound activities and the activities themselves also define 
category membership. Therefore, an individual could be placed into the membership 
category „doctor‟ based upon performing the actions stated above. The issue of how 
members „orient to‟ or „make relevant‟ category membership will be discussed later in 
this section. However, importantly, in MCA analysis, explicit reference to a category by 
a speaker is not necessary to demonstrate that a member is orienting to that category.     
A key issue in MCA is how membership categories are „made relevant‟ or 
„oriented to‟ in discourse (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Sacks, 
1995; Schegloff, 2007). In line with CA, MCA concerns itself with the situated use of 
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categories within talk-in-interaction. Category membership alone is an insufficient basis 
for claiming that membership is salient in the current interaction (Benwell & Stokoe, 
2006; Sacks, 1995; Schegloff, 2007). For example, the sex of the participants alone is 
insufficient basis to claim that gender is operating in the interaction (it may be 
irrelevant). Instead, analysts must demonstrate that participants are orienting to a 
particular category or category-bound activity. In the marriage counseling session 
referenced above (Edwards, 1998), the husband‟s shifting classification of his 
relationship with „another woman‟ to „a girl‟ was deemed significant because it arguably 
downgraded the seriousness of the relationship—semantically, „girl‟ may imply 
someone who is less threatening than a „woman‟. The analyst was able to make this 
claim based upon the inference-rich nature of the cited categories. Since the categories 
„girl‟ and „woman‟ were deployed by husband and wife during the interaction, the 
researcher‟s claims were based upon categories that both participants invoked.  
Another example of research on how members orient to categories within 
discourse is Hester‟s study of teachers‟ classification of „deviance‟. Hester (1998) 
investigated the construction of „deviance‟ in „referral talk‟ between teachers and 
educational psychologists. Teachers drew on „category contrasts‟ and the „stage of life 
MCD‟ (Sacks, 1995) in order to construct „deviance‟.  
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A „category contrast‟ constructs certain behavior as deviating from the norm. 
For example, a teacher contrasted the behavior of one student with the „normative‟ 
behavior of many other students in order to emphasize that student‟s behavior was 
marked and therefore „deviant‟ (Hester, 1998). The teacher stated that all children 
initially require time to adjust to a new teacher and may misbehave, but they eventually 
„settle down‟. The „deviant‟ student, by contrast, continually refused to cooperate with 
the teacher, thus his behavior diverged from the norm. 
The „stage of life‟ MCD (Sacks, 1995) rests on the assumption that at each age 
there are normative behaviors or actions that individuals are able to do. In reference to 
education, children are expected to attain a certain level of academic achievement at 
different ages. Children who fail to do this can become labeled as „slow‟ (Hester, 1998). 
For example, a teacher described a child‟s academic achievement as „two years behind‟ 
(Hester, 1998). This MCD indicates the student has failed to acquire the appropriate 
level of academic achievement in relation to other students of the same age. The stage 
of life MCD in conjunction with category contrast constructs the child‟s academic skills 
as below those of other students and thus „deviant‟.  
The teachers‟ authority to make claims about students‟ „deviant‟ behavior and 
educational progress comes from their „category entitlement‟ (Sacks, 1995) as teachers. 
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Membership in the category „teacher‟ provides them with the status of being viewed as 
knowledgeable about education-related issues; however, and importantly, category 
entitlements are not stable or fixed, but instead can be built up or undermined in talk 
(Potter, 1996). For instance, one teacher worked up a category entitlement in the 
following way: „now I‟ve been teaching now for something like twenty five or thirty 
years and never have I had to call on the help of a year tutor or anybody else to assist 
me with a child but in this one I must admit that I just don‟t know what to do to handle 
him‟ (Hester, 1998, p.145). Notice that the teacher‟s claim to category incumbency as an 
„experienced teacher‟ provides him/her with the knowledge to claim that this particular 
student‟s behavior is „deviant‟, and thus the intervention of an educational psychologist 
is necessary. By professing the „experienced teacher‟ category incumbency, the teacher 
also protects him/herself from being seen as „incompetent‟ and instead implicitly 
positions the student as the „problem‟. Quite feasibly, the administration could position 
this teacher as „incompetent‟ by claiming that despite his or her many years of service 
she/he is unable to discipline problems students, thus undermining his category 
entitlement.     
In addition to claiming membership in a category, individuals also reject 
category membership and contest category affiliation. In a study of youth subcultures, 
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Widdicombe‟s (1998) interviewees responded negatively when asked if they considered 
themselves to be „punks‟: they denied characteristics of „punk‟ group membership such 
as having an „attitude‟ and dressing in a certain way. A more implicit way to resist 
category incumbency was to orient away from the „punk‟ category entirely. For example, 
when asked to describe his or her appearance, an interviewee responded, „slightly longer 
than average hair‟. As in Speer‟s study (see section 3.3.3), interviewees can and do 
actively resist the subject positioning of the interviewer.  
The significance of MCDs is that categories which individuals use in discourse 
carry certain assumptions about „normative‟ activities and behaviors, which in turn 
„perform actions‟ in discourse. Through invoking the contrastive categories „fling‟ 
versus „affair‟, the husband was attempting to downgrade the significance of his 
relationship and construct his extra-marital affair as temporary (Edwards, 1998).  
Both CADP and CDP are also concerned with the categories that speakers draw 
on in conversation. Specifically, MCDs have important implications for the discursive 
psychological notion of a speaker‟s stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in using certain 
categories. In the marriage counseling session (Edwards, 1998), the husband clearly had 
a personal investment in justifying his affair and reducing his own accountability for 
their marital troubles. Similarly, Hester‟s (1998) teacher had an investment in 
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constructing certain students‟ behavior as „deviant‟, through the use of a category 
contrast between „normative‟ and „non-normative‟ behavior. The teacher‟s claim was 
corroborated by the „stage of life‟ MCD which constructed students‟ failure to perform 
at an appropriate level due to their inadequate cognitive development. The MCD 
effectively performed the action of justifying the teachers‟ classification of the students. 
In the study of the „punk‟ subculture discussed above (Widdicombe, 1998), the 
active resistance to category membership can also be linked to speaker investment. One 
inference which can be made from a speaker‟s explicit affiliation with the „punk‟ 
category is that the member lacks individuality (Widdicombe, 1998). Accordingly, an 
individual may resist category membership due to a personal investment in presenting 
oneself as a unique individual. The individual may claim that their style of dress or 
behavior is unrelated to punk group membership and simply a reflection of personal 
preference. The active resistance of category membership is a discursive resource which 
allows individuals to construct a certain self-presentation (see section 2.1.4).  
Similar to reported speech (see section 5.2), membership categories and 
category-bound activities are intertextually (see section 5.2.1) linked to the concept of 
interpretative repertoires‟ (see section 3.4.1). For example, „compulsory heterosexuality‟ 
(Rich, 1980) can be seen as an interpretative repertoire associated with hegemonic 
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femininity (see section 2.5.3). Therefore, a woman may engage in the category-bound 
activities of marriage, childbirth, and fulltime motherhood in an attempt to embody 
hegemonic femininity.  
Categories and their associated activities are not value-free, but interspersed 
with interpretative repertoires that are infused with a culture‟s „lived ideologies‟ (see 
section 3.4.2). For example, a young man may construct his sexual prowess as „out on 
the pull‟ (Wetherell, 1998) in order express membership in the category „hard lad‟. The 
„hard lad‟ could be a very desirable category to position oneself as in an environment 
where „permissive sexuality‟ (Hollway, 1998) is the cornerstone of hegemonic 
masculinity (see section 2.5.2). The affiliation with and resistance toward certain 
categories involves drawing on and assuming subject positions in relation to 
interpretative repertoires, thus constructing one‟s subjectivity (see section 3.4.3).  
It is also necessary to emphasize that the names which analysts assign to 
categories are provisional, as is category membership itself. Category names are 
constructed within a specific time and place and those category names change over time 
and vary by community of practice (see section 2.1.2). For example, the category „queer‟ 
has historically been an abusive epithet directed at homosexuals, but it has been 
reclaimed by scholars in the field of „queer studies‟ who use it in reference to the 
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destabilization of binary sexual identities (Butler, 1999; Sauntson, 2008).   
In the next section, I discuss the final discursive analytic device, the discourse 
marker „yappari‟ („as expected‟) which suggested that participants were drawing on and 
assuming particular subject positions in relation to particular repertoires as they 
constructed hegemonic and pariah femininities (see sections 2.5.3-2.5.4).  
5.4 The discourse marker ‘yappari’ 
Discourse markers are “members of a functional class of verbal (and 
nonverbal) devices which provide contextual coordinates for ongoing talk” (Schiffrin, 
1987, p. 41). Therefore, a hearer can elicit an inference from a speaker‟s use of a 
discourse marker. Such inferences exemplify the „action orientation‟ of language which 
is of keen interest to discursive psychologists (see section 3.2.3). „Yappari‟ („as 
expected‟) is used to emphasize that the information a speaker is conveying is not new 
but commonly known or accepted, thus a form of „commonsense‟ (Fairclough, 1989), 
critical discourse analysts see „commonsense‟ as knowledge which has become 
„naturalized‟ by groups with institutional power in order to sustain unequal power 
relations (Fairclough, 1989, 1992; Wodak & Meyer, 2005). Yappari can be used to a 
speaker to construct information as commonsense and thus corroborate the overall 
account. We always need to question whose „commonsense‟ yappari refers to and what 
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discursive actions the speaker is performing by constructing a claim as „commonsense‟, 
e.g., attributing blame. I address these points in section 5.4.2.  
5.4.1 Semantic function 
„Yappari‟ functions semantically to emphasize that an outcome or result 
confirms a speaker‟s expectation, translating best as „as expected‟ (Makino & Tsutsui, 
2002; Morimoto, 1994). For example a speaker could make the following prediction 
based upon watching the weather forecast, “Yappari furanakatta darou” (As expected, it 
didn‟t rain) (Collins, 2004). The speaker uses yappari to emphasize that his or her 
expectation about the weather was confirmed. Without yappari the connotation that the 
speaker had expected the temperate weather would not be conveyed. Yappari would not 
however be used in cases such as, „Ame ga furu to omoimashita kedo yappari 
furanakatta‟ (I thought that it would rain, but as expected it didn‟t), since the speaker‟s 
prediction proved false. Yappari would not be used because yappari is only used in 
situations when a speaker‟s expectation is confirmed and not countered.  
An important point about yappari is that the claims individual speakers make 
are seen as generalizable to members of society at large (Itasaka, 1971) which indicates 
its social function. Regarding the previous example, as the information about the 
weather forecast was widely available, a listener could make the following reply, 
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„Yappari sou ka‟ (It figures). The listener‟s reply indicates that the speaker‟s weather 
prediction is not simply the speaker‟s expectation, but that of many people. Yappari 
functions to accentuate the taken-for-granted nature of a claim. 
5.4.2 Discursive functions 
We also need to consider the discursive function of „yappari‟, i.e., what the 
speaker is „doing‟ by using „yappari‟ to assert that a claim or result is expected and thus 
„commonsense‟. This can be tied to the notion of speaker accountability (see section 
3.2). Speakers arguably draw on yappari to position claims as „commonsense‟ thereby 
reducing their own „accountability‟ by shifting responsibility to society (Sasamoto, 
2006). To illustrate with a simple example, “Yappari nihon no biru ha oishii desu ne” 
(As expected, Japanese beer is good) (Makino & Tsutsui, 2002, p. 539). This type of 
praise for Japanese products is common in Japan where people often assert the 
superiority of Japanese items and uniqueness of Japanese culture (Sugimoto, 2003). 
Prefacing the claim about Japanese beer with yappari is one way to position this claim 
not as the speaker‟s opinion, but as „commonsense‟ shared by members of Japanese 
society. Consequently, yappari allows speakers to avoid the charge of having a stake or 
interest in their claims (see section 3.2.3) and effectively corroborates them. For 
example, one of my participants prefaced her claim that a mother‟s care is essential 
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during the first three years of a baby‟s life with yappari, thus framing women‟s maternal 
role as „commonsense‟ and not simply her individual or potentially biased claim (see 
section 6.2.1). Yappari allowed her to position women who are fulltime homemakers as 
adhering to social norms, while working women as „outliers‟. Her potential stake in the 
claim that women are „natural‟ caregivers was reduced because yappari framed this 
information as „commonsense‟ and not simply representative of her personal opinion.  
The issue of whose „commonsense‟ yappari refers to requires further 
discussion. As discussed, interpretative repertoires are common ways of talking about 
certain topics or events which are available to members of a given society (see section 
3.4.1). I also suggested that repertoires are not neutral but infused with a culture‟s lived 
ideologies (see section 3.4.2). I propose that when speakers use yappari to frame 
information as commonsense, they are drawing on and assuming subject positions in 
relation to interpretative repertoires. For example, one of my participants claimed, 
„yappari children are best raised by their mothers‟ hands‟. In this example (see Chapter 
6; Extract 2), Mayumi can be seen as drawing on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ 
repertoire (see section 6.2.1) and positioning women in a domestic role. „Women as 
natural caregivers‟ is not a neutral representation of women, but positions them as 
caregivers because of their childbearing capacity. The „commonsense‟ articulated by this 
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repertoire, then, is that since women give birth to children they also possess a natural 
predisposition to care for them. Similarly, a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire 
(see section 6.2.2) presumably positions women in a domestic role because of the 
association between femininity and the domestic sphere. The „commonsense‟ espoused 
by these repertoires illustrates how social significance can be constructed from 
biological differences between men and women and in the process position women in a 
subordinate role. If these repertoires are accepted by individuals as „natural‟ or 
„commonsense‟, which the use of yappari would indicate, then they can contribute to 
the maintenance of a patriarchal gender order whereby men normatively maintain 
economic and social power over women.  
Fairclough (1989) discusses the process of „naturalization‟ as entailing certain 
discourses achieving the status of „commonsense‟. Similarly, specific interpretative 
repertoires, infused with lived ideologies, can gain dominant or „hegemonic‟ status; 
however, through the process of naturalization they lose their ideological character and 
become accepted as „cultural truths‟. For example, the long-standing influence of 
„compulsory heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980) is so ingrained in many societies that married 
women (or men) are rarely asked „how did you end up married?‟ (Reynolds & Wetherell, 
2003). „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoires 
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(see sections 6.2.1-6.2.2) may be accepted as value-free, „commonsense‟; however, they 
are infused with an „invisible‟ ideology which constructs women‟s roles and ultimately 
femininity as involving „other-centeredness‟ (Lazar, 2000; see section 1.3), i.e. 
foregrounding the needs of other family members.   
According to Fairclough (1989), one way that „naturalization‟ occurs is through 
individuals‟ explanations which „rationalize‟ certain phenomena. As individuals 
construct accounts, they „naturalize‟ certain phenomena, e.g. heterosexuality, which, in 
the process, loses its ideological underpinnings and becomes sanctioned as 
commonsense. Therefore, a question about marital status may be deemed „normative‟ 
within many communities of practice (see section 2.1.2); however, it rests on the 
„heteronormative‟ assumption of „compulsory heterosexuality‟. It could be argued, then, 
that individuals‟ accounts are a fruitful „epistemological sites‟ (Sunderland, 2004) to 
investigate the process of „naturalization‟ and construction of „commonsense‟. In my 
data, some speakers seemed to draw on „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoires (see chapter 6) as they constructed accounts which 
rationalized a conventional division of domestic labor, apparently accepting the 
„commonsense‟ constructed by these repertoires. Other participants, by contrast, 
assumed more resistant subject positions and thus challenged the „commonsense‟ 
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embedded in these repertoires. 
 Yappari is thus, I argue, a discursive device which constructs a claim as 
„commonsense‟, and the „commonsense‟ to which yappari refers is that of different 
interpretative repertoires. I suggest that when participants utilize yappari to make a 
claim, they are drawing on and assuming subject positions in relation to particular 
interpretative repertoires. By allowing participants to construct claims as 
„commonsense‟, yappari thus reduces participants‟ own accountability by attributing it 
to „society‟. Since the claim has the „authority‟ of „commonsense‟ it is rhetorically 
stronger. Participants‟ taking up subject positions in relation to interpretative repertoires 
contributes to the „naturalization‟ of the „commonsense‟ articulated by these repertoires.   
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed the discursive analytic devices of reported speech, 
membership categories, and yappari. I selected these discursive devices because they 
frequently surfaced in participants‟ discourse and suggested that participants were 
drawing on and assuming subject positions in relation to certain interpretative 
repertoires (discussed in chapters 6, 7, 8). In the analytical chapters 6-8 I demonstrate 
how participants use reported speech, MCDs, and yappari to draw on and assume 
subject positions in relation to interpretative repertoires and in the process construct 
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hegemonic or pariah femininity subjectivities.  
In Chapter 6 I focus on the discursive construction of hegemonic femininity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion: ‘Hegemonic Femininity’: Part I 
6.1 Introduction 
 This is the first of two chapters concerning the discursive construction of 
hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). I address research question one: „What 
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interpretative repertoires do participants draw on as they discursively construct (a) 
hegemonic femininity‟? I also address research question 1(a): „What discursive features 
are associated with interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity? 
This chapter also addresses research question 1(b): „What subject positions (self and 
other) do participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) 
hegemonic femininity?‟ Finally, the chapter addresses research question two: „Is there 
evidence of ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions between different 
interpretative repertoires in participants‟ discourse?‟  
 In order to answer research questions 1, 1(a), and 1(b), I was attempting to 
identify interpretative repertoires (IRs) that participants draw on, and position self and 
others in relation to, as they constructed hegemonic femininity subjectivities (see 
section 2.5.3). In the course of my data analysis and categorization (see section 4.7), I 
noticed that participants were constructing binary differences between men and women 
in their talk (e.g., women possess a maternal instinct), which led me to identify „gender 
differences‟ as an overarching interpretative repertoire.  
 „Gender differences‟ has been identified as a discourse (Sunderland, 2004), but 
can also be seen as an IR circulating in popular culture (see section 3.4.1). „Gender 
differences‟ is built upon the essentialist assumption that „fixed‟, biologically-based, 
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differences between men and women predispose them to perform different social roles 
and rationalizes an unequal gendered division of labor. Women‟s ability to give birth is 
used as a rationale to position them as „natural caregivers‟, while men‟s inability to do 
so is used to position them rather as „family providers‟. The material consequences of 
this discourse are a „naturalized‟ gender order where women may be relegated to the 
domestic sphere or else marginalized in underpaid „pastoral occupations‟ in the service 
sector.  
„Gender differences‟ is politically problematic for a number of reasons. First, 
purported „differences‟ rarely translate to „equality‟ (Burr, 1998; Cameron, 2007; 
Connell, 2002; Weatherall, 2002), which can result in women‟s suppression, i.e. it can 
be articulated as justification for women performing most aspects of childcare. Quite the 
contrary, this repertoire may also position „male as norm‟ (e.g., Sunderland, 2004). For 
example, if corporations are „masculinized‟ (Baxter, 2008; Holmes, 2006; Tannen, 
1995), this entails that women need to adapt their interactional styles to fit this norm. 
This fails to challenge the legitimacy of an unmarked „masculine‟ and „feminine‟ as 
marked. Women who wish to compete with men in the public sphere need to somehow 
cast themselves as reflections of the masculinist norm (Crawford, 1995; Weatherall, 
2002; Weedon, 1997). The alternative may be to retreat to more „feminized‟, and not 
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coincidentally, lower-paid professions in education, service industries or health. The 
result is an unequal, largely „heteronormative‟ social order where „masculinity‟ involves 
providing for a family and „femininity‟ involves caring for them and often replicating 
this role at work.  
 I will show how participants constructed women and men as inherently 
different and thus predisposed to certain gendered roles. Against the backdrop of an 
overarching „gender differences‟ IR, participants drew on what I have called a „Women 
as natural caregivers‟ and a „Women as eventually domestic‟ IR as they constructed 
subjectivities in line with hegemonic femininity.  
6.2 ‘Women as natural caregivers’ 
In this section I present extracts from an individual interview with Mayumi. I 
present the interview extracts chronologically to illustrate the cumulative „force‟ of this 
repertoire which Mayumi draws on to position women domestically and in the process 
constructs hegemonic femininity. The fact that Mayumi articulates this repertoire does 
not indicate that it is „dominant‟; however, it does show that this is a repertoire which 
currently circulates in Japanese society and constructs one version of Japanese 
femininity.  
6.2.1 Mayumi: The Legitimation of Hegemonic Femininity 
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 At the time of the interview, Mayumi was sixty, married with two adult 
children, and self-employed. In the first extract „Women as natural caregivers‟ is 
suggested by Mayumi‟s attribution of different social roles to men and women due to 
their „different makeup‟ („Men‟s and women‟s makeup is basically different‟). When I 
ask her to further elaborate on this point, she makes reference to a „maternal instinct‟:   
Extract 1 
43 Mayumi: Although there is a childcare leave system in Japan, the idea that men miss 
44 work for a long period of time is not generally accepted.   
45 Justin: So how is this related to men‟s and women‟s different makeup? 
46 Mayumi: (laugh). The maternal instinct. The ability to mother is something that men 
47 probably don‟t have. I wonder if that doesn‟t say it all? So especially since women  
48 have this instinct, I think it‟s a good idea for them to raise children. I‟m not sure  
49 about this, but only the person who has borne a child can experience this. Despite  
50 this feeling [maternal instinct], there are many incidents lately. Even though the  
51 person gave birth to the child, there are many incidents. Those people are a  
52 different story.  
  Mayumi thus constructs an account where women are positioned as „natural 
caregivers‟ due to a purported „bosei honnou‟ („maternal instinct‟; l. 46). In order to 
support this construction, she draws on the idiomatic phrase „sore ga subete jyanai 
kashira‟ (I wonder if that doesn‟t say it all; l. 47) to terminate further discussion of the 
topic (see Drew, 1998; Drew & Holt, 1989, 1998). The idiomatic „sore ga subete jyanai‟ 
rhetorically both supports Mayumi‟s claim about a „maternal instinct‟ and releases her 
from the necessity of providing further elaboration. „Kashira‟ (I wonder) appears to 
function to mitigate Mayumi‟s claim that a „maternal instinct‟ is sufficient basis to 
204 
 
rationalize women raising children. However, since such „non-confrontational‟ 
discourse markers are normative in Japanese, the direct assertion of an opinion is 
typically avoided (Watanabe, 1993).  
 A „maternal instinct‟ thus becomes the rationalization for women undertaking 
childcare. „Maternal instinct‟ constitutes a discursive resource which constructs a 
gendered „natural order‟ (Edley & Wetherell, 1999) where childrearing becomes 
women‟s and not men‟s natural vocation. Rhetorically, this argument is effective 
because it is difficult to dispute something that is rooted in biology and purportedly 
unchangeable. Thus, a „maternal instinct‟ becomes the rationalization for women 
undertaking childcare.  
 Mayumi further corroborates her account by incorporating exceptions to her 
argument which function to „prove the rule‟. The strategy of identifying discounting 
exceptions is what Billig (1987) terms „particularization‟. The reference to „incidents‟ (l. 
50) functions to construct women who do not fulfill their maternal role as „outliers‟ 
which thereby pathologizes these cases and constructs them as misrepresentative of the 
general population. „Incidents‟ refers to cases disseminated in the media where children 
are somehow presumably mistreated by their mothers. Acknowledging these anomalies 
however further corroborates the account because it illustrates Mayumi‟s critical 
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awareness of potential deviations from the normative pattern she constructs. In other 
words, she constructs a „nuanced‟ account which encompasses multiple scenarios and is 
thus difficult to dispute. 
 Mayumi‟s reference to a „bosei honnou‟ and incorporation of exceptions into 
her account are discursive resources which allow Mayumi to maintain her own 
accountability. She does not directly position women as homemakers but instead 
constructs women as having an „instinct‟ which makes them naturally suited to the task. 
In this way, Mayumi avoids the charge of having a „stake‟ or „interest‟ (see section 
3.2.3) in positioning women as homemakers, i.e. that she is opposed to working 
mothers.    
Mayumi further elaborates on the „maternal instinct‟ in the continued extract 
below:   
Extract 2 
53 Justin: So you mean generally speaking?  
54 Mayumi: That‟s right. People who cause incidents. The way that young people today  
55 think might be different. In our, since a long time ago in Japan, yappari only the 
56 person who had the child can understand. I don‟t think that those who‟ve never given  
57 birth to children can understand. The cuteness of children. Even though there is a  
58 maternal instinct, there might be people who don‟t have that instinct such as monks. 
59 When asked what that instinct is, I can‟t express it.  
60 Justin: Isn‟t there a proverb about until age three? 
61 Mayumi: Mitsugo no tamashi hyaku made. Yappari from the time the child is born  
62 until age three, his or her life changes. Yappari somehow throughout one‟s life until 
63 age three, raising a child with love involves taking him or her in your arms. But  
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64 when I hear that quite a few foreign people leave their children in childcare from an  
65 early age. Is that usual? 
66 Justin: Yes it is.  
67 Mayumi: You probably will disagree with the way I think. Yappari I‟m thinking that  
68 children are best raised by their mothers‟ hands. I don‟t know which is better. But 
69 when you think about raising children it‟s probably not about words, but about  
70 skinship [physical closeness] and the heart. 
Mayumi is first going to construct an account of her generation, with „in our‟ (l. 
55), but then „self-repairs‟ (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977) to the more „mystical‟ 
„since a long time ago‟. This formulation is effective because her comments are now 
constructed as representative of traditional Japanese thinking and not just her own 
generation. In addition, it functions again to avoid an accusation that Mayumi has a 
stake or interest in the claims she is making because the account encompasses many 
women across time.  
A third strategy which strengthens Mayumi‟s account is a „category entitlement‟ 
(see section 5.3) provided by category incumbency as a mother which corroborates her 
claim about a „maternal instinct‟. Mayumi never explicitly makes this categorical 
reference; however, she cites category-bound activities (see section 5.3) associated with 
motherhood. Mayumi could not convincingly make the claim that only mothers can 
truly understand „the cuteness of children‟ (l. 57) unless she possessed membership of 
this category. She also mentions that she is unable to express the „maternal instinct‟ (l. 
59), which would not apply to her unless she was a mother. Drawing on a category 
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entitlement is a rhetorically effective strategy because Mayumi in effect positions 
herself as more knowledgeable than me (at least), which further corroborates her 
account  
 I next attempt to introduce a proverb which Mayumi first clarifies and then 
elaborates on (l. 60). The proverb translates as „what‟s learned in the cradle is carried to 
the grave‟. The proverb implicitly positions mothers as responsible for teaching their 
children right from wrong which is needed for proper social development into adults. 
Proverbs often function like idiomatic phrases which are often used to both close down 
a topic from further discussion and corroborate accounts (Drew, 1998; Drew & Holt, 
1989, 1998). Although in this case the proverb was „made relevant‟ by the interviewer, 
Mayumi‟s elaboration of the topic of motherhood suggests that she is orienting toward it 
and thus the account is not simply elicited by me. Combined with yappari, Mayumi 
uses the proverb as evidence to support her account of women‟s crucial caregiving role. 
Mayumi carefully manages her accountability in relation to her philosophy of 
raising children. Her account expresses awareness that the interviewer may not agree 
with her: she first questions me about how children are raised abroad (ll. 64-65), and 
then specifically concedes that I may not agree with her formulation (l. 67). She 
continues by taking an apparently neutral stance („I don‟t know which is better‟; l. 68), 
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but later on in the account her own reported view is clear. For Mayumi, raising children 
involves „skinship‟ (physical contact between a mother and child) and the reference to 
„heart‟ (l. 70) and her use of a proverb indicates that her opinion is that mothers are most 
suitable for performing these tasks.  
In this account, the proverb, coupled with yappari, thus provide discursive 
evidence that Mayumi is drawing on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ IR. I am 
suggesting that proverbs are part of a „lexicon or register of terms‟ (see section 3.4.1), 
shared by members of a society and thus a form of „cultural commonsense‟ that 
indicates a repertoire. Yappari also suggests that Mayumi is drawing on this 
interpretative repertoire because it frames the crucial role that mothers play in their 
children‟s development as commonly accepted. So Mayumi uses the proverb and 
yappari to invoke the authority of a „Women as natural caregivers‟ IR and discursively 
position women in a domestic role.     
Mayumi constructs a gendered subjectivity in line with hegemonic femininity 
as she accepts the commonsense espoused by a „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire, 
which positions women as full-time homemakers. Her account can be seen as a 
paradigmatic example of hegemonic femininity since she positions women as 
self-sacrificing wives and mothers who place their family‟s needs before their own. 
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Later in the interview, Mayumi constructs an account of her friend to support 
her „maternal instinct‟ account and positioning of women as mothers or of mothers as 
the „better parents‟. A striking aspect of this extract is the multiple voicing and thus its 
„polyphonic‟ nature (see section 5.2.1).    
Extract 3 
222 Mayumi: It‟s difficult for women to continue their jobs, but it‟s quite easy for  
223 teachers because they have a license.  
224 Justin: Civil servants are the same. 
225 Mayumi: That‟s right. That‟s because they‟re in a situation where it‟s easy to return 
226 to work.  
227 Justin: There are many women teachers. 
228 Mayumi: Now women can also easily return to work. But a friend of mine who‟s a 
229 nurse said, “It‟s no good.” Yappari since medicine is advancing everyday everyday, 
230 if you take leave it‟s hard to stay up to date with current techniques. If you get  
231 recertified you can return to work. It‟s hard to become a nurse though. I have a  
232 friend who‟s a nurse. We study English together. She‟s about 38 now and her child 
233 is how old? The child entered fourth grade. She was asked to come back, but  
234 medicine is advancing, so yappari she can‟t stay up to date with it. She‟d need to go 
235 to the hospital for training. What‟s more since her husband is the type of person  
236 who wants her at home, he doesn‟t support her working. If you‟re wondering why, 
237 her husband‟s parents got divorced when he was young. Yappari since he grew up  
238 without a mother figure, he has extremely painful memories. He wants the mother 
239 at home when their child gets home [from school]. He‟s an old-fashioned Japanese. 
240 I think it‟s fine for people to think in that way. Her husband earns quite a bit of 
241 money. Even without working, she‟s fine. Needless to say, even without working, 
242 she has a comfortable lifestyle. Since her son has grown up a little she says, “I want  
243 to do some sort of part-time job”. Since they only have one child she doesn‟t have 
244 much to do, you see. Regarding that part-time job, she‟s saying, “I only want to  
245 work during the daytime.” 
246 Justin: Can‟t she work as a nurse part-time? 
247 Mayumi: Since there‟s such a huge shortage of nurses and doctors in hospitals right 
248 now, once you start working, they won‟t let you quit. Even though you have the  
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249 feeling that you want to quit or say that you can only work for a certain amount of 
250 time, no matter what when you‟re faced with the actual situation, you definitely  
251 won‟t be able to say “Goodbye” and go home early. My friend says, “I can‟t go  
252 back.” I have the feeling that I understand how she feels now. It‟s difficult (laugh). 
The phrase „easy to return to work [for women]‟ (ll. 225-226) brings to mind an 
„Equal employment opportunities‟ IR (Wetherell et al., 1987). Yet Mayumi is critically 
aware that while equal opportunities exist in theory, in practice, she says, they are 
unavailable to women, who thus face an ideological dilemma (see section 3.4.2). 
Women are thus multiply positioned by an „Equal opportunities‟ IR and „Practical 
considerations‟ repertoire which make it difficult to achieve the goal of equal 
opportunities in practice (Wetherell, et. al., 1987). The story of her friend functions to 
illustrate this dilemma.  
In Mayumi‟s account, her friend‟s situation evidences why returning to work is 
unfeasible for many mothers. By drawing on reported speech („it‟s no good‟; l. 229), the 
words of her friend are employed to actively build support against mothers working 
outside the home (see section 5.2.3) and thus the account again goes beyond Mayumi‟s 
possible personal investment in the claim. Mayumi is here the „neutral‟ animator of 
another „author‟s‟ speech („it‟s no good‟; see section 5.2) by which she makes an 
implicit assessment regarding women returning to work, but then continues to more 
directly assess the situation. However, the significance of this move lies in the fact that 
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Mayumi‟s own stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in this assessment is discursively 
reduced as she presents the assessment as first coming from her friend. Following this, 
she uses yappari to construct the difficulty of staying up-to-date with medical 
advancements as „commonsense‟ (ll. 229-231).  
The difficulty of returning to work, however, is expressed not only through the 
logistics of staying up-to-date with the field, but also a „Women as natural caregivers‟ 
repertoire. The repertoire is reflected in Mayumi‟s account of her friend‟s account of her 
husband who positions women as caregivers. The husband reportedly has „painful 
memories‟ (l. 238) because he „grew up without a mother figure‟ (ll. 237-238). We can 
deduce the husband is positioning women as caregivers from the category 
„old-fashioned Japanese‟ and category-bound activity (see section 5.3) of being at home 
when the child returns from school (l. 239). Notably, in the account there is no mention 
of the husband assuming an active role in childcare, so we can infer a discursive 
absence of a „Shared parenting‟ repertoire (see Sunderland, 2004).    
Another reason why Mayumi‟s friend‟s financial contribution is reportedly 
unnecessary is that the family is comfortably supported by the husband‟s income (ll. 
240-241). Interestingly, Mayumi constructs women working to supplement the 
household income and not for personal development (ll. 242-243). In Mayumi‟s account, 
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we thus see the discursive absence of a repertoire where individuals work for 
non-economic reasons, e.g. contributing to society or personal development. Once again, 
Mayumi positions women as wives and mothers whose role is to support the household 
in a non-economic way, but as hypothetically and implicitly able to do so in an 
economic way.  
Mayumi uses reported speech (see section 5.2.3) to provide evidence that her 
friend wants to resume working and to position women returning to work in a certain 
capacity, i.e. as part-time employees (l. 243). The friend reportedly wants to resume 
working because now that her child is grown up she „doesn‟t have much to do‟ (l. 244). 
Despite this, her friend still apparently privileges motherhood above all else and thus 
does not want to return to nursing. To reflect this, Mayumi again voices her friend‟s 
desire to work „during the daytime‟ (l. 245). This desire is framed within direct reported 
which constructs it as originating from the friend. The implication, then, is that she does 
not really want to resume nursing. When I directly ask if the friend could resume 
nursing part-time, Mayumi claims this is impractical (l. 246).  
In this account, „practical considerations‟ (Wetherell et al., 1987) are given as 
the main deterrent for resuming a (nursing) career, i.e. that the critical shortage of nurses 
would place the friend‟s skills in high demand and would make working only part-time 
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or quitting altogether next to impossible (ll. 247-250). The second „practical 
consideration‟ is the difficulty of leaving work at the end of your shift. Overtime is a 
common practice in many Japanese workplaces and „giri‟ („social duty‟) may make it 
difficult to refuse a request to work overtime (Mouer & Kawanishi, 2005; Sugimoto, 
2003). Mayumi constructs hypothetical reported speech to vividly convey the difficulty 
for her friend to say „goodbye‟ and leave work early (l. 251; see section 5.2.8). Reported 
speech is used again to express Mayumi‟s main point of the narrative—that the dual 
pursuits of career and motherhood are incompatible („it‟s no good‟; l. 229; see section 
5.2.2). By assuming the role of „animator‟, Mayumi again avoids the charge of having a 
stake or interest in this particular claim. Since her friend has said she „can‟t go back‟ (ll. 
251-252) there is no need for Mayumi to assess the situation. Instead she makes an 
„affiliative remark‟ (Holt & Clift, 2007) („I understand how she feels now‟; l. 252). 
While this presents her as orienting sympathetically toward her friend, Mayumi is in 
fact arguably using the account of her friend to construct the dual pursuits of work and 
motherhood as incompatible. The decision not to resume nursing is constructed as 
resulting from „practical considerations‟ that her friend carefully weighed up before 
coming to this decision. „Practical considerations‟ is a rhetorically effective argument as 
it stresses the „inevitability‟ of the current situation and reproduces the status quo 
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(Wetherell et al., 1987). Nevertheless, it ignores the fact that structural obstacles to 
returning to work are amenable to change and are standing in the way of real choice.  
In this account, Mayumi‟s friend thus reportedly faces an ideological dilemma 
between honoring work and family commitments on several different levels. First, 
privileging her maternal role over career results in her falling behind in developments in 
the medical field. Whereas „equal opportunities‟ are in principle available to male and 
female nurses, women have to weigh the „practical considerations‟ of potential 
recertification and combining this demanding job with motherhood largely because 
husbands do not share parenting, which was reflected by the discursive absence of a 
„Shared parenting‟ repertoire and indeed no mention of the husband‟s domestic role at 
all. The second dilemma involves her friend‟s husband‟s reported desire for her to 
remain at home. We can conceptualize the husband as drawing on a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire. Therefore, if such repertoires reflect actual discourse 
and past talk, Mayumi‟s friend must consider whether or not she is willing to put a 
potential strain on her marriage. The third dilemma concerns reemployment options for 
women who wish to reenter the workforce and is applicable to many women without 
any type of skills or certification. Although Mayumi‟s friend does not need to work out 
of economic necessity, the decision not to work results in boredom once her child grows 
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up. Yet, while nurses are in high demand, this is not reportedly an attractive option for 
Mayumi‟s friend, because part-time work is reportedly unfeasible. Consequently, the 
friend‟s employment choices are limited to marginalized (in terms of benefits) part-time 
positions. The „practical consideration‟ for women who wish to resign from their jobs is 
that only a limited number of reemployment options would then await them. Many 
middle-aged Japanese women without particular skills or certification are confronted 
with this bleak reality (Gottfried, 2003; Sugimoto, 2003). According to Mayumi‟s 
account, her friend rhetorically solves this dilemma by embracing a „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ repertoire and constructing an identity in accordance with hegemonic 
femininity through positioning herself as a „devoted‟ wife and „dutiful‟ mother.      
Mayumi positions her friend as accepting the full-time homemaker subject 
position offered by a „Women as eventually domestic‟ IR and thus constructing 
subjectivity which aligns with hegemonic femininity.  
Later in the interview, Mayumi formulates an account where getting married 
and raising children are part of a „natural‟ life course: 
Extract 4 
546 Justin: I‟m reading a book The Terms of Marriage. The author thinks that the 
547 average age of marriage is gradually increasing because women want someone who 
548 will support them financially and this type of man is difficult to find. What do you 
549 think of this?  
550 Mayumi: I can understand it. In my case, I ended up getting married at 22. Ended 
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551 up, I mean I got married at 22. At about 23. Though I was an adult in terms of my 
552 age, I was still very much a child. Yappari my thinking, how do I say it, was  
553 Since I was still young, I couldn‟t see the big picture. It was a matter of course to 
554 have and raise kids. I isshokenmei [worked with my whole heart] everyday  
555 everyday, even though I didn‟t have much money. I isshokenmei to spend each day. 
556 That was normal for us. Regarding late marriage, there are several women in my 
557 shop. As I said before, even though a woman who is around 43 has many formal 
558 introductions [to men]. 
559 Justin: Yes. 
560 Mayumi: Like informal introductions. Even though she is informally introduced to 
561 many men, as your age gradually increases, once you pass 30, yappari you have 
562 many requirements, salary and needless to say interests don‟t match. Many different  
563 requirements, but at the very least your interests are different. For example, you  
564 have to live with his parents (laugh). You have many requirements and there‟s a  
565 good chance you don‟t marry. For that reason, the feeling, how do I say it? Since 
566 you didn‟t initially fall in love with that person because it‟s an introduction, you 
567 won‟t think, “I want to date this person.” 
Mayumi initially orients away from the topic I introduce about „bankon‟ („late 
marriages‟) and instead produces an account of marriage for women of her generation. 
She self-repairs (Schegloff, et al., 1977) „kekkon chatta‟ („I ended up getting married‟) 
with „kekkon shita‟ „I got married‟ (ll. 550-551) which stresses her active choice to 
marry. Despite her apparent positive decision, Mayumi constructs herself as „still very 
much a child‟ (l. 552) and her naiveté („I couldn‟t see the big picture‟) is constructed as 
„commonsense‟ through the use of yappari (see section 5.4.2). Mayumi draws on a stage 
of life device (ll. 553-556; see section 5.3) to construct marriage and raising children as 
category-bound activities for young women, i.e. a „normative‟ life trajectory involves 
devoting much effort to getting married and raising a family during your early twenties. 
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The lexical item „isshokenmei‟ (l. 554) is frequently invoked in conversation to 
emphasize that one is exerting tireless effort to accomplish a task (Davies & Ikeno, 
2002; Sugimoto, 2003). Apparently, „working with your whole heart‟ is gendered and 
involves having and raising children for women. The question remains as to who 
defines and benefits from this „natural course‟. I propose that the construction of 
marriage and childbirth as a „matter of course‟ suggests that Mayumi is at least drawing 
in part on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire. What Mayumi is doing is working 
up an account of hegemonic femininity for women of her generation, which she later 
uses as a category contrast (see section 5.3) to emphasize what women today are not 
doing and support her overall account of women as natural caregivers. Mayumi 
positions herself as embracing this repertoire and manages a positive self-presentation 
(see section 2.1.4) as embodying hegemonic femininity through her reported actions of 
marrying young and raising her children.   
 Mayumi‟s account of hegemonic femininity for women of her generation 
further serves to highlight and criticize what women of today are not doing. She uses 
this account to construct a category contrast between women of her generation and 
women today. In line 556, Mayumi reintroduces my topic of „late marriages‟ and 
distinguishes between „formal‟ (l. 557) and later „informal‟ (l. 560) introductions. 
218 
 
„Formal introductions‟ refers to the not uncommon practice of arranged marriages 
(Sugimoto, 2003). In arranged marriages, while the initial meeting between prospective 
marriage partners is arranged by an intermediary, the couple decides whether or not the 
courtship will continue and „informal introductions‟ refers to blind dates arranged by 
friends. Mayumi‟s account then proceeds to the issues facing women who „delay‟ 
marriage: as your age increases, so do the conditions you set for marriage (ll. 561-562), 
which is constructed as commonsense knowledge through yappari. In addition, 
dissimilar interests are provided as evidence for why women tend not to marry later in 
life. (ll. 562-563). Finally, negated hypothetical reported thought (see section 5.2.8) is 
used to convey the subtext that as your age increases, so does the likelihood that you 
will remain single (ll. 556-557).  
Mayumi‟s construction of hegemonic femininity for women of her generation 
has a dual function. First, she is able to manage a positive self-presentation as a „good‟ 
wife and „wise‟ mother, the cornerstone of hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). 
This self-presentation is accomplished by creating an account of how she engages in the 
category-bound activities of marrying and bearing and raising children, which follows a 
„normal‟ life cycle (see section 5.3). Accordingly, her constructed account is not a 
neutral move, but one in which Mayumi has an invested interest (see section 3.2.3) in 
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presenting herself to me as conforming to hegemonic femininity. In other words, her 
rhetorical actions are in line with those that constitute hegemonic femininity. Second, by 
constructing hegemonic femininity for women of her generation, she is also indirectly 
criticizing younger women today as failing to embody hegemonic femininity by 
highlighting that they are not following a „normal‟ stage of life trajectory. Mayumi‟s 
own reported actions stand in sharp contrast and accentuate what women of today are 
not doing.  
Excerpts from Mayumi‟s interview illustrate how hegemonic femininity is 
discursively constructed by drawing on a range of discursive devices. Mayumi draws on 
a „Women as natural caregivers‟ IR and positions women as wives and mothers. 
Discursive evidence which suggests that she is drawing on the repertoire is suggested by 
her uncritical use of the phrase „maternal instinct‟, which she proffers as sufficient basis 
to position women as mothers through an idiomatic phrase, „say it all‟. In extract two, 
Mayumi extends this positioning of women through the use of the proverb „what‟s 
learned in the cradle is carried to the grave‟ to stress the vital role that mothers play in 
their children‟s early development. In extract three, she draws on reported speech to 
construct an account where her friend possesses agency to choose a domestic role due to 
„practical considerations‟ which make combining fulltime work with motherhood 
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impractical. By constructing an account of her friend, Mayumi is able to further support 
her claim that children require a full-time, stay-at-home mother while maintaining her 
„neutrality‟. In her friend‟s account, there is also a discursive absence of a „Shared 
parenting‟ repertoire which further suggests that parenting is gendered in modern Japan. 
In extract four, we see how Mayumi draws on the „stage of life device‟, „isshokenmei‟ 
(work with your whole heart), and category contrasts to construct a normative life 
trajectory and present „late marriages‟ as „deviating‟ from this course (see section 5.3). 
Yappari is used throughout the interview to construct full-time motherhood as 
„commonsense‟. Mayumi draws on all these devices to discursively construct 
hegemonic femininity.   
In section 6.2.1, I have addressed research question one, i.e. „What 
interpretative repertoires do participants draw on as they discursively construct (a) 
hegemonic femininity?‟ I demonstrated how Mayumi draws on a „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ IR to discursively construct hegemonic femininity.  
Research question 1(a) asks: „What discursive features are associated with 
interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity? Mayumi draws on a 
„maternal instinct‟, proverb, reported speech (see section 5.2), category entitlement (see 
section 5.3) and yappari (see section 5.4) to construct women as natural caregivers, 
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thereby suggesting that she is drawing on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ IR.  
Research question 1(b) asks: „What subject positions (self and other) do 
participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic 
femininity?‟ Mayumi discursively positions herself, her friend, and other women her age 
as conforming to hegemonic femininity by taking up the position of „good‟ wife and 
„wise‟ mother, and positioning those women who are „delaying‟ their marriages as 
outside her construction of hegemonic femininity.  
In response to research question two, i.e. „Is there evidence of ideological 
dilemmas generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in 
participants‟ discourse?‟ I have shown how „Women as natural caregivers‟ can become 
dilemmatic for women attempting to construct subjectivity outside of hegemonic 
femininity. An ideological dilemma was suggested in extract three where Mayumi‟s 
friend attempts to construct a „working mother‟ subjectivity, but Mayumi draws on a 
practical considerations argument to resist this subjectivity. 
In the next section, I address the second repertoire, „Women as eventually 
domestic‟, which was initially identified and named as a discourse (Sunderland, 2004), 
and its connection with hegemonic femininity. This repertoire also relates to research 
questions 1, 1(a), and 1(b) in that participants drew on and assumed subject positions in 
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relation to „Women as eventually domestic‟ as they constructed subjectivities in line 
with hegemonic femininity. 
6. 3 ‘Women as eventually domestic’  
In this section I present extracts from an individual interview with a working 
professional, Akiko, and two group interviews with students. I have selected these 
participants to illustrate how women of different ages draw on and assume subject 
positions in relation to a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire and in the process 
constructed hegemonic femininity. However, not all participants uniformly accept the 
„commonsense‟ offered by the repertoire, which highlights individuals‟ agency to 
assume resistant subject positions in relation to interpretative repertoires.  
6.3.1 Akiko: Resisting Hegemonic Femininity    
At the time of the interview, Akiko was forty-two years old, married with a 
four-year old, and a university lecturer. Akiko‟s account constructs women‟s social roles 
as managing the dual pursuits of career and domestic responsibilities; nevertheless, she 
maintains that women are more accountable to the domestic role than are men:  
Extract 5 
27 Justin: What do you think about women‟s roles today? 
28 Akiko: Women‟s roles today. If you think about what I said before, then I think  
29 [their role] is to do housework and work alongside men. But I think there is a chance  
30 that looking after the children and taking care of the neighborhood affairs becomes  
31 the role of women as long as men are busy [with their work]. 
223 
 
32 Justin: Do you think that workplaces are equal?    
33 Akiko: I think that school teachers are probably equal. But it‟s not about whether or 
34 not a particular school is equal. For example, women need to pick up their children 
35 from nursery school by six o‟clock. I think it‟s unfair that due to this women are not  
36 given important responsibilities or their workload is decreased.   
37 Justin: Does the same apply to schools? 
38 Akiko: I don‟t think that it‟s necessarily a problem with particular workplaces.  
In Akiko‟s account, membership in the category „woman‟ involves the 
category-bound activities (see section 5.3) of „housework‟ and „work alongside men‟ (l. 
29). Nonetheless, Akiko suggests that the burden of domestic work still falls on 
women‟s shoulders. The result of men‟s reported busyness at work is that women „look 
after the children‟ and „take care of the neighborhood affairs‟ (l. 30). Paralleling 
Mayumi‟s account, in Akiko‟s there is a discursive absence of a „Shared parenting‟ IR. 
Significantly, Akiko takes a resistant subject position in relation to a „Women 
as eventually domestic‟ repertoire; she says: „women need to pick up their children from 
nursery school at six o‟clock‟ (ll. 34-35). „Need to‟ implies a critique of society‟s 
automatic assumption that women perform this task. This „commonsense‟ (see section 
5.4.2) assumption is embodied in a „Women as eventually domestic‟ IR, which Akiko 
discursively resists by evaluating the practice of reducing women‟s work-related 
responsibilities as „unfair‟ (l. 35).  
 Akiko attributes these gendered category-bound activities to structural 
inequalities that exist on the level of the gender order (see section 2.3) which structures 
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Japanese society. In Akiko‟s words, „it is not about whether or not a particular school is 
equal‟ (ll. 33-34) or „particular workplaces‟ but about the premise that women perform 
domestic work because „men are busy‟ (l. 31) with their jobs.  
In the next extract, Akiko discusses how even at the workplace women are 
sometimes expected to perform „feminine‟ duties such as serving tea, which she 
apparently opposes: 
Extract 6 
154 Justin: Do you think that women can resist social pressure? 
155 Akiko: I think that if women have the mind to, they can do it. It might be an  
156 overstatement to say that many can. Japanese women of my generation did not go 
157 as far as wanting to resist [social pressure]. I‟m the same way. Yappari the feeling  
158 that because you‟re a woman, do such and such is big. If someone says, “Because  
159 you‟re a woman, if you don‟t make the tea...” I hate it. But when someone says,  
160 “you can‟t do this job because you need to go and pick up your kids”, I think it‟s 
161 true. There are many people who think this way. I do too.  
162 Justin: How do you think your female students feel about this? 
163 Akiko: I feel that this conservative tendency is even stronger. I think it‟s a social 
164 or economic issue. But I have the feeling that women want to get married early, quit  
165 their jobs and become professional homemakers even more so than people in my 
166 generation. But I‟m not sure of the exact number. 
167 Justin: What do you make of this? 
168 Akiko: Because they don‟t have their own dreams. They get a job either to  
169 contribute to the family budget or buy personal items.  
In this extract, Akiko discursively resists the „commonsense‟ within „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ by drawing on hypothetical reported speech, membership 
categories, and yappari (see sections 5.2-5.4). Akiko prefaces her claim that 
gender-category membership is the basis for women performing unspecified 
225 
 
category-bound activities („because you‟re a woman, do such and such‟: l. 158) with 
yappari to emphasize that these gendered category-bound activities are accepted as 
„commonsense‟ (see section 5.4.2). She next invokes hypothetical reported speech (see 
section 5.2.8) to criticize gender as the basis for assigning women to the task of making 
tea (“because you‟re a woman, if you don‟t make the tea...” I hate it; ll. 158-159). 
Framing the assumption that women make tea within hypothetical reported speech and 
then criticizing it („I hate it‟) demonstrates how hypothetical reported speech can be 
used to construct a hypothetical situation, i.e. women should make tea, which the 
speaker can then criticize. Akiko‟s negative assessment of this hypothetical scenario 
suggests that she is taking up a resistant subject position in relation to „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ and ultimately to hegemonic femininity.  
Akiko further extends her argument that women are positioned in domestic 
roles by applying „Women as eventually domestic‟ to the workplace. She comments on 
the gendered assumption that women pick up their children and its repercussions for 
their career advancement: (“you can‟t do this job because you need to go and pick up 
your kids” (l. 160). Although Akiko would reportedly resist being asked to make tea (ll. 
158-159), she concedes that many working women are expected to—and do—pick up 
their children („I think it‟s true‟; ll. 160-161). Notably, working women are still 
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expected to privilege their maternal role while men give precedence to their careers.    
In the next part of the account, Akiko discursively positions university students 
as accepting the „commonsense‟ offered by a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire. 
She refers to a „conservative tendency‟ (l. 163) where women are choosing to forgo a 
career in exchange for a domestic role. However, she does not attribute this to structures 
of gender inequality, but to young people lacking dreams („because they don‟t have their 
own dreams‟; l. 168).  
The reason why Akiko positions university students as accepting the subject 
position of „professional homemaker‟ offered by „Women as eventually domestic‟ is 
clearer in the next extract: 
Extract 7 
180 Justin: So in one sense choosing to become a professional homemaker is easier than 
181 working? 
182 Akiko: My generation was heavily influenced by Women‟s Lib and feminism. We 
183 sugoku isshokenmei [worked really hard with our whole hearts] because the Equal  
184 Employment Opportunity Law had just been passed. Men ended up continuing as 
185 they always had. We felt fortunate [to be working] so we had to do the housework 
186 as well as our jobs. The generation that saw this are now university students. So  
187 they don‟t think they will go to the extent where they do housework and a job. They 
188 choose to become professional homemakers because yappari they hate the fact that 
189 it‟s OK for their fathers only to work, while their mothers are expected to work and 
190 do housework. Those who work choose not to get married. I think they‟ve become  
191 more conservative because one generation has seen this pattern. We didn‟t know. At 
192 any rate, women in my generation were so happy to be working that we were a  
193 generation that thought we needed to do the housework.  
Akiko draws on a category contrast (see section 5.3) to construct a contrastive 
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account between women of her generation (Akiko is 42 years old) and those of today, 
highlighting how women of both generations are similarly positioned by „Women as 
eventually domestic‟. The intensifier „sugoku‟ („really‟) prefaces „isshokenmei‟ („with 
our whole hearts‟; l. 183) to stress the tireless effort exerted by women of Akiko‟s 
generation (Davies & Ikeno, 2002; Sugimoto, 2003). Unlike men who were „continuing 
as they always had‟ (ll. 184-185), women „had to‟ do housework in addition to their „day‟ 
jobs. Notably, there is again a discursive absence of a repertoire which positions men 
and women as equally responsible for housework or a „New man‟ repertoire (see 
Benwell, 2002; Edley & Wetherell, 1999).  
Akiko discursively positions women today as possessing agency in their refusal 
to combine paid with domestic work (l. 187). Yappari prefaces the comment, „it‟s okay 
for their fathers only to work, while their mothers are expected to work and do 
housework‟ (ll. 188-190) to emphasize that this is „commonsense‟ inherent to a „Women 
as eventually domestic‟ repertoire, which they reportedly resist: „they hate‟. Women 
who do desire careers are also presented as agentive as they reportedly „choose‟ to 
remain single (l. 190). Notably, the dual pursuits of career and family are not easily 
combinable for women, so „career or family‟ is also an IR for women.  
In Akiko‟s account, women of both generations are positioned as caregivers 
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within a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire. The somewhat „naïve‟ women of 
the 1980s („we didn‟t know‟; l. 191) reportedly felt „fortunate‟ to finally have the 
opportunity to work. However, „Women as eventually domestic‟ positions these women 
as homemakers regardless of their occupational status. In extracts five and six, we see 
how women are expected to leave work early because they „need to‟ pick up their 
children from school. In extract 7, domestic obligations are conveyed with „we were a 
generation that thought we needed to do the housework‟ (l. 193). „Need to‟ suggests that 
Akiko is referring to the „commonsense‟ of a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire, 
which she constructs as the reported thought of an aggregate (see section 5.2.7). 
Reporting the thoughts of a group here constructs the expectation that women perform 
domestic work as „commonsense‟ for women of her generation and thus corroborates 
her claim. In Akiko‟s account, for women today, the subject position of „professional 
homemaker‟ is made to appear more appealing than that of a „superwoman‟ who 
balances the conflicting demands of a career with the „second-shift‟ (Hochschild & 
Machung, 2003) of domestic responsibilities due to the discursive absence of a 
repertoire which positions women and men as equally responsible for domestic duties.   
 Akiko‟s account next moves into the topic of the long working hours which are 
normative in Japan (Mouer & Kawanishi, 2005; Sugimoto, 2003). In the extract below 
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she discusses after-hours socializing:  
Extract 8 
302 Akiko: The way of thinking might be a little old-fashioned at Bunri University, but 
303 if I say, “Let‟s hit the next bar” someone would say “Your husband‟s waiting, so 
304 why don‟t you go home?”  
305 Justin: Have you ever been told that? 
306 Akiko: Yeah, I‟ve been told that before. But if someone else says that then you can 
307 go home early. But especially when you have a child and even attend a meeting and 
308 someone says, “It‟s OK to go and pick up your child” and are sent home early and 
309 then important jobs don‟t come your way. I think there‟s an assumption at a regular 
310 company you‟d be passed over for promotion. But my friend comes home after  
311 midnight even though she‟s married and has a family. Even though she has a child. 
312 She was born and raised in England but spent elementary and junior high school in 
313 Japan and after that lived in the United States. She‟s fine with that, but she‟s  
314 probably a special case. As far as I know, I think the general consensus is that you 
315 aren‟t expected to go [out drinking] and don‟t go as long as your child‟s small.  
316 Yappari many things are extremely equal in the educational world. There isn‟t that 
317 much male-female discrimination. For example, we can go home at five and both 
318 men and women regularly submit articles for publication. I don‟t think there are so 
319 many merits to attached to being a woman or man. 
In this extract we also see the workings of „Women as eventually domestic‟. 
Akiko positions herself as a „fellow employee‟ when she reports herself as saying, „let‟s 
hit the next bar‟ (l. 303); however, her colleague reportedly draws on a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire, positioning women as wives and mothers, by saying, 
„your husband‟s waiting, so why don‟t you go home‟ (ll. 303-304). Akiko conveys the 
central point of her narrative through hypothetical reported speech (see section 5.2.2; 
5.2.8). We can see interdiscursive „traces‟ (Talbot, 1998) of „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ in extracts 5, 6, and 7 when Akiko references the category-bound activities 
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(see section 5.3) of looking after children and taking care of neighborhood affairs (l. 30), 
picking up children from school (l. 160), and doing housework (l. 190).  
Akiko is careful to distinguish between leaving a social event early, which she 
apparently appreciates (ll. 306-307) from the repercussions of leaving a meeting early, 
when „important jobs don‟t come your way‟ (l. 309). Akiko draws on reported speech 
yet again to convey the central point of her narrative („it‟s okay to go and pick up your 
child‟; l. 308), i.e. women are positioned as mothers within a „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ repertoire. Reported speech is a discursive resource which strengthens 
Akiko‟s claim that others such as her colleagues position women within a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire (see section 5.2.3). 
Akiko next discusses a friend who, despite having a family, is still reportedly 
held to the same responsibilities as her male colleagues, e.g. working late (ll. 310-311). 
In her case, gender-category membership does not exclude her from the category-bound 
activities of corporate employees. The inclusion of this „special case‟ (l. 314) who does 
not represent most Japanese women, i.e. she grew up abroad, functions to strengthen her 
claim that most women are „released‟ from work-related obligations due to their 
assumed domestic duties (ll. 314-315), thus her friend can be seen as the exception 
which „proves the rule‟. 
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In the last part of the account, Akiko claims that almost egalitarian gender 
relations are normative in education (l. 316). Yappari constructs this near-equality as 
„commonsense‟ (see section 5.4.2) and supports her earlier formulation („I think that 
school teachers are probably equal; extract 6; l. 33). Thus, women and men teachers are 
reportedly positioned as the same within an „Equal employment opportunities‟ 
repertoire. Education is presumably a special case because job responsibilities are not 
distinguished by gender as they are in regular companies where many women work as 
„OLs‟ and men as „salarymen‟ (see section 1.3).  
If we accept that discourse reflects the symbolic dimension of gender relations, 
i.e. the way we define masculinity and femininity (see section 2.5), then discourse is 
arguably one area where non-discursive aspects of gender relations are also reflected, 
e.g. power, production, and emotional relations (see section 2.2). In Akiko‟s discursive 
account of schools, power relations between male and female teachers are equal, thus 
Akiko‟s account provides hope that more egalitarian gender relations are the benchmark 
of some institutional contexts, i.e. schools. Nevertheless, underpaid, „pastoral‟ 
occupations such as school teaching are typically associated with femininity (Burr, 
1998; Connell, 2002), so the fact that egalitarian gender relations are reportedly 
normative in some educational institutions does not provide hope that the hegemonic 
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gender order (see section 2.3) of Japanese society is in the midst of social 
transformation. In fact, Akiko‟s friend, who may have the status of „honorary male‟ 
since she adapts to the working style set by men, suggests that in non-educational 
contexts egalitarian gender relations are not the norm. Akiko‟s account discursively 
supports previous research which has demonstrated that major social institutions are still 
overwhelmingly dominated by men (e.g., Connell, 2002). In Akiko‟s account, women 
who desire „equal employment opportunities‟ need to balance the „double-burden‟ of 
housework and a career which renders the notion of equal employment opportunities 
meaningless.  
In the next part of this section, I present extracts from interviews with 
university students. While Akiko discursively positioned female university students as 
overwhelmingly taking up the professional homemaker subject position, we can now 
investigate the various positions such students themselves assume. The students‟ 
accounts are interesting because they assumed both complicit and resistant subject 
positions in relation to „Women as eventually domestic‟.    
6.3.2 Yurika and Yuka: Gender Relations are Gradually Improving 
This first extract is from an interview with a dyad of first-year university 
students who were eighteen at the time of the interview:       
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Extract 9 
24 Justin: How about women‟s roles today? 
25 Yurika: In the past many women didn‟t go on to college, but now women are going 
26 to college in the same numbers as men, so they have careers. The number of women 
27 who ganbaru [work hard] in relation to their careers is increasing. Yappari you see 
28 this in the media and news, so viewers‟ ideas are changing. Women‟s choices are 
29 increasing. Their roles aren‟t changing though. They still do housework. The number  
30 of women who are working is increasing.  
31 Yuka: But “onna no hito dakara” [because you‟re a woman] many things don‟t  
32 change.  
33 Yurika: Women‟s ability to have children is something that doesn‟t really change.  
34 The reality is that women think a little bit about staying at home for awhile. Some  
35 basic things aren‟t changing.  
36 Justin: Only women can have children, but both men and women are able to raise  
37 kids, right?  
38 Yurika: If women use their maternity leave well, then probably they can take a little 
39 time off, have kids, and then go back to work. Since I have not been out in society  
40 yet, I don‟t really know that much about the childcare leave system. I don‟t know if 
41 women can use the system or not.  
At the beginning of this extract we see traces of a „Progressive view of history‟ 
repertoire (see Edley & Wetherell, 2001) which portrays society as progressing from a 
state of relative „underdevelopment‟ to „sophistication‟. This repertoire is suggested by 
Yurika when she says, „in the past many women didn‟t go to college, but now women 
are going to college in the same numbers as men‟ (ll. 25-26). Yurika prefaces her claim 
that the media is representing working women with yappari to construct this 
phenomenon as „commonsense‟, thus bolstering her claim (ll. 27-28; see section 5.4.2).   
A „Progressive view of history‟ repertoire is sometimes employed to justify the 
current status quo and discourage social action because progress is ongoing and requires 
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time (Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell et al., 1987). In this 
repertoire, social development is constructed as „evolutionary‟, thus certain inequalities 
are an inevitable part of this gradual process, i.e. women are underrepresented in 
managerial positions; however, these disparities, it is implied, will gradually cease to 
exist as society becomes increasingly egalitarian. Rhetorically, the repertoire can be 
deployed to rationalize current inequalities as simply „temporary‟. Yurika and Yuka, 
however, do not use this repertoire to rationalize current gender inequalities, but instead 
they draw on the repertoire to compare social change with the apparently unchangeable, 
i.e. women‟s reproductive capacity, thus constructing childcare as women‟s 
„responsibility‟, which effectively limits the degree of professional advancement women 
can attain. Notably, Yurika and Yuka‟s account is essentialist in that not all women have 
children.  
 Yurika and Yuka thus draw on a „Progressive view of history‟ IR in conjunction 
with a „Gender differences‟ repertoire (see section 6.2) to construct a „natural order‟ 
(Edley & Wetherell, 1999) that limits the degree to which women‟s social advancement 
is possible. „Gender differences‟ is suggested by the unmodified use of women: „their 
roles aren‟t changing‟ (l. 29), „some basic things aren‟t changing‟ (ll. 33-34), and most 
noticeably in the membership categorization device (see section 5.3) „onna no hito 
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dakara‟ (because you are a woman‟; l. 31). In Yurika‟s account, membership in the 
category „woman‟ involves the category-bound activities of „housework‟ (l. 29) and 
„staying at home for awhile‟ to raise children (l. 33).  
 In the final part of the exchange, I pose the provocative question, „only women 
can have children, but both men and women are able to raise kids, right‟ (ll. 35-36) to 
encourage further elaboration on the limitations imposed by „natural‟ differences. 
Notably, Yurika does not directly answer my question about men‟s and women‟s 
potentially shared parenting responsibilities, but instead „orients to‟ the ways in which 
women can manage the „double-burden‟ of paid and non-paid work (ll. 37-38). The 
„commonsense‟ of „natural‟ differences which positions women in a domestic role 
rationalizes the status quo and discourages the emergence of a „Shared parenting‟ 
repertoire.  
 In contrast to Akiko, who took up a resistant subject position in relation to a 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire, Yurika and Yuka appear to position 
themselves within what we can call a „professional homemaker‟ subject position. 
Although the reason why university-aged women accept the homemaker position is not 
specifically articulated in Yurika and Yuka‟s interview, Akiko had attributed university 
students‟ unwillingness to juggle the „double-burden‟ of domestic and non-domestic 
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work as a reason for their choice, but the reason why is unclear from their interview. 
Although it is unclear from their interview whether Yurika and Yuka assume the 
„homemaker‟ or „superwoman‟ subject position, they can be seen as constructing their 
subjectivity in line with hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3) because they accept 
the „commonsense‟ offered by a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire which 
positions women in a domestic role irrespective of their non-domestic responsibilities. 
6.3.3 Reiko, Manami, Moeko: Challenging Hegemonic Femininity  
 The third group of extracts is from an interview with a group of three 
university seniors who were then twenty-two. Reiko, Manami, and Moeko. Their 
extracts are interesting because of the way they resist a „Women as eventually domestic‟ 
repertoire through reported speech. In the first extract, Reiko complains about her 
father‟s non-involvement in domestic affairs: 
Extract 10 
28 Justin: So you said that ideas about masculinity are changing, but have men‟s ideas 
29 about things like housework and childcare changed? 
30 Reiko: My dad definitely won‟t do housework. Women should do housework. It‟s  
31 not just because I‟m a kid. It‟s like, “because you‟re a woman, why not do it? Even  
32 though I‟m not doing anything, women should definitely do it”.  
33 Moeko: My older brother is in his late twenties, so he‟s slowly starting to think about 
34 marriage. If he gets married, they might both work. If he can‟t cook, then it becomes   
35 a burden on his wife. So recently he‟s started cooking. 
36 Reiko: Come to think of it, yappari your brother has that way of thinking. I don‟t  
37 think my dad thinks like that.  
38 Manami: But it reflects his generation, don‟t you think?  
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39 Reiko: Yeah and my mother understands that. 
40 Manami: Older men are probably thinking in that way. My dad doesn‟t cook either. 
41 Reiko: It‟s not “help out your mother”, but “because you‟re a woman help out”. It‟s   
42 like because he‟s a man it‟s okay not to help out. 
43 Manami: Not “help out your mother” but “you do it”. 
44 Reiko: Men who live alone are probably different. 
45 Justin: Has he ever been „tanshinfunin‟ [transferred to a far-off post] before?   
46 Reiko: Yeah. It looks like he cooked, did housework and laundry during that time. I 
47 don‟t really know to what extent he actually cooked. 
In contrast to Yurika and Yuka who do not challenge the „naturalness‟ of 
women‟s domestic role, Reiko, Manami, and Moeko resist a homemaker subject 
position offered by a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire. Reiko produces the 
following strong claim about her father‟s refusal to do domestic work, „my dad 
definitely won‟t do housework‟ (l. 30), which challenges the „commonsense‟ intrinsic to 
a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire because it implies that he should. The 
membership categorization device, „onna no hito dakara‟ (because you‟re a woman; l. 
31), which is presented within hypothetical reported speech, frames housework as a 
category-bound activity that women engage in (see section 5.3). Reiko uses hypothetical 
reported speech in order to evidence her father‟s views about the division of domestic 
labor (see sections 5.2.3; 5.2.8).   
Reiko, I argue, strategically employs reported speech not only to evidence but 
also to criticize her father‟s views of housework (see sections 5.2.3-5.2.4). Arguably, 
she is „voicing‟ (see section 5.2.1) her father in order to offer up his purported „gendered‟ 
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views to the other participants for them to negatively assess. She attempts to elicit their 
assessment on four occasions. First, she produces the statement, „jibun ha nani mo 
yateinai no ni onna no hito ga zetai yaru beki da‟ („even though I‟m not doing anything, 
women should definitely do it‟; ll. 31-32). The „critical‟ nature of this utterance is 
conveyed by „nani mo‟ („anything‟), which is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 
1986) that „upgrades‟ Reiko‟s negative assessment of her father‟s domestic contribution 
from minimal to non-existent and makes her account rhetorically stronger. The extreme 
case formulation may leave no doubt in her hearers‟ minds that her father makes no 
contribution whatsoever to domestic affairs. She discursively contrasts her father‟s lack 
of contribution with his expectation that women „zetai yaru beki da‟ („should definitely 
do it‟) to criticize the sexist nature of his alleged views. 
In the next turn (l. 33), Moeko does not evaluate Reiko‟s use of reported speech, 
but instead works up an account of her own brother which suggests that younger men‟s 
consciousness about domestic work is changing (ll. 33-35). Reiko continues by 
acknowledging Moeko‟s contribution („yappari your brother has that way of thinking‟; 
l.36), but then shifts the topic back to her father and explicitly asserts, „I don‟t think my 
dad thinks like that‟ (l. 37). The shift back to the topic of her father represents Reiko‟s 
second attempt to elicit an evaluation of her critical account of her father. Nevertheless, 
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Manami orients to Moeko‟s contribution instead and proposes that Reiko‟s father is 
simply a product of his generation („but it reflects his generation‟; l. 38). Instead of 
supporting Reiko‟s account of her father, Moeko and Manami reconstruct and restrict 
Reiko‟s account as applicable to men of a certain age.  
 Reiko‟s third attempt to elicit an assessment of the account of her father is by 
criticizing him within reported speech („it‟s not “help out your mother”, but “because 
you‟re a woman help out”; l. 41). The account contrasts sex-based category-bound 
activities (e.g., preparing a meal) to elicit this assessment. Diverging from her previous 
turns, however, she not only reports speech, but also explicitly assesses that speech (ll. 
41-42). Although she risks being seen as having a personal investment in criticizing her 
father, this explicit assessment may represent a fourth attempt to get the hearers to 
critically assess the account of her father. If so, this time Reiko is successful as Manami 
reproduces Reiko‟s reported speech which criticizes Reiko‟s father („not “help out your 
mother” but “you do it”‟; l. 43). The critical nature of Manami‟s contribution is 
suggested by the use of the imperative „you do it,‟ which was not present in Reiko‟s 
original utterance („because you‟re a woman help out‟; l. 41).    
Reiko acknowledges that her comments may not apply to men who live alone (l. 
44), which may strengthen her account. Discounting exceptions is an example of 
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„particularization‟ (Billig, 1987; see Section 6.2.1, Extract 1), which Reiko 
accomplishes by acknowledging exceptions, e.g. men who live alone and men like 
Moeko‟s brother, which results in „particularizing‟ her account to men of her father‟s 
generation. „Particularization‟ allows Reiko to formulate an account which is not simply 
a personal attack on her father, which could arguably be attributed to another reason, e.g. 
she is angry with him. Therefore, when seen with other considerations, Reiko‟s use of 
reported speech reduces the chance that the other participants will view her as 
personally invested in criticizing her father and strengthens her overall account.    
This example nicely illustrates the assessment function of reported speech and 
its use as a device to manage speaker accountability (see sections 3.2.3; 5.2.5). The first 
instance of reported speech is presented to Reiko‟s interlocutors in order to elicit an 
evaluation from them (l. 31). The „critical‟ and thus evaluative nature of Reiko‟s 
reported speech is suggested by the extreme case formulation „anything‟ and „should 
definitely do‟ (l. 32) when Reiko formulates her father‟s presupposition that women 
make domestic contributions. This initial attempt to solicit an evaluation is unsuccessful 
because Moeko formulates an account of her brother, which actually counters Reiko‟s 
account (ll. 33-35). Reiko makes a second attempt to elicit the hearers‟ assessment by 
switching the topic back to her own father and asserting that Moeko‟s account is 
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inapplicable to him (l. 37). Manami, however, does not assess Reiko‟s father‟s reported 
views, but instead proposes that he is simply a product of his generation. Reiko‟s third 
attempt (l. 41) is upgraded by Reiko‟s explicit evaluation of her father (ll. 41-42). A 
potential reason why Reiko makes this assessment is because Manami and Moeko fail 
to pick up on her criticism, so she now more directly points them to the critical nature of 
her account. In contrast to Holt‟s (2000) findings, where speaker‟s explicit assessments 
follow hearer‟s assessments, Reiko directly assesses the reported speech. The case of 
Reiko does however support Buttny (1997) and Buttny and Williams (2000), who found 
that speaker‟s direct assessments can follow reported speech (see section 5.2.4). Reiko‟s 
final attempt, i.e.„it‟s like because he‟s a man it‟s okay not to help out‟, is indeed 
successful as Manami orientates to it as a complaint and extends it further through 
reported speech („not “help out your mother” but “you do it”‟; l. 43).   
The sequential location of the speaker‟s explicit assessment can be tied to 
speaker accountability. As Holt (2000) illustrates (see section 5.2.4), when a hearer first 
makes an assessment of a speaker‟s reported speech, the speaker can then produce an 
assessment which appears to be in response to it and thus to affiliate with the hearer. 
The speaker‟s accountability to the assessment is reduced and thus the speaker does not 
have a stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in producing that assessment. In Reiko‟s 
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account, there are clues which indicate that she is formulating a criticism of her father, 
thus she is not simply the „neutral‟ „animator‟ of another „principal‟s‟ speech (see 
section 5.2.6). On the other hand, explicitly assessing the reported speech before the 
hearer‟s assessment greatly increases the speaker‟s accountability and the speaker risks 
being seen as having a personal investment in the assessment, e.g. that Reiko is 
criticizing her father because she has a bone to pick with him. We can see how Reiko‟s 
initial attempts to elicit an assessment from Moeko and Manami are unsuccessful, her 
next strategy is the interactionally risky move of explicitly assessing the speech which 
does elicit the evaluation she is looking for. After Manami makes this assessment, Reiko 
attempts to distance herself from being seen as having a personal investment in 
criticizing her father by acknowledging that there are exceptions to her account. We see 
here then that reported speech is very much geared toward the interactional function of 
making an assessment and managing accountability. 
In the next extract, Reiko and Manami further challenge the „commonsense‟ of 
a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire: 
Extract 11 
134 Justin: Since you are planning to be a fulltime mother at least for a certain period of 
135 time, is it all right for your husband not to help out with the housework? 
136 Reiko: No, he needs to help out. My mother often says, “Even though you are tired 
137 from your job, the housework is waiting once you get home”. I suppose that applies 
138 to both full-time and part-time working women. For example, even if you are at  
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139 home for the whole day there is always so much to do. Men are thinking that since 
140 you are home all day there is plenty of time to relax.  
141 Manami: My mom can‟t take time off all week. She has time off from her part-time  
142 job, but since she has housework to do, she has no time off. My dad rests when he‟s 
143 at home.   
144 Reiko: Men think that because they‟re working at a company, it‟s okay to do   
145 nothing once they get home. “Because you‟re a member of this family, the chores 
146 you can do on your own, do them”. My mom said that when she was cooking my 
147 dad said, “Can I help out”. She seemed really disgusted. He thought something like, 
148 “I‟m going to help out”. She thought something like, “It‟s not „can I help out‟ just 
149 pitch in”. Men think that it‟s okay to do nothing. “My wife‟s cooking, but „can I 
150 help out‟”. „Can I help out‟. It‟s not „can I help out‟. It‟s okay to help out. It‟s  
151 okay to help out. If it‟s okay to help out, then that means the mother is playing the 
152 central role. It‟s like it goes without saying. It doesn‟t go without saying. It just so  
153 happened that mom‟s cooking. It would be fine for dad to make dinner as well. It 
154 would be fine for him to cook.  
Reiko uses reported speech to frame the central point of her narrative: 
housework is a task couples should share (ll. 136-137; see section 5.2.2). However, 
Reiko constructs „company‟ men as not thinking this way, „men are thinking that since 
you are home all day there is plenty of time to relax‟ (ll. 139-140)—reporting the 
thoughts of „men‟ as an aggregate and criticizing their views about housework (see 
section 5.2.7). By reporting the thoughts of men as a group, Reiko frames the account 
which follows as not simply representative of her father but of the „normative‟ thinking 
of most men, which she criticizes. Manami produces a turn which affiliates with Reiko‟s 
construction of men by constructing an affiliative account concerning her mother‟s 
fatigue and father‟s lack of involvement in domestic affairs (ll. 141-143). In contrast to 
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Manami‟s father, her mother is never able to rest because of ever present domestic 
responsibilities. In Reiko and Manami‟s critical accounts, „housework‟ is a 
category-bound activity wrongly restricted to „women‟ (see section 5.3).  
 Reiko uses Manami‟s turn to continue working up a critical account of men 
through both reported thought and reported speech. She uses reported thought to 
construct the account of her father‟s views about housework as representative of most 
men: „men think that because they‟re working at a company, it‟s okay to do nothing 
once they get home‟ (ll. 144-145), and reported speech as evidence to support her claim 
that men in general (and her father in particular) position housework as women‟s duty, 
which she contests: „“because you‟re a member of this family, the chores you can do on 
your own, do them”‟ (ll. 145-146). The critical nature of her account is suggested by the 
entire utterance and particularly the imperative, „do them‟, which she directs at her 
father. Reiko‟s direct criticism of her father is interactionally risky because she sets 
herself up for the charge of having a stake or interest (see section 3.2.3) in criticizing 
her father and being „unaffiliative‟. Nonetheless, she attempts to avoid this by first 
reporting the thoughts of men as a group (ll. 144-145), perhaps to make it appear as 
though she does not have a stake in specifically criticizing her father. To further support 
her claim that men position women as responsible for domestic work, she reconstructs a 
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narrative originally constructed by her mother (ll. 146-154).  
 At the onset of the narrative, Reiko reports her father‟s speech, „tetsudaou ka‟ 
(„can I help out‟; l. 147). This utterance becomes the basis from which Reiko formulates 
a critical account of her father. Reiko constructs her mother‟s assessment of „can I help 
out‟ as „sugoi mukatsuku rashi‟ („she seemed really disgusted‟; l. 147). By constructing 
the assessment of her father‟s utterance as generated from her mother, Reiko reduces her 
own accountability when it comes to the criticism of her father, her mother‟s reported 
assessment supporting Reiko‟s critical account of her father. In other words, Reiko‟s 
mother‟s assessment of her father‟s reported speech functions to support Reiko‟s own 
assessment of her father and men in general.   
Reiko next interprets her parents‟ thoughts about „can I help out‟ (ll. 148- 149). 
Although Reiko‟s father offered to „help out‟, her mother expected him to „yaru mitai‟ 
(„pitch in‟; ll. 148-149). Reconstructing the thoughts of her parents is an interactionally 
risky move because it is impossible to know for certain what others think. Again, Reiko 
risks being seen as having a personal investment in criticizing her father, i.e. a bone to 
pick with him regarding another issue. However, she avoids this charge by mitigating 
their reported thoughts with „something like‟ in lieu of the more direct „they thought‟. 
„Something like‟ provides Reiko with the rhetorical flexibility to make a claim about her 
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parents‟ thoughts, while at same time it reduces her accountability for those thoughts, i.e. 
„something like‟ is deniable while „they thought‟ is not. Their reported thoughts also 
function to reassert the previously stated central point of her narrative, „men think it‟s 
okay to do nothing‟ (ll. 144-145).  
Reiko next problematizes the embedded assumptions in „can I help out‟ (l. 148) 
and produces an extended complaint sequence about her father in particular and men in 
general („men think that it‟s okay to do nothing‟; l. 149). „Help out‟ entails the 
peripheral role of an assistant (her father), whereas her mother plays the primary role. 
Reiko repeats her father‟s reported „can I help out‟ and then explicitly criticizes it 
through negation: „tetsudaoukajyanakute‟ („it‟s not “can I help out‟”; l. 150). Therefore, 
she does not simply present the reported speech to the hearers to elicit their evaluation, 
but instead directly criticizes her father‟s reported peripheral role („it‟s not “can I 
help”‟). A direct assessment is rhetorically risky because Reiko is assuming a very clear 
stance in relation to the reported speech, i.e. that her father is wrong. One reason why 
she may have performed this direct criticism is because it is in relation to her mother‟s 
account and not an account which Reiko constructed and might be seen as having a 
personal investment in blaming her father, i.e. she has another bone to pick with him. 
Since Reiko‟s mother first reportedly criticizes her husband („she seemed really 
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disgusted‟; l. 147), Reiko can now „safely‟ construct her own criticism as a response to 
her mother‟s assessment. Rhetorically, Reiko‟s mother‟s account functions to bolster 
Reiko‟s reported claim that men view housework as „women‟s work‟, e.g. „women 
should do housework‟ (Extract 11; l. 30). Reiko continues to problematize „can I help 
out‟ by proclaiming „sore ha atarimaijyanai‟ („it does not goes without saying‟; l. 152) 
that women are primarily responsible for the management of domestic affairs, thus 
building up her account. Instead, Reiko constructs her mother cooking as „happenstance‟ 
and maintains that her father is equally capable of cooking, implying that if he can cook, 
he should („it‟s fine for him to cook‟; ll. 153-154). 
The extracts in section 6.3 have demonstrated how reported speech is a 
discursive device which can be used to or can function as evidence to support 
individuals‟ claims and thus corroborate accounts. In extract five, Akiko claims that 
while women today have careers, they are still expected to assume the greater burden of 
childcare (l. 30). In extracts six and eight she claims that women are „released‟ from 
work-related responsibilities due to their assumed domestic burden, which she 
authenticates by „voicing‟ a colleague (ll. 160; 309) in lieu of simply stating the 
assumption as her own opinion, and in doing so positions her colleague as drawing on a 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire in his conceptualization of gender-based 
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roles. Similarly, Reiko uses the reported speech of her father as evidence for her claim 
that men conceive of domestic work as women‟s responsibility, which she criticizes 
(extract 10; l. 31). The evidential function of reported speech is even more apparent in 
extract eleven where Reiko reconstructs her mother‟s reported account of her husband‟s 
assumption that women perform domestic work. Reiko‟s claim that men position 
women as „domestic‟ was initially demonstrated by „voicing‟ her father (extract 10), 
which was then further corroborated by „voicing‟ her mother (extract 11). For both 
Akiko and Reiko, simply stating their claims in the form of an opinion, i.e. men believe 
that women should do domestic work, would not have been as rhetorically effective as 
using reported speech or thought. Reported speech and thought can thus be rhetorical 
devices which strengthen one‟s claims and thus corroborate accounts.  
The accounts of Akiko, Reiko, Moeko, and Manami also illustrate how 
reported speech is a discursive phenomenon that involves drawing on and assuming 
subject positions in relation to interpretative repertoires. Akiko contested a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire by evaluating the expectation that women are expected 
to leave work early in order to pick up their children from school and consequently are 
passed over for promotion as unfair (Extract 5, ll. 35-36; Extract 6, l. 160). By rejecting 
a professional homemaker subject position and adopting a superwoman position, Akiko 
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attempts to challenge hegemonic femininity as a subjectivity located exclusively in the 
domestic realm to an identity that is situated in both domestic and non-domestic spheres 
(see also Chapter 8). Reiko, Manami and Moeko also resist a professional homemaker 
subject position when Reiko criticizes her father and many men‟s reported assumption 
that women should perform all the domestic work. Reiko, Manami, and Moeko concur 
that domestic work is the shared responsibility of husband and wife, thus they redefine 
hegemonic femininity as not only located in both domestic and non-domestic roles, but 
also domestic work is shared between spouses. These accounts illustrate how 
individuals do have agency to contest the hegemonic gender order articulated by a 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire and construct gender subjectivities outside 
of hegemonic femininity.  
In this second part of Chapter 6, I have attempted to address research question 
number one, i.e. „What interpretative repertoires do participants draw on as they 
discursively construct (a) hegemonic femininity?‟ „Women as eventually domestic‟ is an 
interpretative repertoire participants use to discursively construct hegemonic femininity.  
Research question 1(a) asks, „What discursive features are associated with 
interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity?‟ Participants‟ use of the 
explicit category references, „onna no hito dakara‟ („because you‟re a woman‟) and 
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category-bound activity of domestic work, suggest that membership categories are a 
discursive feature associated with „Women as eventually domestic‟. The use of „yappari‟ 
to construct gender „appropriate‟ category-bound activities as „commonsense‟ (see 
section 5.4.2) is another discursive feature associated with the construction of 
hegemonic femininity. Most noticeably, the participants heavily draw on „reported 
speech‟ (see section 5.2); therefore, we can conceptualize this device as a main 
discursive feature associated with the construction of hegemonic femininity. In section 
6.4, I discuss in more detail the role reported speech plays in the construction of 
hegemonic femininity.   
Regarding research question 1(b), „What subject positions (self and other) do 
participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic 
femininity‟, the participants demonstrate their agency by assuming different positions. 
Akiko (see extracts 5-8) takes up a „superwoman‟ subject position which involves 
juggling the responsibilities of home and work. Yurika and Yuka (see extract 9) accept 
women‟s performance of domestic work as „commonsense‟ (see section 5.4.2); however, 
it is unclear from their interview whether they align with a „professional homemaker‟ or 
„superwoman‟ subject position. Reiko, Moeko, and Manami (see extracts 10-11) assume 
resistant subject positions in relation to the repertoire, reformulating „Women as 
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eventually domestic‟ to what we can call „Domestic work as shared between spouses‟.  
My findings illustrate how hegemonic femininity is discursively constructed by 
drawing on and assuming subject positions in relation to a gendered „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ IR. I am not proposing that these 
findings are either unique to Japan or characteristic of all contexts in Japan. Making 
such a claim would run the risk of proposing an „essentialist‟ conceptualization of 
Japanese hegemonic femininity as inherently different from other societies. In fact, 
other research has determined that women are positioned as responsible for domestic 
work irrespective of their career-related responsibilities (e.g., Hochschild & Machung, 
2003; Lazar, 2000). The subjectivities of homemaker and superwoman can be viewed as 
subordinate to the „masculine‟ „full-time employee‟ who automatically receives 
domestic support which places him in an advantageous position over the „superwoman‟ 
who struggles with the „double-burden‟. My findings exemplify the discursive 
construction of hegemonic femininity in the accounts of women of different ages. 
Hegemonic femininity quite conceivably materializes in different forms both inside 
Japan and within other CofPs (see section 2.1.2). 
6.4 The main discursive functions of reported speech and reported thought in the 
interpretative repertoires used to construct hegemonic femininity     
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 In this section, I focus on how my participants use reported speech and thought 
and hypothetical reported speech and thought to achieve various discursive functions 
and construct or resist hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). I also discuss the 
rhetorical strengths and weaknesses of these.  
6.4.1 The discursive functions of reported speech and thought 
Reported speech is used as evidence to support a speaker‟s claim (see section 
5.2.3). For example, Mayumi (extract 3) claims that the dual pursuits of motherhood 
and work are incompatible. In order to corroborate this claim, she voices her friend who 
attests to the unfeasibility of combining these twin pursuits (e.g., „it‟s no good‟).  
Reported speech is rhetorically stronger than reported thought because speech 
was ostensibly uttered by someone else while thought represents a speaker‟s 
construction and thus interpretation of another‟s thought since thought itself is not 
always verbally articulated. Accordingly, a claim produced within reported thought can 
be undermined on the grounds that it is impossible to know someone‟s thoughts. For 
instance, Reiko‟s (extract 10) claim that men think women should do housework could 
be discredited on the grounds that it is impossible for Reiko to know thoughts. However, 
Reiko rhetorically protects the authenticity of her claim by also using reported speech to 
explicitly evidence her father‟s views about housework, which she claims are 
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representative of most men‟s thinking. Since Reiko‟s interpretation of her father‟s 
purported views (reported thought) about housework is supported by reported speech, 
Reiko can conceivably make a claim about her father‟s thoughts about housework 
without it being undermined. Therefore, reported speech and thought can be deployed 
together to further corroborate a speaker‟s overall account (see also section 7.4.3)   
 A speaker can use reported speech to criticize someone else. For instance, 
Reiko (extract 11) presents her father as offering to help her mother with dinner 
preparations within reported speech. Reiko repeats her father‟s reported utterance, „can I 
help out‟, which she uses as the basis of her criticism of his „sexist‟ view that domestic 
work is women‟s responsibility. In this case, reported speech is rhetorically stronger 
than reported thought because speech explicitly evidences her father‟s purported views 
about housework. Reiko‟s criticism of her father would have been less rhetorically 
effective had she used reported thought, e.g. „he thinks housework is women‟s 
responsibility‟, because thought represents Reiko‟s interpretation of her father‟s views. 
By utilizing reported speech, she reconstructs the „actual‟ words which her father 
presumably uttered and then criticized them.     
 The reported thought of an aggregate is a more rhetorically effective form of 
support for a claim than the thought of an individual. For example, Reiko (extracts 
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10-11) claims that men think housework is women‟s responsibility. The reported speech 
of an aggregate (e.g. „men say X‟) could be used to achieve a similar rhetorical purpose 
but would not have had the same rhetorical force. Whereas reported speech is 
provisional and uttered in a specific conversational setting, reported thought represents 
something deeper and more enduring (i.e. a belief system) and for this reason is an 
appropriate device to formulate a criticism. In Reiko‟s case, men do not simply 
comment that housework is women‟s responsibility, but instead this view is formulated 
as constituting part of their belief system. Accordingly, reporting the thoughts of an 
aggregate is a way to construct „normativity‟ because a certain way of thinking is 
presented as representative of a group, which the speaker can then take issue with.   
 I suggested that reported thought is less rhetorically effective than reported 
speech from the standpoint that thought can be discredited. One way to rhetorically 
insulate against a claim being undermined is to use mitigated reported thought. For 
example, Reiko (extract 11), presents her father‟s offer to assist her mother with dinner 
within reported speech („can I help out‟), which she then interprets within mitigated 
reported thought („he thought something like‟). Mitigated reported thought allows Reiko 
to interpret her father‟s reported utterance and concurrently avoid claiming direct 
knowledge of his thoughts. While reported speech evidences her father‟s purported 
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views about domestic work, Reiko is able to provide an interpretation of those views 
through mitigated reported thought which corroborates her overall claim that men 
regard domestic work as women‟s responsibility. 
6.4.2 The discursive functions of hypothetical reported speech and thought 
 Hypothetical reported speech is a rhetorically effective device to construct a 
hypothetical situation which illustrates the central point of a narrative (see section 5.2.8). 
For example, Akiko (extract 8) constructs a hypothetical scenario where she says to her 
colleague, „let‟s hit the next bar‟ and he suggests that she go home. Akiko uses 
hypothetical reported speech to convey the main point of her narrative which is that her 
colleague positions women in domestic roles. Hypothetical reported speech is more 
rhetorically effective than hypothetical reported thought because Akiko can demonstrate 
her colleague‟s potential response to her suggestion to „hit another bar‟, which 
illustrates his positioning of women in domestic roles. In this case, hypothetical 
reported thought (e.g., „He thought I should go home) is less rhetorically effective 
because it conveys Akiko‟s interpretation of his thoughts versus hypothetical speech 
which „stands alone‟ or „speaks for itself‟ (e.g., „Someone would say, “Your husband‟s 
waiting, so why don‟t you go home‟).  
 A speaker can also use hypothetical reported speech to construct a hypothetical 
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situation which he or she then criticizes. For example, Akiko (extract 6) takes issue with 
the notion that women should make tea, which she presents within hypothetical reported 
speech („if someone says, “Because you‟re a woman, if you don‟t make the tea…” I 
hate it‟.). In this case, hypothetical reported speech is more rhetorically effective than 
hypothetical reported thought because speech allows Akiko to criticize an utterance 
which could be uttered whereas she could not conceivably criticize thoughts which are 
not explicitly articulated, but reside within individuals (e.g., „If someone thinks…‟).  
 A speaker can use hypothetical reported thought to support a claim. For 
instance, Mayumi (extract 4) claims that people who wait too long to get married will 
remain single. In this case, hypothetical reported speech could also have been used (e.g. 
„you won‟t say, “I want to marry this person”‟); however, as I mentioned in 6.4.1, 
thought indexes a speaker‟s belief system and is a more effective device to strengthen a 
speaker‟s account. Hypothetical reported thought allows Mayumi to present this person 
as having decided not to get married whereas hypothetical reported speech still allows 
for the possibility that the person may at some point change his or her mind and want to 
marry this person.   
6.5 Conclusion   
 This chapter has discussed how hegemonic femininity was discursively 
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constructed by different Japanese women (two individuals, a pair, and a group) who 
assumed heterogeneous subject positions in relation to „Women as natural caregivers‟ 
and „Women as eventually domestic‟ IRs. These subject positions included a 
professional homemaker, superwoman, and shifting between these positions. The 
repertoires were identified through the occurrence in respondents‟ interview discourse 
of different discourse analytic devices: reported speech, membership categorization 
devices, and yappari, and particular uses of these which functioned to evidence claims, 
„naturalize‟ gendered category-bound activities, and construct „commonsense‟ (see 
sections 5.2-5.4) These repertoires reflect and arguably construct commonplace 
assumptions about Japanese hegemonic femininity within which women are positioned 
as „devoted‟ wives and „dutiful‟ mothers.  
We also saw the emergence of ideological dilemmas generated from 
contradictions between interpretative repertoires (see section 6.2.1). Participants 
struggled with ideological dilemmas due to contradictions between „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟, and repertoires which do not position 
women as making their social contribution in the domestic realm as expressed within 
the same interview. In extract four, Mayumi constructs an account where her friend 
faces a dilemma involving balancing her domestic roles with a career, which Mayumi 
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constructs as next to impossible. Thus, „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ can be seen as not providing women with much discursive space to 
construct subjectivities outside of hegemonic femininity in contexts where these 
repertoires are dominant.  
 This chapter also highlights the symbolic dimension of gender relations (see 
section 2.2.4). A gender differences IR (see section 6.2), I argue, is largely about the 
widespread practice of attaching social significance to women‟s reproductive capacity. 
However, the consequences of this IR are far-reaching in that it positions women‟s 
social contribution within the domestic realm or certain „pastoral occupations‟, and 
bodily differences between men and women become the rhetorical rationale for 
legitimizing social inequalities (Weedon 1997).  
The focus of Chapter 7 is also on the discursive construction of hegemonic 
femininity and presents discursive evidence of a „Privileged femininity‟ and „Bounded 
femininity‟ repertoire which participants drew on and assumed positions in relation to. 
 
Chapter 7: Hegemonic Femininity Part II: ‘Privileged Femininity’ 
7.1 Introduction  
This is the second of two chapters concerning the discursive construction of 
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hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). Specifically, this chapter discusses a 
„Privileged femininity‟ and a „Bounded femininity‟ interpretative repertoire (IR) which 
participants draw on as they constructed subjectivities in line with hegemonic femininity. 
In this chapter I attempt to address research questions 1, 1(a), 1(b), and 2 (see section 
6.1). „  
 In order to answer research questions 1, 1(a) and 1(b), I was attempting to 
identify interpretative repertoires that participants draw on, and position self and others 
in relation to, as they construct hegemonic femininity subjectivities. In the course of 
data analysis and categorization (see section 4.7), I noticed that participants discussed 
how „being a woman‟ was advantageous in some situations while disadvantageous in 
others. In the course of my reading, I came across reference to a „Privileged femininity‟ 
discourse (Kitetu & Sunderland, 2000), which seemed to apply to parts of my data. 
Through further reading, I discovered the related concept of „Bounded 
masculinity/unbounded femininity‟ (Sunderland, 1995), which I also thought was 
applicable to my data and the concept could be further extended in my study. In this 
chapter, I extend the work of Kitetu and Sunderland (2000) and Sunderland (1995) in 
my identification, discussion and exemplification of a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire 
and „Bounded femininity‟ repertoire.  
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 „Privileged femininity‟ (Kitetu & Sunderland, 2000) was originally named in 
reference to discourse which maintains that female students deserve preferential 
treatment within classroom contexts in Kenya to compensate for past discrimination. A 
teacher who devotes more attention to female rather than male students during a science 
experiment is an example of this discourse in action (Kitetu & Sunderland, 2000).  
Stemming from my own data analysis, I am defining „Privileged femininity‟ as 
giving women preferential treatment which does not ultimately benefit them. Opening 
doors for women and related „chivalrous‟ behavior, which exemplify ‘Privileged 
femininity‟ are not necessarily meant to rectify past instances of gender discrimination 
as in the case of Kenya, but are often commonly accepted as „social etiquette‟. Although 
such practices are preferred over misogyny or „negative‟ gender discrimination, they are 
far from ideal since they presuppose women and men are inherently different and 
warrant differential treatment. Indeed, an action such as opening the door for women 
positions men in a protective and arguably superior position vis-à-vis women, thus 
disempowering them.   
In my sample of relatively economically privileged participants, I show how 
„Privileged femininity‟ manifests in two slightly different, but interrelated, forms. First, 
femininity can be seen as privileged when participants position themselves as fortunate 
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to be released from the pressure to excel academically and professionally compared to 
their male counterparts who face these pressures because of social expectation that they 
become family breadwinners.  
„Privileged femininity‟ also manifests in another form. As an example, women 
are channeled into jobs such as receptionists or OLs (see section 1.3) where their youth 
and femininity are seen as resources which enhance their ability to work in customer 
relations (Gottfried, 2003). In this case, emphasizing one‟s femininity „qualifies‟ women 
for certain jobs within the service industry, i.e. in supermarkets and department stores 
(Kimoto, 2005). The other side of the coin of „Privileged femininity‟ is that women are 
routinely excluded from managerial positions which incur more responsibilities, higher 
salaries, and arguably greater social prestige.  
In her identification and naming of a „Bounded masculinity/unbounded‟ 
femininity‟ discourse, Sunderland (1995) proposes that in some „communities of 
practice‟ (see section 2.1.2) the boundaries of femininity may be more fluid than those 
of masculinity. In these CofPs, girls can more easily engage in „gender crossing‟ 
(Thorne, 1993) or participate in „boys activities‟, while boys are not afforded the same 
luxury. Nevertheless, Sunderland is careful to point out that „Bounded 
masculinity/unbounded femininity‟ is highly situated and in many communities of 
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practice femininity is much more „bounded‟ or restrictive than masculinity, greater 
punishment for women who commit adultery in such contexts being a prime example. 
Building on Sunderland‟s (1995) work, „Bounded femininity‟ can be defined as 
situations where „being female‟ somehow inhibits women‟s opportunities. In my sample, 
„Bounded femininity‟ manifests in two slightly different, but interrelated, forms. First, 
femininity can be conceptualized as bounded when employers position women as 
„temporary employees‟ because they will eventually resign and pursue full-time 
motherhood (see extract 17). Such employers can be seen as drawing on a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire and positioning women as „wives/mothers‟ and working 
professions might be „mutually exclusive‟ categories. The existence of a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire „binds‟ women to domestic roles and prevents them 
from constructing other subjectivities.     
Another form of „Bounded femininity‟ is the relegation of women to „feminine‟ 
duties within the workplace. For instance, Keiko and Michi (extract 18) draw on a 
„Bounded femininity‟ repertoire in their claim that men position their women colleagues 
within „motherly‟ roles as men reportedly expect women to serve the food at 
work-related social events. This reported expectation can be interdiscursively related to 
a „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire (see section 6.2) because women are 
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expected to perform the „maternal‟ function of serving food to others.    
„Privileged femininity‟ and „Bounded‟ femininity are „highly occasioned‟ 
repertoires which are situated within specific communities of practice which need to be 
viewed with a critical eye. Women‟s „privileges‟ such as the „freedom‟ to quit their jobs 
may initially appear as though „women have it better‟; however, the „privileges‟ 
associated with femininity are insignificant compared to the greater privileges 
associated with masculinity (e.g. material wealth and social prestige). The limits of 
„Privileged femininity‟ become even more apparent when we consider how women are 
„bound‟ to domestic roles or „feminine‟ roles within the workplace. Significantly, 
„Privileged femininity‟ and „Bounded femininity‟ both position women in domestic-type 
and arguably subordinate roles, which indicate that these are not pro-female repertoires 
but in fact detrimental to women.         
7.2 The role of ‘Privileged femininity’ in the construction of HF  
 In Chapter 6 I characterized hegemonic femininity as being discursively 
supported by a „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire and „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ IR. „Privileged femininity‟ is another manifestation of hegemonic femininity 
which is related to these. The „freedom‟ women reportedly receive to resign from work 
can be rationalized on the basis that women, not men, are „natural caregivers‟ who are 
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„suited‟ for domestic roles, which are not coincidentally unpaid and undervalued. 
„Privileged femininity‟ more closely resembles the original definition of gender 
hegemony which is compliance through consent not coercion (see section 2.5.1) than 
„Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ which more 
explicitly position women in a subordinate role. „Privileged femininity‟ positions 
women as possessing agency to choose not to work; however, the only access route to 
this „privilege‟ is through a domestic partnership where women remain financially 
dependent on their husbands. „Privileged femininity‟ illustrates how gender hegemony 
can operate subtly through a repertoire which appears to empower women when in fact 
it disempowers them.   
7.2.1 ‘Privileged femininity’ at high school and university 
 In this section I present extracts from interviews which illustrate how 
participants draw on and take up subject positions in relation to „Privileged femininity‟ 
in their discussions about high school and university. Not surprisingly, interviews with 
university students often focused on their educational experiences, so I have selected 
two extracts from separate interviews with university students which illustrate how 
femininity can be „liberating‟ within the context of school. I first present an extract 
which describes how boys are reportedly pressured to excel in school while girls are not. 
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Then I present an extract with a student who takes up a resistant position to this lack of 
pressure and arguably to „Privileged femininity‟.  
 In this first extract, Ai and Ayaka were university sophomores who were 
nineteen at the time of the interview:  
Extract 12 
129 Justin: Do you think that men and women are different? 
128 Ayaka: Men have a stronger desire [than women] to face challenges. 
129 Ai: Getting into college is a perfect example. There‟s the way of thinking that since 
130 you‟re a woman if you go to a university in Aichi prefecture, you can get a job. It‟s 
131 unnecessary for a woman to go to the extent of becoming a ronin in order to enter a  
132 competitive university. Yappari there are women who have a university in mind that 
133 they want to go to. They‟ll keep studying even if it means becoming ronin. I think 
134 that‟s great. Yappari the ratio of men who think that way is greater. You hear about 
135 making a fresh start. Women have a stronger tendency to do the things they want to 
136 for the time being.  
137 Ayaka: Men are thinking yappari that they have to support [their families]. For  
138 example, if they graduate from a university such as Nanzan the chances of landing a 
139 good job are higher. Many people are thinking that yappari women don‟t need to 
140 exert themselves to that extent. Many people are thinking that if men don‟t get a 
141 good job yappari that‟s no good.   
 Ai draws on a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire when she positions women as 
free from the pressure to enter competitive universities and able to pursue the „things 
they want‟—unlike men, who are default breadwinners. „Traces‟ (Talbot, 1998) of the 
repertoire are first evident when Ai makes a reference to the category „onna dattara‟ 
(since you‟re a woman‟; ll. 129-130) and category-bound activities (see section 5.3) of 
attending a local (versus a distant, more competitive) university (l. 130). Ai continues, 
266 
 
„it‟s unnecessary for a woman to go to the extent of becoming a ronin in order to enter a 
competitive university‟ (ll. 130-132). „Ronin‟ are high school students who fail a 
university entrance examination and spend a year or more preparing to resit the exam 
(Sugimoto, 2003). The „inference-rich‟ nature of categories allows us to conclude that 
becoming a ronin and entering a competitive university are category-bound activities 
which apply to men and not women.    
Ai next uses „particularization‟ (Billig, 1987) as a rhetorical strategy by 
incorporating into her account women who desire admittance to competitive universities 
(132-133), but then constructs them as not representative of the masses, „yappari the 
ratio of men who think that way is greater‟ (l. 134). Yappari formulates men‟s but not 
women‟s purported desire to enter prestigious universities as commonsense (see section 
5.4.2). Ai also constructs „Men as breadwinners‟ as commonsense through the use of 
yappari („Men are thinking yappari that they have to support [their families]; l. 137). 
Yappari and the discursive absence of a „Women as breadwinners‟ repertoire position 
entering a competitive university and securing a good job as men‟s category-bound 
activities. Men who fail to secure a decent job are reportedly viewed in the following 
way, „Many people are thinking that if men don‟t get a good job yappari that‟s no good; 
ll. 140-141). Women, by contrast, are reportedly „released‟ from this expectation, 
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indicating that Ai is at least indirectly drawing on a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire, 
„Many people are thinking that yappari women don‟t need to exert themselves to that 
extent‟ (ll. 139-140). These reported category-bound activities reference a conventional 
domestic division of labor where women „care‟ and men „provide‟.  
In the course of constructing her account, Ai discursively manages her own 
accountability to the claim that men and women are reportedly held to different 
expectations by positioning the claim as originating from „society‟. She references a 
„kangaekata‟ („way of thinking; ll. 129-130), which frames the claim that it is 
unnecessary for women to attend far-off, competitive universities as coming from 
society and is not simply representative of (or even necessarily) her own opinion. Ai 
further corroborates this claim by acknowledging exceptions, i.e. women with high 
educational aspirations (ll. 132-133). These women are formulated as „exceptions‟ 
because „yappari the ratio of men who think that way is greater‟ (l. 134). By making a 
more direct claim about „what men think‟, Ai opens herself up to the charge of having a 
personal investment in this claim, i.e. she claims to know what is going on in men‟s 
minds; she avoids this by positioning it as commonsense. Having acknowledged 
exceptions and articulated men‟s views about educational success, she can then make a 
direct claim about women without being seen as having a stake or interest (see section 
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3.2.3) in the claim, „women have a strong tendency to do the things they want for the 
time being‟ (ll. 135-136).  
In the latter part of her account, Ai draws on reported thought of men as a 
group to further corroborate her claim that men and women face different expectations 
regarding their futures (see section 5.2.7). She first makes a direct claim, „men are 
thinking yappari that they have to support [their families]‟ (l. 137). Making a direct 
claim about how men think is rhetorically risky because it could be argued that it is 
impossible for Ai to possess knowledge about men‟s or indeed anyone‟s thoughts. 
However, Ai draws on what could be named a „Men as breadwinners‟ repertoire when 
she states that men think, „yappari that they have to support their families‟ (l. 137). The 
repertoire is suggested by „yappari‟ and the category-bound activity of supporting a 
family. The rhetorical „force‟ of this repertoire supports her claim about men‟s reported 
thinking and makes her account rhetorically stronger. She next claims that women are 
not reportedly expected to enter competitive universities: „many people are thinking that 
yappari women don‟t need to exert themselves to that extent‟ (ll. 139-140). Ai attributes 
this claim to „many people‟ which functions rhetorically to position the claim as 
pertaining to most members of Japanese society, thus corroborating it. „Many people‟ 
also functions to bolster her earlier claim that women with high expectations are 
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exceptions to the norm (ll. 132-133). Finally, Ai claims that „men as breadwinners‟ is a 
repertoire that is not only available to men, but circulates in Japanese society, „many 
people are thinking that if men don‟t get a good job yappari that‟s no good‟ (l. 140-141). 
I next present an extract from an interview with Hiromi and Mariko who were 
university sophomores and nineteen at the time of the interview. In contrast to Ai and 
Ayaka, who did not explicitly resist „Privileged femininity‟, Hiromi problematizes the 
„commonsense‟ constructed by this repertoire:  
Extract 13 
139 Justin: What are the good points about being a woman? 
140 Mariko: Yappari being cherished by others.  
141 Hiromi: One more thing that I can think of is that my parents say to my older  
142 brother “study hard,” but they‟ve never said that to me even once. They‟ve said to 
143 me for a long time, “Because you‟re a girl, it‟s okay not to study.”  
144 Mariko: Really? 
145 Hiromi: When I was choosing a college they said, “Because you‟re a girl, really,  
146 even a private college is fine. Anyplace is fine.” 
147 Justin: Did they tell your brother to study hard? 
148 Hiromi: They didn‟t say, “study hard” but “if you don‟t study, you won‟t be able to 
149 land a good job in the future.” I was always told, “just do what you like. Women 
150 don‟t need to worry about anything.” Everyone probably says that, but I wasn‟t  
151 very happy when I heard it. You won‟t do anything without some pressure. 
152 Mariko: That‟s true, but Hiromi you turned out all right. 
153 Justin: You even studied abroad.   
154 Hiromi: My parents let me do whatever I wanted. In a good way, I had a lot of  
155 freedom. On the other hand they never said, “Do such and such”. If my brother had 
156 asked to study abroad, there‟s no way they would have let him. 
157 Justin: Why do you think that is? 
158 Hiromi: Because it might affect his future. 
159 Justin: Do you think that women have more freedom than men? 
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160 Hiromi: People say that but I wonder really.  
In this account, we can see the reported repercussions of privileged femininity 
in school. Mariko initially cites „kawaigatteiru‟(„being cherished by others‟; l.140) as a 
positive aspect of being a woman, which is framed as „commonsense‟ by yappari. While 
„love‟ can semantically convey a couple‟s egalitarian relationship, „kawaigatteiru‟ may 
imply an unequal relationship, i.e. a father who cherishes his daughter. Likewise, if a 
woman is cherished by others, a further connotation may be that she is „fragile‟ and 
requires protection by someone stronger than her. It is interesting that Mariko constructs 
being cherished by others, presumably men, as a positive aspect of femininity.  
Hiromi next formulates an account where her parents‟ reportedly position her 
brother and her differently in terms of their expectations for their futures. Notably, 
Hiromi positively constructs a certain degree of pressure. She draws extensively on the 
reported speech of her parents coupled with membership categorization devices as 
evidence for her claim that providing children with too much freedom is not necessarily 
good (see sections 5.2-5.3). Gender-based category-bound activities are evident when 
Hiromi‟s parents reportedly tell her brother to “study hard”, yet „they‟ve never said that 
to me even once‟ (line 142). By negating hypothetical reported speech (see section 
5.2.7), Hiromi is arguably making a negative assessment of her parents‟ low 
expectations for her; that is, she is explicitly flagging what her parents have reportedly 
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never said to her but could and perhaps „should‟ have. Hiromi‟s parents reportedly tell 
her, „because you‟re a girl, it‟s okay not to study‟ (l. 143). „Onna no ko dakara‟ 
(„because you‟re a girl‟) is an explicit reference to the category „girl‟ and 
category-bound activity of not studying, which Hiromi expands upon further, „when I 
was choosing a college they said, “because you‟re a girl, really, even a private college is 
fine. Anyplace is fine”‟ (ll. 145-146). „Doko demo („anyplace‟) is an „extreme case 
formulation‟ (Pomerantz, 1986) which „upgrades‟ her claim that she was not only 
reportedly „released‟ from the pressure to enter a very competitive public university or 
less competitive private university, but told that any university is fine—implying where 
she studies and what she achieves academically is relatively unimportant.  
Hiromi‟s parents‟ reported different expectations for their male and female 
children become even more apparent when she discusses her brother. Hiromi draws on a 
category contrast (see section 5.3) when she states the following concerning her parents‟ 
expectations of her brother, “if you don‟t study, you won‟t be able to land a good job in 
the future” (ll. 148-149). These reported expectations stand in sharp contrast to those 
related to Hiromi, “just do what you like. Women don‟t need to worry about anything.” 
(ll. 149-150). Through a category contrast Hiromi is able to explicate her parents‟ 
disparate expectations of her and her brother. Within reported speech, Hiromi‟s parents 
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position her brother as a future „breadwinner‟ while she is positioned as supported by 
someone, presumably a husband. Within the category contrast, there is a further extreme 
case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), „anything‟ (l. 150), which „upgrades‟ her claim 
regarding her parents‟ low expectations of her, in addition to the evidence provided by 
formulating their expectations within reported speech. Hiromi constructs their 
expectations of her as representative of the populace, „everyone probably says that, but I 
wasn‟t very happy when I heard it. You won‟t do anything without some pressure‟ (ll. 
150-151). „Everyone‟ functions to support her claim because now her claim is 
formulated as not simply representative of her parents‟ view of women but as an 
interpretative repertoire, which Hiromi negatively evaluates („I wasn‟t very happy).  
In the next part of the account, the reported repercussions of privileged 
femininity become even more apparent. While Hiromi positively evaluates her reported 
„freedom‟ („In a good way, I had a lot of freedom‟; ll. 154-155), at the same time she 
comments on the consequences of that freedom („they never said, “Do such and such” ‟; 
l. 155). Hiromi arguably reconstructs what her parents reportedly never said in order to 
problematize their lack of expectations for her (see section 5.2.7). Her reported 
„freedom‟ is extended even further to studying abroad; however, the reason why she was 
granted this freedom once again relates back to her parents‟ different expectations of 
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their children. Hiromi‟s brother would not be allowed to study abroad for the following 
reason: „because it might affect his future‟ (l. 158). This second reference to Hiromi‟s 
brother‟s future (also in l. 149) suggests that her parents are drawing on a „Men as 
breadwinners‟ repertoire which positions her brother as a future provider. In the parents‟ 
reported account, there is no mention of Hiromi and the category-bound activities of 
entering a university or getting a job, which suggests that they are drawing on a 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire (see section 6.2.2) in this reported 
positioning of Hiromi.    
Similar to extracts 10 and 11, Hiromi‟s account illustrates how reported speech 
and membership categorization devices are discursive resources which individuals can 
draw on to resist the subject positions offered up by certain interpretative repertoires. I 
suggested that contrastive categorical references to Hiromi‟s brother versus „girls‟, 
coupled with disparate category-bound activities, suggests that Hiromi is drawing on a 
„Privileged femininity‟ repertoire. Hiromi uses reported speech in order to provide 
evidence of their reported disparate expectations of her and her brother. She resists their 
reported positioning of her by „voicing‟ (see section 5.2.1) what they do not say; that is, 
she took issue with the discursive absence of a „Women as breadwinners‟ repertoire 
which would have positioned her as entering a competitive university and securing a 
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decent job in the future. 
7.2.2 ‘Privileged femininity’ at work 
 Having discussed „Privileged femininity‟ in relation to university, I now 
present extracts from interviews which demonstrate how participants draw on and take 
up subject positions in relation to „Privileged femininity‟ in their discussions about work. 
I have selected three extracts which illustrate the workings of „Privileged femininity‟. In 
the first extract the participants discuss how their employers apparently overlook their 
mistakes, even going as far as reportedly constructing women as „hopeless‟ due to the 
high frequency of these errors. The second participant discusses how women are free 
from the responsibility to support a family and thus at liberty to resign from their jobs, 
in contrast to their male counterparts who are „bound‟ to a breadwinning role. The third 
extract illustrates how a woman‟s „feminine‟ characteristics purportedly „qualify‟ her for 
her job.   
The first extract is from an interview with Ai and Ayaka (see also extract 12) 
who were university sophomores and nineteen at the time of the interview:  
Extract 14 
239 Justin: What are the good points about being a woman? 
240 Ayaka: “Because you‟re a woman shikataganai” [you‟re hopeless].  
241 Ai: The margin of error given to men is different. Shikataganai for women. On the  
242 other hand, men have to succeed at work.  
243 Ayaka: Women don‟t have the same sense of responsibility that men do. Like  
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244 related to the future, we don‟t have to exert ourselves to the extent men do. Women 
245 are protected. 
246 Ai: The escape route is different when you‟re in trouble.  
247 Ayaka: Men don‟t have an escape route. It‟s fine though. 
248 Ai: That‟s right.  
249 Ayaka: I‟ve also thought that I‟d like things to be equal, but yappari we have an 
250 escape route.  
 Aya and Ai articulate different social expectations of men and women, however, 
they do not problematize „Privileged femininity‟, which suggests that they are assuming 
„complicit‟ subject positions in relation to the repertoire. „Privileged femininity‟ is 
suggested when Ayaka makes a category contrast between men‟s and women‟s reported 
category-bound activities (see section 5.3). She draws on reported speech to evidence 
her claim that while women are allowed a certain margin of error (“because you‟re a 
woman shikataganai”; l. 240), this „freedom‟ is not extended to men („men have to 
succeed at work‟; l. 242; see section 5.2.3). „Shikataganai‟ functions to construct 
women‟s mistakes as expected and inevitable and notably it is only applied to women (l. 
241), which further highlights the different standards that men and women are 
reportedly held to. Reasons for this reported discrepancy are suggested when Ayaka 
elaborates on the different category-bound activities for men and women (ll. 243-245).  
The social actor who „protects‟ women is suggested in the next turn when Ai 
makes reference to the metaphor „marriage is an escape route for women‟ (l. 246). 
Ayaka builds on Ai‟s turn: „Men don‟t have an escape route‟ (l. 247). Both Ayaka („it‟s 
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fine though‟; l. 247) and Ai („That‟s right‟; l. 248) positively evaluate this „escape route‟, 
which suggests that they position themselves as complicit with both subject positions 
offered by „Privileged femininity‟—„peripheral‟ employees who eventually „retire‟ and 
who then prioritize their domestic roles. Ayaka‟s acceptance is further suggested when 
she concedes that while gender equality could be viewed as desirable, the benefits 
procured from a reported „escape route‟ (i.e. lack of pressure to perform at work and 
„freedom‟ to resign) apparently outweigh any advantages gained from „equal 
employment opportunities‟ (ll. 249-250). Ayaka‟s use of a contrastive structure „but‟ 
indicates a preference for an escape route over „equal opportunities‟ („I‟ve also thought 
that I‟d like things to be equal, but yappari we have an escape route‟; ll. 249-250). 
 In Extract 15, Nayu, is a 30-year-old, single, art museum curator who also 
draws on a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire as she positions women as uninhibited to 
serve in a breadwinning role:   
Extract 15  
363 Justin: What are your thoughts on women‟s choices today?  
364 Nayu: Women might even have more choices than men do today. Men can‟t really 
365 say, “I‟ll become a househusband”. I think that probably as women are able to work 
366 more, men won‟t be able to work less in society today. I don‟t know who faces  
367 more pressure. For example, from what I‟ve heard from my friend who‟s a  
368 researcher, there‟s a woman who he wants to marry, but because he doesn‟t earn 
369 that much money, he can‟t get married. 
370 Justin: Do you think that women expect their partners to earn a lot? 
371 Nayu: Probably. If she‟s working, then it‟s fine. If she wants to become a housewife, 
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372 then yappari the only option is for the man to work. Women can say, “I‟ll quit my 
373 job” but men can‟t say, “I‟ll quit my job.” Yappari the stress and various problems 
374 resulting from working outside the home are extremely big. That‟s the external  
375 stress that men receive. But there‟s probably also stress inside the home. Just  
376 because you become a housewife doesn‟t mean that your life is stress free. But you  
377 don‟t have to associate with people whom you don‟t want to, so some people may 
378 wish to quit their jobs.  
In this sequence, Nayu constructs the boundaries of femininity as looser than 
those of masculinity, using negated hypothetical reported speech (see section 5.2.8) to 
support her claim that non-domestic work is a gender-based category-bound activity: 
„men can‟t really say, “I‟ll become a househusband”‟ (ll. 364-365). The presence of 
hypothetical reported speech suggests that Nayu is conveying a critical subtext 
regarding men‟s reported inability to become househusbands and constructing 
masculinity as „bounded‟. That is, Nayu‟s remark suggests the discursive absence of a 
„Privileged masculinity‟ repertoire which offers men the subject positions of 
„homemaker‟ and „family breadwinner‟ (see section 5.2.3). Further evidence which 
suggests a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire is suggested in Nayu‟s, „I think that 
probably as women are able to work more, men won‟t be able to work less in society 
today. I don‟t know who faces more pressure‟ (ll. 365-366). Nayu constructs women‟s 
opportunities as increasing, while men remain „bound‟ to the workplace. Although this 
could be seen as a positive development for women‟s social advancement, Nayu does 
not voice an interpretative repertoire in which women are positioned in a domestic role 
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(a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire) and thus does not address the „double 
burden‟ issue.   
In the next part of the extract, Nayu constructs an account reportedly 
articulated by a friend which bolsters her claim that men are positioned as family 
breadwinners, „from what I‟ve heard from my friend who‟s a researcher, there‟s a 
woman who he wants to marry, but because he doesn‟t earn that much money, he can‟t 
get married‟ (ll. 367-369). This reported account supports Nayu‟s previous claim that 
while women‟s opportunities may be increasing, men are still expected to perform in a 
breadwinning role and assume responsibility for the bulk of living expenses (ll. 
365-366).  
Further evidence of a „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire is indicated in Nayu‟s 
response to my question, „do you think that women expect their partners to earn a lot‟ (l. 
370). She draws on a category contrast (see section 5.3) and hypothetical reported 
speech (see section 5.2.7): „women can say, “I‟ll quit my job” but men can‟t say, “I‟ll 
quit my job.” (ll. 372-373), which depicts a homemaker subject position as unavailable 
to men. Similar to earlier in the account (ll. 354-365), we also see the discursive absence 
of a „Privileged masculinity‟ repertoire offering men subjectivities outside of „family 
breadwinner‟ (ll. 364-365).    
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In the final part of her account, Nayu contrasts stress induced from domestic 
versus non-domestic labor. „Yappari‟ formulates work-related stress as „commonsense‟ 
(ll. 373-374; see section 5.4.2), but at the same time stress generated from the home is 
also acknowledged (ll. 375-376). Constructing both domestic and non-domestic roles as 
stressful boosts Nayu‟s account of „Privileged femininity‟ because it appears to 
incorporate multiple views of the situation. Nevertheless, Nayu positions femininity as 
less bounded than masculinity, „you don‟t have to associate with people whom you 
don‟t want to,‟ (ll. 376-377). Nayu thus again constructs women‟s ability to quit their 
jobs as a category-bound „alternative‟ which suggests the existence of a „Privileged 
femininity‟ repertoire.  
 In her account, Nayu positively presents a homemaker subject position as an 
option exclusively available to women. She accomplishes this discursively through 
hypothetical reported speech (e.g., „men can‟t say‟, „women can say‟) in order to 
support her claim that women and men have different options. Notably, she omits any 
mention of how while women may have the option to assume the subject positions of 
„working professional‟ or „homemaker‟, combining both positions is difficult due to the 
presence of a dominant „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire. 
The final extract in this chapter is from an interview with Akiko, a forty-two 
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year old married university lecturer with one child (see also extracts 5-8). Akiko 
constructs a „relativist‟ account in the sense that she defines „gender inequality‟ as 
highly situated:   
Extract 16 
98 Justin: I often hear that things are pretty equal at schools. But a friend of mine said  
99 even though she‟s a teacher, when people come to visit the school, she‟s had to serve 
100 tea before.  
101 Akiko: Now I‟m on the open campus committee. A male professor does the initial 
102 explanation when high school students come to campus. Yappari that professor  
103 faced a lot of resistance when he proposed that a young woman from the  
104 academic affairs office, or at least a young female professor should do the 
105 explanation. “There‟s no need for that person to be a woman or young.” But in  
106 terms of the social image, yappari he knows that a young, pretty „older sister‟ from 
107 the academic affairs office more than an older male professor coming out first  
108 creates a better atmosphere and results in people relaxing more. If you say that  
109 people relaxing more is a form of social pressure toward women, then I don‟t think 
110 there‟s anything more to say about it. But if that person‟s voice, beauty, and so on 
111 are helping her and she‟s enjoying her job; if she thinks that it‟s all part of her job, 
112 then it doesn‟t become a form of social pressure.  
Akiko constructs an account where a male professor faces resistance from 
members of a committee when he makes a suggestion which could be considered sexist. 
Akiko does not take issue with his comment, but instead uses it as the basis for 
constructing a „relativist‟ account of gender equity. The committee‟s resistance is 
conveyed as „commonsense‟ through the use of yappari (ll. 102-105). To further 
evidence this apparent resistance, Akiko „voices‟ the committee‟s strong resistance to 
his comment (l. 105; see section 5.2.3). In contrast to the committee, Akiko apparently 
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does not take a critical view of his comment, but instead presents him as „astute‟ to the 
fact that a woman would convey a positive image to the public, „but in terms of the 
social image, yappari he knows that a young, pretty „older sister‟ from the academic 
affairs office more than an older male professor coming out first creates a better 
atmosphere and results in people relaxing more‟ (ll. 106-108). Semantically we can infer 
a family-like relationship based upon caring from the membership category „older 
sister‟, while „male professor‟ conveys a sense of „authority‟ (see section 5.3). Yappari 
conveys his astuteness to the image a woman would convey as „commonsense‟ (see 
section 5.4.2) which further illustrates that Akiko does not categorize this professor‟s 
purported comment as „sexist‟ but as „savvy‟. Her account can be considered „relativist‟ 
and individualistic because she claims that gender discrimination can only be negatively 
defined by the parties concerned. Therefore, we cannot consider a woman who enjoys 
performing a „feminine‟ task such as serving tea as a victim of gender discrimination 
because the woman does not define the task as discriminatory. Akiko‟s „relativist‟ 
account of gender equality is conveyed in her next comment, „„If you say that an 
outcome where people relax more is a form of social pressure toward women, then 
there‟s nothing more to say about it.‟ (ll. 108-110). Notably, Akiko contrasts the positive 
outcome of „people relaxing more‟ with the negative „social pressure toward women‟ to 
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convey the „short-sighted‟ and „misguided‟ nature of this feminist perspective. Akiko 
uses hypothetical reported speech („if you say‟) to „voice‟ the „limited‟ view, which she 
constructs as inflexible with the idiomatic „sore made da‟ („there‟re nothing more to say 
about it‟). I am suggesting that „sore made da‟ functions to construct the „limited‟ view 
as inflexible because idiomatic phrases such as this often function to close down topics 
from further discussion (Drew, 1998; Drew & Holt, 1989, 1998). Akiko then provides 
her „relativist‟ account of gender equality where femininity is a resource a woman can 
draw on as she performs her job, „if that person‟s voice, beauty, and so on are helping 
her and she‟s enjoying her job; if she thinks that it‟s all part of her job, then it doesn‟t 
become a form of social pressure‟ (ll. 110-112). In the „relativist‟ account, feminine 
features such as voice and beauty become welcome credentials which enhance a 
woman‟s job performance. Akiko‟s „relativist‟ account is rhetorically effective in part 
because her use of hypothetical reported speech („if she thinks it‟s all part of her job‟) 
constructs this hypothetical woman as content to use her femininity to her own 
advantage when performing her job, thus making it difficult to argue that she is a victim 
of sexism. 
 I would like to suggest that we can see Akiko‟s account of a woman happily 
performing her job in this way as complying with hegemonic femininity (see section 
283 
 
2.5.3). The cornerstone of hegemony is power achieved through obtaining the 
populace‟s consent versus coercive force (see section 2.5.1). The hypothetical woman in 
Akiko‟s account is one who accepts that her voice and beauty are „skills‟ which enhance 
her job performance (despite these „skills‟ being arguably different from those which 
qualify male employees to perform work-related tasks, i.e. leadership ability and the 
ability to multi-task; further, women‟s skills do not develop with experience but in fact 
decline with age). While the woman may see her „femininity‟ as an „asset‟ when she is 
young, the „asset‟ will rapidly decline in value in a patriarchal market-place. The woman 
performs a primarily symbolic function of cultivating a „nice‟ ambience which sets the 
stage for someone else to explain the more „important‟ information about the university. 
Since Akiko is reportedly unaware of the woman‟s „peripheral‟ function, I am 
suggesting that Akiko is positioning the woman as complicit with hegemonic femininity 
because the woman‟s „peripheral‟ role is subordinate in status to the more „central‟ role 
played by her male counterparts, thus representing the relationship of dominance and 
submission between masculinity and femininity.   
In this extract, Akiko does not take up a resistant subject position in relation to 
„Privileged femininity‟. Instead, she subject positions the „office flower‟, who „relaxes‟ 
people, as a potential positive form of femininity. In Akiko‟s „relativist‟ account there is 
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nothing inherently „sexist‟ about assigning a task to a woman on the basis of her gender 
as long as she gives her „consent‟, which notably is a defining feature of hegemony.  
In other points of Akiko‟s interview, her discursive self-positioning fluctuates 
(Baxter, 2003), suggesting that she is struggling with an ideological dilemma (see 
section 3.4.2). In extract six (see section 6.2.1), I suggested that Akiko took up a 
resistant subject position in relation to „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire when 
she states, „if someone says, “Because you‟re a woman, if you don‟t make the tea...” I 
hate it‟ (ll. 158-159). This „resistant‟ subject position stands in sharp contrast to the 
„relativist‟ perspective she adopts in extract 16 where gender discrimination can only be 
defined as negative by the parties concerned. Given the highly situated nature of 
„Privileged femininity‟, it is not surprising that Akiko is struggling to resolve the 
apparent contradiction between constructing „Privileged femininity‟ as a discursive 
resource which positions women as qualified for certain occupations, and as an obstacle 
which inhibits gender equality because membership in the category „woman‟ is the 
essential and only prerequisite for the job. Some may cast „Privileged femininity‟ in a 
favorable light by saying that it empowers women by qualifying them over men for 
certain jobs and represents a positive step in the march toward gender equality and is 
better than being compulsively excluded. Nevertheless, I do not think that we can 
285 
 
overstate the ways in which „Privileged femininity‟ is a historically and culturally 
situated repertoire (Kitetu & Sunderland, 2000) and that the purported „privileges‟ of 
femininity are needed to be viewed against all its entailed disadvantages, e.g., here the 
short „shelf-life‟ of youth and hence OLs‟ (see section 1.3) lack of opportunities for 
promotion.  
In Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 I have discussed „Privileged femininity‟ within the 
contexts of school and work. In drawing on „Privileged femininity‟ to discursively 
construct their subjectivities, participants again utilize the discursive devices of reported 
speech, categorical references, category contrasts, and yappari. By drawing on these 
devices, participants assume various subject positions in relation to „Privileged 
femininity‟; while some participants positively construct „Privileged femininity‟ as a 
resource exclusively available to women, others construct it as a constraint which 
hinders future success. It is through this process of discursively positioning self and 
others in relation to „Privileged femininity‟ that participants construct their gendered 
subjectivities. 
In the next section I illustrate how the purported „advantages‟ women gain from 
„Privileged femininity‟, i.e. the freedom from pressures to excel at school or work, need 
to be viewed vis-à-vis the costs incurred from those „advantages‟, i.e. women are unable 
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to achieve financial independence and thus ultimately „bound‟ to men in 
„heteronormative‟ domestic partnerships. „Privileged femininity‟ is also binding in that 
women are reportedly restricted to domestic roles even within the workplace.   
7.3 The role of ‘Bounded femininity’ in the construction of HF 
 „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ IRs 
position women as „good wives, wise mothers‟ (see section 1.3) whose ultimate 
responsibility is to their children which constitutes Japanese hegemonic femininity. 
„Privileged femininity‟ positions this domestic role as a choice which is potentially even 
more desirable than the breadwinning role men are expected to play. „Bounded 
femininity‟ is another manifestation of hegemonic femininity because working women 
are not positioned as „professionals‟ but within „feminine‟ roles in the workplace. Thus, 
in the workplace, the hierarchical and complementary relationship definitive of 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity (see section 2.5.3) is reflected in the discursive 
positioning of women within „domestic‟ roles such as serving their male colleagues 
during social events. Significantly, practices associated with hegemonic femininity (e.g. 
supporting others) are deemed subordinate compared to those associated with 
hegemonic masculinity (e.g. leadership skills) and for this reason women and not men 
are expected to perform them. 
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7.3.1 ‘Bounded femininity’ at work 
 The next section presents extracts which illustrate how femininity can be 
discursively constructed as „bounded‟ at the workplace. Participants construct accounts 
where women are positioned as „risky investments‟ from an employer‟s perspective 
because they may eventually quit their jobs and are positioned within „feminine‟ roles 
both at work and during after-hours social events. Resembling the findings presented in 
section 6.3, women are positioned as „peripheral‟ employees whose ultimate 
responsibilities are domestic, not professional.  
 I have selected extracts from interviews with a „non-traditional‟ student and 
„traditional‟ students (entered university directly after high school) to demonstrate how 
demographically very different participants draw on a „Bounded femininity‟ repertoire 
when discussing different work-related topics: job interviews, after-hours socializing, 
and work-related responsibilities.    
 The first extract is from an interview with Yukari who was forty-two, married 
without children, and a university senior at the time of the interview. Yukari is a 
„non-traditional‟ student who entered university after caring for her husband‟s elderly 
parents:  
Extract 17 
207 Justin: Many of the students who I‟m interviewed have said that they haven‟t  
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208 really felt many gender differences. Why do you think that is? 
209 Yukari: Things are basically the same except for grades and so on when you‟re in 
210 school. There‟s a tremendous amount of pressure on the employment exam. The 
211 first thing to do when you think you want to find a job is request brochures from 
212 companies. Out of 100 brochures requested about 30 are sent to you. From those, 
213 you can get an interview in about one company. Then at that time, at the time of the 
214 interview you‟re asked, “How long do you plan to continue this job?,” “Do you  
215 want to get married?,” “What are you going to do with your kids?,” “Are you 
216 commuting from home?.” At that moment you choose what you have to do from 
217 that point on. When men request brochures, they receive them and get interviews. 
218 At the interview you‟re asked, “What do you want to do at this job?” That kind of 
219 question, you see? You‟re not asked, “Do you want to get married?,” “If you have 
220 kids, what are you going to do?” It‟s entirely different. All throughout school things 
221 were the same. Women were in leadership positions in clubs. When you enter a  
222 company it‟s like, “You can‟t do the same job [as men] because you‟re a woman.”  
 Yukari works up a category contrast to present women and men as engaging in 
different category-bound activities (see section 5.3). She presents school as „basically 
the same‟ (l. 209), thus the first time that students reportedly „encounter‟ gender 
inequalities is at the site of job interviews. Yukari claims that women face inequalities 
from the time they request job applications (ll. 212-213). She supports this claim by 
presenting a series of questions that female students reportedly encounter at the time of 
job interviews, which position them in domestic roles (ll. 214-216). Jefferson (1990) 
notes that individuals often construct „three-part lists‟ when they are constructing 
actions or events as normative. Although Yukari cites four examples, we can apply this 
principle to her reported questions and assert that she is not simply citing examples but 
constructing the positioning of women in domestic roles as a normative phenomenon. In 
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addition, the reported speech of the interviewers serves as evidence to support Yukari‟s 
claim that gender inequalities exist from the time of the initial job seeking (see section 
5.2.3).  
 The questions which women are reportedly asked stand in sharp contrast to 
those asked of men, which suggests that Yukari is constructing a category contrast (see 
section 5.3). Men are reportedly asked, “what do you want to do at this job?” (l. 218). 
This question positions men as „permanent‟ versus „peripheral‟ employees who will 
make a meaningful and uninterrupted contribution to the workplace. Constructing the 
question within reported speech supports Yukari‟s claim that men and women are 
differently positioned at the time of the interview (see section 5.2.3). The different 
expectations that women and men are reportedly held to become even more apparent 
when Yukari constructs the type of questions which men are reportedly not asked 
through negated hypothetical reported speech (see section 5.2.8), „“do you want to get 
married?,” “If you have kids, what are you going to do?”‟ (ll. 219-220). Yukari‟s 
evaluative comment, „zenzen chiagau‟ („entirely different‟; l. 220) implies that she is 
taking issue with these alleged questions because „zenzen‟ is an extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1989) that „upgrades‟ her claim that men and women are 
treated differently. Furthermore, Yukari‟s use of hypothetical reported speech implies 
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that she is taking issue with the discursive absence of a „Men as domestic‟ repertoire 
because the questions suggest that men and women should be held to different standards. 
In the final part of the sequence, Yukari once again invokes hypothetical reported 
speech to support her claim that women and men are positioned differently during job 
interviews “you can‟t do the same job [as men] because you‟re a woman” (l. 222).   
 One reading of this extract is that Yukari assumes a resistant subject position in 
relation to „Bounded femininity‟. She constructs male interviewers as reportedly 
positioning women as „temporary‟ employees, which she cites as an example of gender 
inequality. Yukari‟s „resistant‟ subject position is suggested by her extensive use of 
reported speech, hypothetical reported speech, and membership categories in order to 
contrast the different category-bound activities which men and women are held to.  
 The next extract is from an interview with Michi, Keiko, and Yayoi, all 
university juniors and twenty years old at the time of the interview. These participants 
critically evaluate the positioning of women in „motherly‟ roles at work and during 
work-related socializing:  
 
 
Extract 18       
192 Justin: Can you give me an example of how images about femininity affect women? 
193 Michi: Take the example of a woman who is a boss. Yappari she is still seen as a  
194 a woman.  
291 
 
195 Keiko: Like serving food [at a social outing]. 
196 Michi: Since male managers won‟t do it, women have to do those kinds of motherly  
197 duties even after work.  
198 Justin: Is that a source of pressure? 
199 Yayoi: Pressure? How do I describe it? 
199 Michi: Men won‟t do it. If they do, it‟s like “what are the women doing?”  
200 So naturally women end up doing it. 
201 Keiko: Like the year-end party at my part-time job, or even when we just go out to 
202 eat, if I don‟t pour alcohol for the other employees… 
203 Michi: Yeah there‟s that too 
204 Keiko: Just when I think the drinking is finished, they ask me “do you want  
205 something else to drink?” I have to [pour their alcohol]. 
206 Michi: I feel like we‟re hostesses. 
 Michi constructs the claim that women are positioned as „women‟ before 
„bosses‟ as „commonsense‟ through the use of yappari: „take the example of a woman 
who is a boss‟, which she later problematizes: „Yappari she is still seen as a woman‟ (ll. 
193-194). Keiko then bolsters Michi‟s claim with a concrete example (l. 195). Keiko is 
referring to a Japanese-style drinking establishment where food is typically served 
family style, so the customers distribute it onto individual plates. With Keiko‟s example 
as rhetorical support, Michi extends her example by making a categorical reference to 
„women‟ which she links to the „motherly‟ category-bound activity of serving food (see 
section 5.3) (ll. 196-197).  
I next ask them if the expectation that women serve at social events is a source 
of pressure (l.198). After Yayoi considers how to answer my question, Michi asserts for 
the second time that men refuse to serve food during social events (ll. 199-200). Michi 
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draws on hypothetical reported speech to convey the subtext that if women do not serve 
the food, they are seen as „reneging‟ on their „duty‟ (see section 5.2.8), which supports 
her overall argument that women are positioned in „motherly‟ roles at work. Keiko then 
supports Michi‟s claim by sharing examples from her own experience, „like the 
year-end party at my part-time job, or even when we just go out to eat, if I don‟t pour 
alcohol for the other employees…‟ (ll. 201-202). In Japan, when socializing with 
co-workers, the person who you pour alcohol for depends upon your place within the 
organizational hierarchy which is based upon age, gender, and employment position. 
Both pouring your own drink and a higher status individual pouring the drink of a lower 
status individual are social faux pas that are almost always avoided. Keiko‟s claim that 
her co-workers will see her as somehow not fulfilling her „duty‟ if she neglects to pour 
their drinks supports Michi‟s earlier contribution that people ask, „what are the women 
doing‟ (l. 199). Keiko then draws on reported speech to further support this claim, „just 
when I think the drinking is finished, they ask me “do you want something else to 
drink?” I have to [pour their alcohol]‟ (ll. 204-205). The reported speech of Keiko‟s 
colleague provides evidence for her assertion that she „has to‟ pour their drinks (see 
section 5.2.3). Michi ends the sequence with a categorical reference to „hostess‟, i.e. 
women who work in clubs where they serve alcohol and converse with male patrons 
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(see Allison, 1994). We can infer from the categorical reference to „hostess‟ that 
working women are expected to „serve‟ their male colleagues by pouring their drinks. 
Michi‟s final contribution supports her overall point that working women are reportedly 
seen as „women‟ in lieu of their work-based identities (ll. 193-194). 
 One reading of this extract is that Michi and Keiko assumed a resistant subject 
position in relation to a „Bounded femininity‟ repertoire. This position is suggested by 
Michi‟s claim that women in high positions are viewed as „women‟ and not „bosses‟ (ll. 
193-194). Michi constructs men as refusing to serve food at social events, necessitating 
that women become default „mothers‟ during these events (ll. 196-197). Her resistant 
position was also evident when she reports a hypothetical response to men serving food 
(“what are the women doing”; l. 199). Hypothetical reported speech allowed Michi to 
negatively evaluate men‟s expectation that women serve food, yet the evaluation was 
framed as originating from the men, which allowed Michi to assume the position of 
„neutral‟ animator (see section 5.2.6-5.2.7). Keiko‟s resistant subject position was 
suggested by the unfinished clause, „if I don‟t pour alcohol for the other employees‟ (l. 
202), which conveyed her co-worker‟s reported expectation that Keiko pour their drinks 
because she is a woman. Keiko‟s resistant subject position becomes even more apparent 
in her direct claim, „I have to [pour their alcohol]‟ (l. 205). Finally, we can infer a 
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resistant subject position from the categorical reference to „hostess‟, a woman whose 
„job success‟ depends upon entertaining men, because this category is not typically 
associated with skills we might associate with a successful professional employee, i.e. 
specialized knowledge, leadership skills, and the ability to multi-task.  
 Chapter 7 has addressed research question one: „What interpretative repertoires 
do participants draw on as they discursively construct (a) hegemonic femininity?‟ Both 
„privileged‟ and „bounded‟ femininity are IRs which constitute hegemonic femininity 
because they position women in domestic roles (see section 6.3).  
Research question 1(a) asks: „What discursive features are associated with 
interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity?‟ Participants use 
explicit category references such as „onna dattara‟ (since you‟re a woman‟), „onna no 
ko dakara‟ („because you‟re a girl‟), and category-bound activities to construct women 
as either free from the pressure to excel academically or professionally and thus 
„privileged‟ or „bound‟ to a subordinate role at work, thus membership categories (see 
section 5.3) are a discursive feature associated with the construction of hegemonic 
femininity. Participants noticeably deployed reported speech (see section 5.2), which 
can therefore be conceptualized as another discursive feature associated with the 
construction of hegemonic femininity. In section 7.4, I discuss in more detail the role 
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reported speech plays in the construction of hegemonic femininity.     
Research question 1(b) asks: „What subject positions (self and other) do 
participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic 
femininity?‟ Participants take up a range of subject positions which range from 
complicit to resistant and in the process constructed hegemonic femininity. Ai and 
Ayaka (see extracts 12, 14) discursively position women as „released‟ from the pressure 
to excel at work and school, thus assuming a complicit position in relation to „Privileged 
femininity. Similarly, Nayu (extract 15) takes up a complicit subject position when she 
claims that women have more choices than men. Hiromi (see extract 13), by contrast, 
takes up a resistant position in relation to „Privileged femininity‟ when she claims that 
individuals benefit from a certain degree of pressure. Akiko (see extract 16) constructs 
„feminine‟ features such as youth and beauty as resources which enhance a woman‟s job 
performance, thus she assumes a complicit subject position vis-à-vis „Privileged 
femininity‟. Yukari (extract 17) assumes a resistant subject position in relation to 
„Bounded femininity‟ when she claims that job interviewers treat male and female 
applicants differently by asking women questions such as how long they intend to work. 
Michi, Keiko, and Yayoi, (see extract 18) resist being „bound‟ to a „feminine‟ role at 
work-related social when they criticize men‟s expectation that women serve food and 
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beverages. Although some participants did discursively resist „Bounded‟ and „Privileged‟ 
femininity, they ultimately complied with hegemonic femininity by positioning 
themselves or others‟ actions as in line with social norms. For example, although Michi, 
Keiko, and Yayoi criticize their colleagues‟ assumption that women serve refreshments, 
they still position themselves as complying with the request.  
My second research question asks: „Is there evidence of ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in 
participants‟ discourse?‟ Akiko attempts to resolve an ideological dilemma of presenting 
traces of privileged femininity as a discursive resource which qualifies women for 
certain jobs but at the same time is a discursive constraint because those „qualifications‟, 
i.e. youth and beauty, do not accumulate with experience but deteriorate over time. 
Akiko takes up a resistant subject position in relation to a „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ repertoire when she articulates resistance to being asked to serve tea because 
she is a woman (see chapter 6; extract 6), but Akiko also constructs a „relativist‟ account 
of „Privileged femininity‟ where a woman reportedly views aspects of her femininity, i.e. 
her voice and beauty, as enhancing her job performance, and thus is not a „victim‟ of 
gender oppression (extract 16). Akiko does not in fact resolve the tension between 
presenting „Privileged femininity‟ as a source of empowerment or disempowerment for 
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women, but instead constructs „femininity‟ differently in order to suit her shifting 
rhetorical needs. That is, while Akiko would apparently oppose being asked to perform 
a task due to her gender, she also allows for the possibility that this would not be an 
issue for some women. In effect, Akiko discursively presents herself as taking a 
„comprehensive‟ or „eclectic‟ view of gender relations where „equality‟ is highly situated 
in contrast to the more „simplistic‟ view of gender relations where assigning a task to an 
individual because she is a woman is an example of gender oppression.  
The findings presented in Chapter 7 have some important implications for the 
discursive construction of hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). In this chapter, I 
showed how participants construct subjectivities in line with hegemonic femininity by 
assuming complicit subject positions in relation to „Privileged‟ and „Bounded‟ 
femininity repertoires. Since masculinities and femininities vary by and within 
communities of practice (see section 2.1.2) and change over time, including moment to 
moment (see section 2.5), the possibility exists that my findings are context-specific and 
inapplicable more widely; nevertheless, as I stated in section 6.5, to claim that Japanese 
hegemonic femininity is by definition inherently different from femininities constructed 
elsewhere runs the risk of „essentializing‟ it. „Privileged‟ and „Bounded‟ femininity are 
arguably repertoires which exist across many sociocultural contexts, albeit taking 
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different material and linguistic forms. For example, Kitetu and Sunderland, (2000) 
found that that a teacher‟s preferential treatment of girls in the classroom is one example 
of „Privileged femininity‟ that needs to be viewed against the various other contexts 
where femininity is not at all privileged, e.g. where girls do not go to school at all and 
thus are domestically „bound‟ because they are „needed‟ for domestic chores. In my 
study, femininity was „privileged‟ in that women were „released‟ from the pressure to 
excel academically and professionally, but ultimately bound to men in „heteronormative‟ 
domestic partnerships and a domestic role. Similarly, „feminine‟ skills (e.g. „youth‟, 
„beauty‟) which provide women with an advantage in certain professions have a limited 
shelf life compared with „work experience‟ which develops over time. In order to avoid 
„essentializing‟ Japanese hegemonic femininity, I argue that my study is one example of 
„Privileged femininity‟. Further research on other CofPs (see section 2.1.2) may also 
show privileged femininity as a „double-edged sword‟ for women, empowering them in 
some ways but disempowering them in others.  
7.4 The main discursive features used to construct hegemonic femininity: reported 
speech and thought   
7.4.1 The discursive functions of reported speech and thought 
 This chapter has demonstrated (inter alia) how the reported thought of a group 
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is a rhetorically effective device used to support a claim. In extract 12, Ayaka and Ai 
make references to „the way of thinking‟ and „men are thinking that they have to support 
their families‟ to convey that women are reportedly given more leniency than men 
regarding their futures. Specifically, Ayaka and Ai construct this line of thinking as 
group-based, which has a different rhetorical function than individually-based reported 
thought.   
The reported thought of a group allows a speaker to construct „normativity‟, 
which the reported speech of a group (e.g. „men say‟) also does, but not to the same 
extent. As I discussed (see section 6.4.1), speech is temporary and provisional, while 
thought indexes something more permanent, a group‟s „normative‟ „belief system‟. 
Furthermore, unlike the reported thought of an individual, the reported thought of a 
group cannot be undermined on that basis that it only represents one individual‟s 
thought which is not representative of the group. Group-based reported thought is a 
rhetorically effective discursive device that a speaker can use to criticize a group‟s 
„normative‟ thinking or „belief system‟. 
The reported thought of a group can be seen as a linguistic „trace‟ (Talbot, 
1998) of an IR. When Ai and Ayaka invoke group-based reported thought to position 
women as „freer‟ than men, they can be seen as drawing on a „Privileged femininity‟ 
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repertoire. The repertoire becomes even more apparent in extract fifteen when they 
claim that women possess the „escape route‟ of marriage which liberates them from the 
paid labor force. The reported thought of a group is an example of a discursive device 
which indicates the presence of an interpretative repertoire because it indexes the 
„normative‟ thinking of the members of a particular community of practice (see section 
2.1.2).   
7.4.2 The discursive functions of hypothetical reported speech and thought 
 This chapter has demonstrated how hypothetical reported speech can be used to 
convey the central point of a narrative. For example, Nayu (extract 15) frames her claim 
that women and not men are able to quit their jobs within hypothetical reported speech 
(e.g., „women can say, “I‟ll quit my job”‟). Through hypothetical reported speech, Nayu 
can construct speech which women can and may purportedly utter due to the existence 
of a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire (see section 6.3). Nayu could have 
framed her claim that men are unable to quit their jobs and become househusbands 
within hypothetical reported thought (e.g., „men can‟t think, I‟ll become a 
househusband‟); however, men‟s inability to say, „I‟ll quit my job‟ supports her claim 
more than thought would. Presumably, people may think all sorts of things; however, a 
man‟s inability to make this utterance conveys that such a statement is reprehensible, 
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perhaps involving „gender transgression‟.    
Hypothetical reported speech also has an evidential function which bolsters a 
speaker‟s claim. For instance, Akiko (extract 16) draws on hypothetical reported speech 
to claim that categorizing a woman whose physical appearance enhances her job 
performance as a victim of gender discrimination is „short-sighted‟ if the woman enjoys 
her job and she creates a pleasant workplace atmosphere (e.g., „If you say that people 
relaxing more is a form of social pressure toward women…‟). Akiko could have 
constructed and criticized a „short-sighted‟ view of gender discrimination within 
hypothetical reported thought (e.g., „If you think that someone relaxing more…‟); 
however, hypothetical speech provides stronger evidence than thought because thought 
resides within individuals and is not always articulated (see also section 6.4.2).     
7.4.3 The discursive functions of deploying hypothetical and reported speech 
together 
 This chapter also illustrated how hypothetical reported speech and reported 
speech can be used together to perform a criticism. Hiromi (extract 13) draws on 
reported speech when she asserts that her parents tell her brother to „study hard‟ and 
hypothetical reported speech when she claims that they never say „do such and such‟ to 
her. Reported speech provides evidence that Hiromi‟s parents position her brother as a 
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„future breadwinner‟, while hypothetical reported speech conveys the low expectations 
they reportedly have of her which she arguably takes issue with. Reported speech 
evidences what her parents say to her brother, while hypothetical reported speech allows 
Hiromi to convey the critical subtext that they should have higher expectations of her. 
7.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed how hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3) was 
discursively constructed by a diverse sample of women who assume heterogeneous 
subject positions in relation to „Privileged‟ and „Bounded‟ femininity repertoires. These 
subject positions range from accepting the „freedom‟ gained from experiencing little 
pressure to excel at school or work to resisting this „freedom‟ by constructing a certain 
degree of pressure as an essential component of personal and academic development. 
The repertoires were identified through the occurrence in respondents‟ interview 
discourse of different discourse analytic devices: reported speech, membership 
categorization devices, and yappari, and particular uses of these which functioned to 
evidence claims, manage accountability, contrast gender-based category-bound 
activities, and construct „commonsense‟ (see sections 5.2-5.4). These repertoires reflect 
and arguably construct commonplace assumptions about Japanese hegemonic 
femininity which position women not as „high-achieving students‟ or „working 
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professionals‟, but as „devoted‟ wives and „dutiful‟ mothers (see section 1.3).  
In this chapter, we also saw the emergence of an ideological dilemma in 
Akiko‟s account. Although „femininity‟ can be a privilege which qualifies women for 
certain jobs, even professional women may be asked to perform certain „feminine‟ jobs 
such as serving tea. Akiko positions „femininity‟ as a resource which qualifies women 
for certain jobs, but at other points in her account criticizes gender category membership 
as the sole criteria for assigning women tasks such as serving tea. Although femininity 
can „privilege‟ women for certain jobs, the influence of „Women as eventually domestic‟ 
positions women either within „peripheral‟ roles at work or „binds‟ them to the domestic 
realm. Significantly, these subjectivities do not empower women, but do represent 
subjectivities in line with hegemonic femininity. 
This chapter also highlights the subtle workings of gender hegemony; that is, 
hegemony operates in part through „heteronormative‟ repertoires which „privilege‟ 
femininity. Prima facie, „Privileged femininity‟ repertoire appears to be a discursive 
resource which „frees‟ women from the pressure to enter competitive universities or 
secure high positions in contrast to their male counterparts who are materially and 
discursively „bound‟ to these social practices because of their assumed future 
breadwinning role. These „freedoms‟, however, must be weighed against their 
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limitations, i.e. women are ultimately „bound‟ to the domestic realm because they resign 
from their jobs. Participants Ai and Ayaka (extract 14) positively construct „Privileged 
femininity‟ by articulating the „escape route‟ of marriage and a fulltime domestic role, 
the latter role being apparently unavailable to men. Similarly, Nayu (extract 15) 
constructs the subject position of „homemaker‟ as a positive option only available to 
women. Both accounts are built upon the assumption of a „heteronormative‟ domestic 
partnership and financial support of a man. Akiko‟s account (extract 16) is built on the 
„essentialist‟ assumption that women are more verbally skilled at facilitating rapport 
(see Cameron, 2007 for a critique). In all three cases, the participants unequivocally 
construct femininity as „privileged‟ without acknowledging the limits associated with 
those privileges including that women are discouraged from pursuing professional 
careers. In this way, I propose that gender hegemony operates subtly, through 
„Privileged‟ and „Bounded‟ femininity repertoires. 
I am not suggesting a one-to-one correspondence between discourse and 
material practices (see section 3.3.1). Nevertheless, I am arguing that discourse is one 
dimension of gender relations (the symbolic) which can and does operate with the 
mutual support of other, material dimensions, e.g. power, production, and emotional 
relations (see section 2.2). A „Gender differences‟ discourse (see section 6.1) is a prime 
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example of how symbolic gender constructions can influence material practices, i.e. a 
discourse surrounding women‟s „natural‟ caregiving ability may be seen as befitting 
them for jobs in the service sector or „pastoral‟ occupations. Similarly, „Privileged 
femininity‟ repertoires can also influence material practices, e.g. if women are not 
encouraged to excel in school or pursue careers and if young women (and their parents) 
incontestably accept these „privileges‟ without taking into account more subtle ways in 
which masculinity is normatively „privileged‟ over femininity, i.e. in terms of social 
practices and institutional power.  
In Chapter 8 I shift the focus from hegemonic femininity to non-hegemonic, i.e. 
pariah femininity (see section 2.5.4). Pariah femininity refers to women who embody 
aspects of hegemonic masculinity, e.g. authority, competitive individualism, and 
aggressiveness (Messerschmidt, 2000) and by doing so refuses to occupy a subordinate 
position vis-à-vis hegemonic masculinity. For example, lesbians, „sexually promiscuous‟ 
women, women gang members and women working in traditionally „masculine‟ 
professions such as academia, criminal justice, law, and the priesthood (Bagilhole, 
2002; Martin & Jurik, 2007). Gender is constructed not only through relations between 
men and women but also among women (as among men) (see section 2.5), so our 
understanding of hegemonic femininity will benefit from the analysis of non-hegemonic 
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femininity. Through the study of pariah femininities I provide insights into how women 
are „stigmatized‟ for enacting the discursive practices associated with hegemonic 
masculinity, such practices „troubling‟ (Butler, 1999) the hierarchical and 
complementary relationship between hegemonic masculinity and femininity (see 
sections 2.5.3-4). The investigation of hegemonic femininity has provided insight into 
relationships between men and women. In contrast, the study of pariah femininities 
focuses on the relationship between women and thus provides insight into another 
aspect of „gender relations‟ (see section 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8: Alternatives to ‘Hegemonic Femininity’: ‘Pariah 
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Femininities’ 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I attempt to address research question one: „What interpretative 
repertoires do participants draw on as they discursively construct (b) pariah femininity?‟ 
In addition, I address research question 1(a): „What discursive features are associated 
with interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah femininity?‟ The chapter also 
addresses research question 1(b): „What subject positions (self and other) do 
participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah 
femininity?‟ I address research question two: „Is there evidence of ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in 
participants‟ discourse?‟ More than in Chapters 6-7, the participants‟ struggles to resolve 
ideological dilemmas were explicitly articulated; therefore, I could also answer research 
question three: „What discursive features are associated with ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in their 
discourse?‟  
8.2 ‘Troubled’ identity 
Although I take it as given that gender and other identities are fluid and 
individuals possess agency to „perform‟ gender in multifarious ways (see sections 
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2.1.3-2.1.4), identities which challenge dominant sociocultural norms can be seen as 
„troubling‟ for society or particular communities of practice (see section 2.1.2) and thus 
require a an account in talk. As Wetherell and Edley (1998) state, “people are 
accountable to each other in interaction and thus departures from „what everybody 
knows to be appropriate‟ require explanation and create „trouble‟ in the interaction 
which will need repair” (p. 161). Wetherell and Edley exemplify this with a „negatively‟ 
valued identity, a young man, Aaron, who, when describing his heterosexual prowess, is 
positioned by a friend Paul as „out on the pull‟ which Aaron disavows and reformulates 
as „just out‟. Aaron then produces an account which constructs his sexual encounters as 
happenstance and consensual versus actively pursuing a sexual encounter with women 
which suggests that he regards „out on the pull‟ as a troubled identity, i.e. difficult to 
align with (see Wetherell, 1998). Clearly what constitutes „troubled‟ is inseparable from 
the larger sociocultural context and CofP (see section 2.1.2) where the interaction occurs. 
Being „out on the pull‟ is a troubled subject position in a discursive context where 
monogamy and long-term relationships are privileged over reckless promiscuity. In 
another discursive context, such as one where „permissive male heterosexuality‟ 
(Hollway, 1998) is extolled, e.g. some college fraternities, „out on the pull‟ is 
conceivably not a „troubled‟ but instead celebrated identity.  
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In my data, two subject positions which were „troubled‟, thus requiring „repair‟ 
when articulated in talk, were the unmarried „career woman‟ and married „superwoman‟. 
Both of these subject positions are „gendered‟ (Sunderland, 2004), i.e. single men are 
labeled „eligible bachelors‟ whereas single women are „lonely spinsters‟ or „old-maids‟ 
(Reynolds, 2008). In Japan, while working men do not face discursive sanctioning with 
a term such as „career man‟, career-oriented women are denigrated with labels such as 
„career women‟ or „make inu‟ (loser).  
The long-lived influence of „compulsory heterosexuality‟ (Rich, 1980; see 
section 2.5) still constructs normative femininity as involving a long-term, heterosexual 
relationship, so married women are not usually asked, „how come you‟re (still) married‟ 
whereas singleness is by definition and in contrast a „marked‟ social category (Reynolds, 
2008). In Japan, cultural expectations are still that marriage and motherhood are part of 
a woman‟s „normal‟ life cycle and a source of women‟s happiness (Nemoto, 2008). 
Single women can be „troubling‟ to the notion of hegemonic femininity (and, as I will 
show, hegemonic masculinity). 
Single career women further challenge hegemonic femininity because they are 
empowered by their financial independence. Not needing to look for a man to 
financially support them can become another source of „trouble‟ in terms of securing a 
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heterosexual relationship. While professional ambition, high education, and high 
income can enhance middle-class men‟s marriage „marketability‟, they can detract from 
women‟s because men apparently view these capable women as „unfeminine‟ (Ehara, 
2008b; Nemoto, 2008). This was reflected in my data when Kayoko claims that she was 
told that her independence might „scare men off‟ (extract 19). Kayoko can be seen as 
facing a dilemma where her category membership as a „highly ambitious woman‟ may 
prevent her from getting married.    
Similar to a single „career woman‟, a married „superwoman‟ is a troubled 
subject position and also contests hegemonic femininity. This category also challenges 
the assumption that women are financially supported by men. Taylor and Littleton 
(2006) relatively point out that the „professionally successful married woman‟ identity 
can be seen as „troubled‟ because „professional success‟ is not typically associated with 
„married woman‟ due to a presupposition that if men are breadwinners, only they should 
be professionally successful. In Japan, where the institutions of marriage and 
motherhood are largely deemed „lifetime employment‟ (Iwao, 1993), Taylor and 
Littleton‟s comments ring true. Negotiating the demands of full-time work outside the 
home with those of parenting can thus be materially dilemmatic for many women, but 
these also dilemmas emerge discursively when women construct their careers as a 
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source of personal fulfillment and construct „guilty thoughts‟ for not fulfilling their 
„motherly duties‟ (see extract 21).  
In addition to being „troubled‟ subject positions at the level of conversational 
interaction, „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ also challenge and thus „trouble‟ the 
gendered assumption that men do paid work and women manage the home, which is the 
cornerstone of hegemonic femininity (see chapter 6). Women who take on the practices 
associated with hegemonic masculinity can be seen as „pariah femininities‟ because they 
refuse to assume a subordinate position vis-à-vis hegemonic masculinity and ultimately 
threaten to remove hegemonic masculinity from its extolled position (see section 2.5.4). 
My analysis will demonstrate, however, that there are consequences of engaging with 
these subject positions: the single career woman in my data articulates a fear of „scaring 
men off‟, and the „superwoman‟ express a struggle to balance the domestic with a career. 
These points will be discussed further throughout the chapter.     
I now present data which illustrates how a „career woman‟ subject position can 
be troubling for successful single women who desire marriage and for this reason can be 
seen as a „pariah femininity‟ identity. I have chosen to present two extracts from my 
interview with Kayoko in chronological order to trace the „cumulative‟ effect of this 
troubling subject position. These extracts illustrate how Kayoko shifts between 
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positions ranging from those which celebrate her many professional abilities to those 
that construct those abilities as detrimental to a potential heterosexual relationship.   
8.2.1 ‘Career woman’ as a ‘troubled’ identity and ‘pariah femininity’    
Kayoko was a twenty-six year old, single, junior high school teacher at the time 
of the interview. Prior to this extract, Kayoko articulates a desire for marriage and a 
family; however, she also indicates that her self-described independence may threaten 
men and thus prevent her from achieving that goal:   
Extract 19 
258 Kayoko: I‟m relatively independent like my mother. There are times when I‟ve  
259 been told, “it‟s better to depend more on men”. There are people who think this  
260 way. 
261 Justin: Does that become a form of pressure for you? 
262 Kayoko: Is it a form of pressure? There are many different things that I want to do, 
263 so I‟m doing many different things. I want to go abroad for graduate school. I‟m 
264 doing pilates everyday. When I say, “I want to do such and such” I‟ve been told, “If 
265 you are too perfect, you‟ll scare men away”. I hate that. But maybe it‟s true. I‟m not  
266 really sure. A male friend of mine said, “Men just are that way”. “Ah really”. A   
267 [female] friend of mine who‟s married said “yappari men seem to want to be in a 
268 higher position [than women]”.  
In this first extract we see how Kayoko‟s status as a „Renaissance woman‟ 
could potentially threaten her ability to secure a heterosexual relationship and for this 
reason is „troubling‟. In Kayoko‟s account, membership in the category „independent 
woman‟ inhibits women who desire a heterosexual partnership. Kayoko first articulates 
how independence can work against women seeking a relationship when she reports 
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advice that she was apparently given in reference to her self-proclaimed independence, 
„it‟s better to depend more on men‟ (l. 259). Kayoko frames the potentially negative 
effects of independence within reported speech to construct this claim as „factual‟ or at 
least external to her (see section 5.2.3). Kayoko then claims that her individual 
experience of being told to be less independent actually represents a line of thinking that 
„women should be less independent‟ which she formulates as „there are people who 
think this way‟ (ll. 259-260). Thus, the advice is recontextualized from a potentially 
isolated incident to a general way of thinking, which further corroborates her claim that 
independence is frequently seen as an undesirable characteristic in women.   
 Occupying the subject position of „independent career woman‟, which is a 
pariah femininity identity, can contribute to the formation of an ideological dilemma for 
women seeking marriage because hegemonic femininity is associated with financial and 
emotional dependence on men (see section 2.5.3). Kayoko may be struggling with an 
ideological dilemma when she rhetorically reformulates my question („is it a form of 
pressure‟; l. 262), and describes how her multiple interests might „scare men away‟ (l. 
265), resulting in „not being chosen‟. Kayoko draws on reported speech to evidence her 
claim that her various interests may threaten men: „When I say, “I want to do such and 
such” I‟ve been told, “If you are too perfect, you‟ll scare men away” (ll. 264-265). 
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Kayoko initially resists the troubled subject position of „not being chosen‟ („I hate 
[being told] that‟; l. 265), but immediately concedes, „maybe it‟s true‟ (l. 265). Further 
evidence which suggests that Kayoko is struggling with a dilemma stemming from her 
status as an „independent woman‟ who says she is also „seeking marriage‟, is indicated 
when she „voices‟ her male friend, „men just are that way‟ (l. 266), which she reportedly 
accepts, „Ah really‟ (l. 266). Although this is a very essentialist claim, her friend‟s 
gender provides him with a „category entitlement‟, enabling him to comment on men‟s 
thinking with a certain, if limited, level of authority (see section 5.3). His analysis of 
men‟s thinking is then confirmed by another of Kayoko‟s friends, „A [female] friend of 
mine who‟s married said “yappari men seem to want to be in a higher position” [than 
women]‟ (ll. 267-268). This second friend‟s category membership as a „married woman‟ 
also provides her with the category entitlement to comment on how men think with a 
certain degree of authority. Notably, the friend reportedly constructed men‟s devaluation 
of independent women as „commonsense‟ through the use of yappari (see section 5.4.2). 
Kayoko‟s original struggle to directly answer my question („is it a form of pressure‟; l. 
262), and subsequent voices of her friends together suggest that category membership as 
an „independent career woman‟ is indeed a source of pressure for her. As such, it can 
form the basis of an ideological dilemma because „independent woman‟ and „career 
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woman‟ are categories which directly challenge notions about hegemonic femininity 
which position women as dependent, emotional caretakers of others (see section 2.5.3), 
which are thus by definition pariah femininities.      
 The presence of an ideological dilemma becomes more explicit in the 
continuation of the extract, where Kayoko attempts to discursively resolve the 
double-standard which operates against highly ambitious women:  
Extract 20 
269 Justin: So are you saying that men like to be in a higher position than their partners? 
270 Kayoko: Yeah. My friend Peter was like that. Being in a lower position is no good.  
271 How do I put this? It seems as though yappari men want to earn more [than their 
272 partners]. That‟s why I have the feeling that men think about money more than  
273 women. 
274 Justin: And position, right? 
275 Kayoko: Yeah, that‟s right. I don‟t care about things like educational background at 
276 all. I see people for who they are. Men seem to care much more about these kinds 
277 of things than women do. For example, my [female] friend who got her doctorate 
278 from Tsukuba University said, “Men think that if they are not in a higher position 
279 than their partners, things probably won‟t work out between them”. 
280 Justin: Does your friend want to get married? 
281 Kayoko: She did at one point but not anymore.  
282 Justin: Why is that? 
283 She told me about a couple of previous relationships where the guy wanted her to 
284 give up her career, which she didn‟t want to do. 
285 Justin: I see.  
286 Kayoko: When she told me that I began to think about something. You isshokenmei  
287 [put your whole heart and soul] into something that you really want to do, but  
288 from the perspective of people around you, how do I put this? they compare  
289 themselves with you and don‟t want to get close to you. I‟m not really sure.  
Kayoko directly answers my question (l. 269) affirmatively, and then 
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immediately cites her friend Peter as evidence which supports her answer (l. 270; see 
section 5.2.3). The example of Peter is rhetorically effective because again his 
gender-based category membership provides him with a category entitlement (see 
section 5.3) to „speak for‟ men, which, in turn, bolsters Kayoko‟s claim that men desire 
to earn a high salary. Following this, Kayoko articulates her own, carefully mitigated 
opinion, „It seems as though yappari men want to earn more [than their partners]. That‟s 
why I have the feeling that men think about money more than women‟ (ll. 271-273). A 
mitigated response such as this is rhetorically effective because it allows Kayoko to 
make the general claim that „men care more about money more than women‟, but the 
claim is formulated as applying only to most men and thus could allow exceptions, i.e. 
men who are unconcerned about money. This thus results in a rhetorically 
„comprehensive‟ account. Yappari further corroborates Kayoko‟s claim by formulating 
it as „commonsense‟ and not simply her own opinion (see section 5.4.2). 
I then attempt to reconfirm that Kayoko is claiming that men value not only a 
higher salary than women but also a higher position („And position, right‟; l. 274). 
Kayoko answers in the affirmative, but then notably produces the next formulation, 
„watashi ha gakureki toka zenzen ki ni shinai‟ (I don‟t care about things like educational 
background at all‟; ll. 275-276). It is notable that Kayoko offers her own opinion even 
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though I never asked for it. I suggest that she does so in order to construct a category 
contrast (see section 5.3) between most men and at least some women; that is, men‟s 
concern with educational background and status stands in sharp contrast to Kayoko‟s 
disregard for these things. Kayoko‟s category contrast is upgraded by the extreme case 
formulation „zenzen‟ („at all‟; ll. 275-276), allowing her lack of concern with 
educational background to drastically contrast with men‟s apparent concern with it (see 
Pomerantz, 1986). Kayoko then claims for the second time, „Men seem to care much 
more about these kinds of things than women do‟ (ll. 276-277), which is also carefully 
mitigated by „seem‟. Just as she offered Peter‟s opinion as evidence (l. 270), this time 
Kayoko reports a female friend‟s words as further evidence: “Men think that if they are 
not in a higher position than their partners, things probably won‟t work out between 
them” (l. 278-279). Kayoko‟s friend has a category entitlement as a „career woman‟ to 
make this claim due to her apparent previous experience with men who were concerned 
with status: „She told me about a couple of previous relationships where the guy wanted 
her to give up her career, which she didn‟t want to do‟ (ll. 283-284).  
 The dilemmatic nature of membership in the category „career woman‟ is most 
apparent at the end of the extract. Kayoko struggles to resolve the contradictions 
between gendered repertoires which position men‟s and women‟s social contributions 
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differently, i.e. „Women as eventually domestic‟ and „Men as breadwinners‟ (see 
sections 6.2.1-6.2.2). Kayoko invokes the lexis „issokenmei‟ (your whole heart and 
soul)‟, an acclaimed value in Japanese society (Davies & Ikeno, 2002; Sugimoto, 2003), 
to describe her diligence, yet apparently this perseverance is not celebrated, but 
condemned by others, „You isshokenmei into something that you really want to do, but 
from the perspective of people around you, how do I put this? They compare themselves 
with you and don‟t want to get close to you. I‟m not really sure‟ (ll. 286-289). The 
troubled nature of the „career woman‟ subject position is suggested by „nantte iu darou‟ 
(„how do I put this‟; l. 288) and „wakaranai‟ (I‟m not really sure‟; l. 289) because 
Kayoko appears to struggle to articulate the notion that people, presumably men, may 
not want to get close to her. I am suggesting that „people‟ refers to „men‟ because 
Kayoko‟s whole account has focused on how men attach importance to salary, 
educational background, and social status, while women do not. The last part of the 
account indicates that a „working professional‟ subject position is easily taken up by 
men because they are not sanctioned for working hard, hence a gendered „career man‟ 
equivalent does not exist, yet women who take up this position face the dilemma of 
decreasing their eligibility for marriage and are positioned as embracing a form of 
„pariah femininity‟ subjectivity. 
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 A „career woman‟ subject position can be seen as a pariah femininity identity 
because it challenges the asymmetrical relationship between hegemonic masculinity and 
hegemonic femininity and threatens hegemonic masculinity‟s place of ascendancy (see 
sections 2.5.2-2.5.4). A „career woman‟ does not accommodate the interests of men, i.e. 
as a professional homemaker arguably does, but instead works full-time which 
challenges the hegemonic assumption that women are responsible for domestic work 
and financially dependent on men. A career woman‟s professional ambition and 
financial independence are characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity that 
when taken on by women are an example of „gender deviance‟ (Messerschmidt, 2007), 
i.e. they are subverting traditional gendered practices. The consequences of this 
deviance are reflected discursively when women hesitate to express membership in the 
category, illustrating that the traditional practices associated with marriage are still 
venerated and the fear of „not being chosen‟ very real (see Reynolds, 2008). 
 Another example of a pariah femininity subject position is that of a 
„superwoman‟.  
8.2.2 ‘Superwoman’ as a ‘troubled’ identity and ‘pariah femininity’ 
Another example is arguably a „hybrid‟ subject position because it integrates 
aspects of hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity that of „superwoman‟. 
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Similar to a single career woman, a superwoman works alongside men in a 
non-domestic role, yet assumes as well the „double-burden‟ of household labor. 
Managing these dual roles can develop into an ideological dilemma as women attempt 
to represent themselves as „good wives and wise mothers‟ (see section 1.3) who also 
work, which is displayed discursively by articulating a conflict between performing 
these domestic and non-domestic roles.  
I now present data which demonstrates how a „superwoman‟ subject position 
can be troubling (difficult to align with) for women as they attempt to represent 
themselves as „good wives and wise mothers‟ who also work outside the home. The 
following two extracts from an interview with Akiko (see also extracts 5-8; 16) illustrate 
how „trouble‟ emerges discursively in the process of constructing an account. 
At the time of the interview, Akiko was forty-two, married with a four-year old, 
and a university lecturer. In the extract below she considers whether or not working 
women face social pressure:  
Extract 21 
129 Justin: So do you think that women today face social pressure? 
130 Akiko: That‟s a difficult one. It‟s not that someone specifically said something to 
131 me. But yappari when you‟re working. Yappari I think “it‟s my fault” when the  
132 house needs cleaning. Since my husband and I both work, it‟s fine. Yappari I think 
133 “I was the only one not there” when I‟m late picking up my child. When I can‟t 
134 make the lunch boxes after deciding [in advance] to make them, I think that I had to 
135 make the lunch boxes. Is it social pressure (laugh)? Probably nobody said  
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136 anything to me. But society probably thinks in this way given that I feel like this. 
This extract illustrates the first traces of the „troubled‟ nature of „superwoman‟ 
category membership. Rather than directly answering my question, Akiko produces an 
ambiguous response „muzukashii na‟ (That‟s a difficult one‟; l. 130) and then goes on to 
describe what could be considered „covert‟ pressure („It‟s not that someone specifically 
said something to me‟; ll. 130-131). The first reference to the troubled nature of the 
social category „working woman‟ is Akiko‟s direct reference to „work‟ and use of 
„yappari‟ to construct her conflict as a „working mother‟ as „commonsense‟ („But 
yappari when you‟re working‟; l. 131; see section 5.4.2). She then constructs her 
„internal conflict‟ within self-reported habitual thought (see section 5.2.7) to „evidence‟ 
her apparent struggle to manage her role as a „working mother‟ (I think “it‟s my fault”; l. 
131). Habitual thoughts are invoked to account for hic-et-nunc actions or lack thereof 
(Couper-Kuhlen, 2007). Akiko‟s use of this device suggests that she is expected to clean 
the house and her failure to do so necessitates an account. Akiko‟s articulation of 
self-reported habitual thought to account for her failure to clean the house can be read as 
an attempt to manage a positive self-presentation (see section 2.1.4) as a „devoted‟ wife 
and „dutiful‟ mother, and also as a reflection of the troubled nature of superwoman 
category membership. 
Akiko constructs the failure to clean the house as understandable given her 
322 
 
work-related responsibilities („Since my husband and I both work, it‟s fine‟; l. 132). If 
this „negligence‟ truly was fine, then arguably it would have been unnecessary for Akiko 
to produce two additional examples of „neglected duties‟ and her „guilty feelings‟ 
concerning that negligence, which she constructs within self-reported habitual thoughts 
(„Yappari I think “I was the only one not there” when I‟m late picking up my child. 
When I can‟t make the lunch boxes after deciding [in advance] to make them, I think 
that I had to make the lunch boxes‟; ll. 132-135). The two examples of picking up the 
child late and not making the lunch boxes can be read as forming part of a „three part 
list‟ (Jefferson, 1990) (along with „house needs cleaning‟; l. 132), which together 
suggest that Akiko is referring to a larger phenomenon, i.e. „failed motherhood‟. The 
second example of „guilty feelings‟ („I was the only one not there‟; l. 133) and reference 
to lunch boxes both bolster her self-presentation as a „concerned mother‟. 
Elaborately-crafted lunch boxes are not only expected by nursery school officials, but 
have also been conceptualized as a social sign that a woman has successfully performed 
her motherhood role (Allison, 1991, 2000). Akiko‟s reference to lunch boxes, then, is 
significant because a failure to perform this duty could be interpreted by others as a sign 
of „failed‟ or „neglected‟ motherhood. 
In the last part of this extract Akiko finally produces a response to my question 
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(„So do you think that women today face social pressure?‟; l. 129) when she says, „Is it 
social pressure (laugh)? Probably nobody said anything to me. But society probably 
thinks in this way given that I feel like this‟ (ll. 135-136). I suggest that the implicit 
form of pressure to which Akiko refers could stem from a „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ repertoire (see section 6.3), in relation to which Akiko attempted to produce 
an account of herself as a „devoted‟ wife and „dutiful‟ mother.  
 Akiko‟s account illustrates the troubled nature of „superwoman‟ category 
membership. The trouble arises from the tension between membership in the apparently 
polarized categories of „career woman‟ and „wife/mother‟ categories, which can 
contribute to the formation of an ideological dilemma (see section 3.4.2). In a culture 
where marriage and motherhood are considered „lifetime employment‟ (Iwao, 1993; see 
section 8.2), Akiko risks being seen by others as a „failed mother‟ because she also 
works outside the home. In order to resolve this dilemma, Akiko works up a 
self-presentation as a „working mother‟ who is very concerned about adequately 
performing her domestic duties by drawing on a language of „guilty feelings‟. 
In the next extract, Akiko also draws on „guilty feelings‟ and presents her 
husband as lacking those feelings or at least a sense of responsibility. This (in relative 
terms) bolsters her self-presentation as a „good‟ mother: 
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Extract 22 
138 Justin: How do you and your husband balance things at home? 
139 Akiko: My husband and I decided long ago to do everything together (laugh). It‟s a 
140 good idea for the one who‟s free to jump in since these are household matters,  
141 which both of us can do. It‟s a good idea for the one who‟s not tired to make  
142 breakfast. This is how we do things, but it seems as though I‟m the one who feels 
143 more of the responsibility when we‟re both busy and something doesn‟t get done. 
144 When we decide not to make lunch boxes [for the family] since we‟re both busy, I 
145 think “oh we don‟t have lunch boxes today because I didn‟t ganbaranakatta [work 
146 hard],” but my husband doesn‟t think anything of it. 
147 Justin: But your husband doesn‟t think that you didn‟t work hard enough, does he? 
148 Akiko: He doesn‟t think that way. Because we‟re both busy in this situation he 
149 thinks, “Shikataganai” [Oh well]. But about half of my friends‟ husbands think that  
150 women should make the lunch boxes.  
151 Justin: Are these friends the same age as you? 
152 Akiko: They‟re the same age but yappari many women are asked to do it because  
153 women have [traditionally] done housework.  
At the beginning of the account it appears as though domestic work is equally 
shared with her husband, thus Akiko‟s category membership (see section 5.3) as a 
working mother is not troubled (l. 139). However, despite this purported equal 
distribution of domestic labor, Akiko constructs herself as feeling the greater burden of 
guilt when something is neglected (ll. 142-143). Similar to extract 21, Akiko draws on 
habitual thoughts in order to account for neglecting to perform some aspect of domestic 
work. Also similar to extract 21 is Akiko‟s reference to lunch boxes in order to illustrate 
her „negligence‟, which, as discussed, are a symbol of a mother‟s devotion to her child 
(„When we decide not to make lunch boxes [for the family] since we‟re both busy; l. 
144), which is immediately followed with, „I think “oh we don‟t have lunch boxes today 
325 
 
because I didn‟t ganbaranakatta [work hard]”, but my husband doesn‟t think anything 
of it‟ (ll. 144-146). Akiko notably invokes her own reported thoughts in concert with the 
lexicalization „ganbaranakatta‟ in order to present herself as very much attuned to her 
domestic duties. The verb ganbaru („work hard‟) indexes the high value placed on 
perseverance in Japanese society (Davies & Ikeno, 2002; Sugimito, 2003) and Akiko‟s 
usage of the term also indicates that it is gendered here, i.e. women „work hard‟ as 
mothers. Given that domestic work is women‟s „responsibility‟, her husband „thinks 
nothing of‟ (l. 146) his failure to perform some aspect of domestic work.  
Akiko‟s response to my question („But your husband doesn‟t think that you 
didn‟t work hard enough, does he?‟; l. 147) is a further indication of the gendered nature 
of ganbaru. In contrast to Akiko, he apparently views the situation where work 
interfering with household-related matters is inevitable, conveyed by „shikataganai‟ (oh 
well). Akiko then makes a gender-based category reference when discussing her friends‟ 
husbands („But about half of my friends‟ husbands think that women should make the 
lunch boxes‟; ll. 149-150). This suggests that domestic work is still viewed as women‟s 
responsibility and supports Akiko‟s construction of her own husband‟s thoughts. Finally, 
Akiko emphasizes the connection between women and the category-bound activity of 
domestic work („They‟re the same age but yappari many women are asked to do it 
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because women have [traditionally] done housework‟; ll. 152-153). 
A notable aspect of this exchange is Akiko‟s positioning of her husband, which 
supports her self-presentation as a „dutiful‟ wife and „devoted‟ mother. As I showed 
above, Akiko invokes the lexis of „ganbaru‟ and „guilty feelings‟ to present herself as 
fulfilling her domestic duties but positions her husband as unconcerned when some 
aspect of domestic work is left unfinished due to their jobs. Akiko accomplishes this 
positioning through a category contrast (see section 5.3): her struggle to manage the 
domestic with the non-domestic stands in stark contrast to her husband‟s apparent 
„laissez-faire‟ attitude (indicated by „shikataganai‟) and could reflect the troubled nature 
of a „superwoman‟ subject position.  
Akiko‟s account in fact nicely illustrates the troubled nature of a superwoman 
subject position: she „accounts‟ for her membership in this category by carefully 
managing a self-presentation as a „devoted‟ wife and „dutiful‟ mother who also works. 
Akiko‟s construction of „guilty feelings‟ and positioning of her husband are examples of 
how she attempts to discursively manage this trouble. Due to the absence of 
interpretative repertoires which position men and women as equally responsible for 
domestic duties, women such as Akiko face an ideological dilemma stemming from 
their membership in the stigmatized category of „working wife/mother‟. One way to 
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discursively manage this dilemma is to present oneself as very much attuned to 
domestic work in an attempt to distance oneself from the negative connotations 
associated with „working woman‟ category membership.  
Like the „career woman‟, a „superwoman‟ subject position can be seen as a 
„pariah femininity‟ because it challenges the ascendant position of hegemonic 
masculinity (see sections 2.5.2-2.5.4). Although the superwoman position incorporates 
aspects of hegemonic femininity, i.e. performing domestic labor, it also challenges the 
traditional assumption that non-domestic work is entirely „men‟s territory‟. Due to this 
nonconformity, women who align themselves with the superwoman position may need 
to produce an account where they are also „good‟ wives and „wise‟ mothers lest they be 
regarded as „gender deviants‟ (Messerschmidt, 2007), i.e. individuals whose sex and 
gender misalign. The consequences of this „deviance‟ are reflected discursively when, 
despite an equal division of domestic labor with their husbands, working women 
hesitate to disavow responsibility for domestic work, and instead construct „guilty 
feelings‟ for failing to adequately attend to that work, while making it clear that they 
know about the work. 
In Chapter 8, I have addressed research question one: „What interpretative 
repertoires do participants draw on as they discursively construct (b) pariah femininity?‟ 
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Kayoko did not draw on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ or „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ repertoire but instead on what we might call a „Working professional‟ 
repertoire when she discusses her professional ambitions. Akiko draws on a „Working 
professional‟ repertoire and a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire when she 
positions herself as responsible for domestic work.  
I have also addressed research question 1(a): „What discursive features are 
associated with interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah femininity? Both 
Kayoko and Akiko draw on membership categories and category bound activities (see 
section 5.3). Significantly, they invoke a lexis of issokenmei („your whole heart and 
soul‟) and „ganbaru‟ („work hard‟) which indicates that „working hard‟ or „putting your 
whole heart and soul into an endeavor‟ is gendered in Japanese society. Men are 
expected to serve as family breadwinners while women act as family caregivers. 
Kayoko uses „yappari‟ (see section 5.4) to emphasize that ambition may prevent 
heterosexual women from „being chosen‟ and construct this as „commonsense‟. Akiko 
draws on „yappari‟ to assert that her „guilty feelings‟ for neglecting her parental duties 
are natural. Both Kayoko and Akiko‟s accounts are replete with reported speech; 
however, Akiko also draws on „self-reported habitual thought‟ (see section 5.2.7) which 
is a notable difference from the previously analyzed accounts. In section 8.3, I discuss 
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the role of reported speech in the construction of hegemonic femininity.    
Research question 1(b) asks: „What subject positions (self and other) do 
participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah 
femininity?‟ Kayoko takes up a „career woman‟ subject position and Akiko a 
„superwoman‟ subject position; however, neither wholeheartedly embraces these 
subjectivities which indicates they may be struggling with ideological dilemmas posed 
by category membership.  
Therefore, this chapter also addresses research question two: „Is there evidence 
of ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions between different interpretative 
repertoires in participants‟ discourse?‟ Kayoko can be seen as facing a dilemma where 
her category membership as an „independent career woman‟ may prevent her from 
securing a long-term heterosexual relationship because hegemonic femininity is 
associated with dependence on men (see section 2.5.3). Akiko faces a dilemma where 
her category membership as a „career woman‟ challenges the normative assumption that 
women‟s subjectivity is entirely domestically-based (e.g., full-time homemaker). 
Despite a purported equal division of domestic labor with her husband, a „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire positions Akiko in a domestic role in addition to her 
non-domestic one, so she faced the dilemma of being viewed as an „incompetent‟ wife 
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and mother, perhaps even „unfeminine‟, which she manages by presenting herself as a 
„diligent‟ wife and mother through the construction of „guilty thoughts‟, i.e. at least an 
awareness of what she „should‟ do.  
Finally, extending chapters 6-7, this chapter also addresses research question 
three: „What discursive features are associated with ideological dilemmas generated 
from contradictions between interpretative repertoires in participants‟ discourse?‟ 
Ideological dilemmas are suggested when speakers hesitate to directly answer my 
question and instead produce ambiguous responses such as „that‟s a difficult one‟. In 
addition, Kayoko uses gendered category membership to contrast how independence 
and ambition are undesirable characteristics for women seeking marriage, which she 
supportes with „yappari‟. Akiko notably invokes a category contrast to position herself 
as concerned and her husband as unconcerned when aspects of domestic life are 
neglected. Ideological dilemmas are also suggested by both speakers‟ extensive use of 
reported speech, which I discuss in 8.3.     
8.3 The main discursive features used to construct ‘pariah femininities’    
8.3.1 The discursive functions of reported speech and thought 
Reported speech and thought is used as evidence which supports a speaker‟s 
claim. For example, Kayoko (extract 19) claims that emotional independence can work 
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against women who want to enter into long-term heterosexual relationships because 
men reportedly prefer to be in a higher position than their partners. Kayoko constructs 
what she was apparently told, „it‟s better to depend on men‟, as representative of a 
common way of thinking through reported thought (see section 5.2.7), „there are people 
who think this way‟. Kayoko‟s possibly isolated experience of being told to depend 
more on men she now reconstructs as representative of a common line of thought, 
which supports her claim that men are threatened by independent women.  
Regarding the rhetorical effectiveness of reported speech versus thought, 
speech is rhetorically stronger than thought because speech was ostensibly uttered by 
someone else while thought represents a speaker‟s construction and thus interpretation 
of another‟s usually unarticulated thought. Therefore, a claim produced within reported 
thought can be undermined on the grounds that it is impossible to know someone‟s 
thoughts. Speakers can, however, rhetorically protect against reported thought being 
undermined, through the use of mitigation. Here, Kayoko first draws on reported speech 
to evidence her claim that men want to be in a higher social position than their female 
partner (e.g., „men want to earn more [than their partners]‟), and later suggests (extract 
20) that this comment is representative of men‟s normative thinking (e.g., „that‟s why I 
have the feeling that men think about money more than women‟). „That‟s why I have 
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the feeling‟ is mitigated and thus less direct than „I think‟. The use of reported speech 
combined with mitigated reported thought allows Kayoko to formulate a claim about 
men‟s thinking which was rhetorically strong and difficult to undermine.  
Another way to rhetorically bolster a claim made within reported thought is to 
construct thought as originating with another speaker. Kayoko (extract 20) provides an 
example of her friend whose academic credentials „disqualify‟ her from a successful 
non-platonic relationship, which supports Kayoko‟s claim that men are uncomfortable 
dating successful women. Kayoko constructs her friend‟s assessment of men‟s thought 
within reported speech, „men think that if they are not in a higher position than their 
partners, things probably won‟t work out between them‟. Notably, the reported thought 
of men is embedded within reported speech, so the friend‟s individual experience with 
men is constructed as part of a larger phenomenon—the „normative‟ thinking of men as 
an aggregate. Therefore, Kayoko‟s claim has the support of both her friend‟s reported 
speech and friend‟s construction of the reported thought of men. 
Reported speech is more „authentic‟ than reported thought in that speech was 
purportedly uttered, whereas reported thought represents a speaker‟s interpretation of 
another‟s unarticulated thought and is thus more mediated. Nevertheless, reported 
speech is transient, being uttered in a particular conversational setting, while reported 
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thought may represent something deeper and more enduring, i.e. a belief system. 
Although reported thought was never „uttered‟, its rhetorical strength stems from its 
representing the normative thinking or belief system of an entire group. 
The above discussion has I hope demonstrated that the rhetorical effectiveness 
of reported speech and thought is contextually dependent. While reported speech is 
„authentic‟ in that it (or something like it) was presumably uttered, it can be discredited 
as an isolated experience, not representative of the „norm‟, e.g. other men are not 
threatened by independent women. However, reported speech is rarely an accurate 
rendition of previously uttered speech but is modified to serve a speaker‟s rhetorical 
needs in the current interactional context (e.g., Holt & Clift, 2007; Tannen 2007). 
Although reported thought may be rhetorically effective because it may be used to 
represent the „normative‟ thinking of a group (i.e., „men think‟), it can be undermined 
on the basis that it is impossible to know what others are thinking. Speakers can 
rhetorically insulate their claims from being undermined through the use of mitigated 
reported thought or constructing the reported thought as originating with another 
speaker. Reported speech and thought are discursive devices which speakers deploy in 
order to increase the credibility of their claims.      
8.3.2 The discursive functions of ‘self’ versus ‘other’ reported thought 
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As previously discussed, the participants in this study tended to construct the 
reported thought of „another‟ versus „self‟ (see section 5.2.7). An exception to this 
general pattern is Akiko who uses self-reported thought to construct her domestic 
obligations which she apparently fails to perform due to her work-related 
responsibilities (see section 8.2.2). 
Akiko (extract 21) claims that housework is divided equally between herself 
and her husband; however, despite this purported equal division of labor, she also 
claims that she feels more guilt than her husband when domestic work is neglected. 
Akiko invokes self-reported thought to construct her internal struggle to manage the 
competing demands of her job and domestic responsibilities. She claims that when the 
house is not properly cleaned, „I think it‟s my fault‟. She also claims that she feels guilty 
for not picking her child up on time, „I think I was the only one not there.‟ Finally, when 
she is unable to make the family‟s lunch boxes, she states, „I think that I had to make 
them.‟  
These three examples are formulated within self-reported thought, which 
indicate that Akiko is accounting for the absence of socially expected practices. Notably, 
cleaning the house, picking up her child, and making lunch boxes are all 
domestically-based practices which suggests that Akiko is drawing on a „Women as 
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eventually domestic‟ repertoire (see section 6.2.2) as she attempts to construct her own 
subjectivity in line with hegemonic femininity (see section 2.5.3). However, her own 
reported inability to perform these domestic tasks prevents her from constructing her 
subjectivity in line with hegemonic femininity (and, as indicated, for this reason „career 
woman‟ can be seen as a pariah femininity subjectivity).  
Self-reported thought performs an important rhetorical function in Akiko‟s 
account. I indicated that reported thought of another person or group may be 
self-undermining from the perspective that it is impossible to know what someone else 
is thinking; however, this does not apply to self-reported thought. Whereas the rhetorical 
effectiveness of reported thought of an aggregate lies in its ability to construct 
„normativity‟ (e.g., „men think that women should do housework‟), self-reported 
thought is rhetorically effective because a speaker can account for some „neglected‟ 
practice and present oneself in a positive manner. Although Akiko‟s involvement in 
professional employment locates her outside hegemonic femininity, which is 
domestically-based (see sections 6.2; 6.3), she invokes self-reported thought to present 
herself as still very much attuned to „appropriately‟ performing a domestic role. 
This section has illustrated how two participants drew on reported speech and 
reported thought and in the process constructed „pariah femininity‟ subjectivity. 
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Reported speech and thought can be used as evidence to support speakers‟ claims and 
bolster their overall account. We also saw how self-reported thought can be used to 
account for some „neglected‟ practice and in the process to positively present oneself.   
8.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the discursive construction of two „pariah 
femininities‟ within the interviews of two Japanese women (see section 2.5.4). Category 
membership as a „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ can be seen as pariah femininity 
subjectivities because they contest a „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as 
eventually domestic‟ repertoire (see sections 6.2.1-6.2.2). These subjectivities can be 
„troubling‟ for participants, i.e. difficult to align with (see section 8.2) and indeed 
troubling for the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic 
femininity.  
I traced the construction of „trouble‟ over the course of the participants‟ 
discourse through the occurrence of different discourse analytic devices: reported 
speech, membership categorization devices, and yappari, and particular uses of these 
which functioned to evidence claims, contrast gender-based category-bound activities, 
and construct a positive self-presentation (see sections 5.2-5.4). „Career woman‟ and 
„superwoman‟ subject positions reflect and arguably construct pariah femininities which 
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challenge the dominant discourse that women‟s primary role is a domestic one.  
Akiko and Kayoko struggle with ideological dilemmas which emerge from 
contradictions between „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ and what we might call a „Working professional‟ repertoire. Kayoko‟s 
dilemma results from her category membership as a career woman and woman who is 
seeking marriage. These women‟s discursive struggles illustrate the hegemony of 
domestic subjectivity and the difficulty of constructing alternative subjectivities.  
This chapter has illustrated how pariah femininities pose a challenge to a 
heteronormative gender order which positions men as breadwinners and women as 
caretakers. „In other words, „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ subject positions 
threaten to disassemble the „heterosexual matrix‟ (Butler, 1999; see section 2.5) where 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity exist in a hierarchical relationship built on 
domination and subordination respectively because these subject positions challenge the 
exalted status of hegemonic masculinity (see sections 2.5.2-2.5.3). Kayoko discursively 
presents a prime example of the sexual double-standard that operates against women 
who embody aspects of hegemonic masculinity. Kayoko‟s characteristics, i.e. being 
independent, ambitious, and successful, would make a single man an attractive marriage 
candidate, but in Kayoko‟s case they reportedly count against her. Similarly, the long 
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hours that Akiko spends at work resulting in a lack of time to perform domestic work 
would in „Women as eventually domestic‟ not be constructed as „failed fatherhood‟ in a 
man, but dedication to his job, which paradoxically makes him appear a responsible 
family man. These two examples illustrate how when aspects of hegemonic masculinity 
are associated with women, they shift from „strengths‟ to „shortcomings‟. 
The two „pariah femininity‟ subjectivities discussed in this chapter thus 
illustrate the sexual double-standard which women can face. Women who embody 
characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are not rewarded as men arguably 
are but instead become „undesirable marriage candidates‟ or „bad mothers‟ because they 
challenge hegemonic masculinity. Whereas a professionally ambitious man is a „good 
catch‟, the professionally ambitious Kayoko articulated a fear of „scaring men away‟. In 
Japan, where masculinity is associated with paid labor, men can pursue their careers 
with the domestic support provided by a wife, while working women such as Akiko 
express „guilty thoughts‟ in order to present themselves as „good wives and wise 
mothers‟ (see section 1.3). However, although constructing pariah femininity 
subjectivity may be „troubling‟ both for women and for the relationship between 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity, this subjectivity may also provide women with a 
politics of resistance. I further discuss this point in the final chapter, Chapter 9.   
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In Chapter 9, in addition to bringing together the „answers‟ to my research 
questions, I also discuss this study‟s contributions to gender theory and critical 
discursive psychology. In addition, I identify its limitations and propose directions for 
further research. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter I discuss the relationship between the results of my 
findings and studies discussed in the literature review, thus locating my research in the 
fields of gender studies and critical discursive psychology. The purpose of this study 
was two-fold: (1) to critically examine the discursive construction of „hegemonic‟ and 
„pariah‟ femininities within the context of interviews; and (2) to relate the concept of 
interpretative repertoires from discursive psychology to specific discursive devices 
which characterize these repertoires (see section 2.6). My goal was to make an original 
contribution to gender studies through the empirical investigation of the theoretically 
operationalized constructs of „hegemonic‟ and „pariah‟ femininity (see section 
2.5.3-2.5.4) and to critical discursive psychology by further attempting to blur the 
distinction between „micro‟ and „macro‟ levels of analysis and move toward more 
synthetic discourse analysis, as proposed by Edley and Wetherell (2008) and Wetherell 
(1998, 2007). In this chapter I also discuss the contributions of my study, its limitations, 
and outline areas for further research.  
9.2 Revisiting the research questions 
Research question one asks, „What interpretative repertoires do participants 
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draw on as they discursively construct (a) hegemonic femininity?‟ Significantly, the 
results of this study indicate that even in an era of post equal opportunities discourse, 
interpretative repertoires which constitute hegemonic femininity still offer women a 
„professional homemaker‟ subjectivity, e.g. what has been called „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟. This suggests that a „good wives, wise 
mothers‟ ideology (see section 1.3) continues to exert an influence on hegemonic 
femininity.  
Recent research has indicated that „Shared parenting‟ repertoires are beginning 
to circulate in Japan. A „new homemaker‟ (Taga, 2006) expects a certain level of 
domestic involvement from her husband; however, she is typically still a full-time, 
stay-at-home mother who may engage in work resembling a hobby once her children 
enter school (e.g., private tutoring from her home). Women‟s desire for greater domestic 
involvement from their husbands can be seen as a positive development for Japanese 
families. However, significantly, we do not see the emergence of repertoires which 
position women as „career professionals‟. As Ogasawara (1998) (see section 1.3) has 
indicated, a possible reason why „office flowers‟ are uncommitted to their work and 
willing to resign is that the work is unstimulating and lacks opportunities for 
advancement. Similarly, Kimoto (2005) found that while male employees are „fast 
342 
 
tracked‟ into managerial positions, women are relegated to shift work with few 
opportunities for advancement. The de facto discriminatory and gendered nature of 
Japanese employment practices may be one reason why there is an absence of 
repertoires which position women as „career professionals‟. Conceivably, many women 
may regard a full-time domestic role as more appealing than a „dead-end‟ job in a 
company.  
 In support of the emergence of the „new homemaker‟, many of my participants 
construct femininity as women‟s exclusive „privilege‟ (see Chapter 7). Ai and Ayaka 
(extract 14) construct marriage as an „escape route‟ and Nayu (extract 15) suggests that 
women have more choices than men. In these accounts, women do not resign from work 
with reluctance, but are empowered by their agency to relinquish their positions. 
Ogasawara (1998) observed a similar phenomenon where women viewed themselves as 
free to resign while men “are tied down to the company” (p. 64). Participants‟ positive 
construction of „Privileged femininity‟ is highly problematic because it binds women to 
heteronormative partnerships. Although men may be „bound‟ to their workplaces, they 
receive a paid wage and social prestige. Women, on the other hand, engage in an unpaid 
and arguably undervalued labor of love.  
Yamada (2001) makes the important point that certain conditions must exist in 
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order for a woman to become a „professional housewife‟. A woman can become and 
remain as a full-time housewife as long as she is able to get married, remain married, 
her husband‟s salary continually increases, and he does not die or lose his job (Yamada 
2001). Therefore, the decision to become a full-time housewife does incur risks. These 
become somewhat elevated in a society which has been plagued by a long-term 
economic recession and work-induced health-problems such as karoshi („death by 
overwork‟) which are making single-income families financially unfeasible, thus the 
responsibility to serve as the primary breadwinner becomes a source of pressure for men 
(Mouer & Kawanishi, 2005; Roberson & Suzuki, 2003; Sugimoto, 2003). When viewed 
in light of these risks, the „privileges‟ associated with a full-time domestic role require 
re-evaluation.  
Research question 1(a) asks: „What discursive features are associated with 
interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic femininity? Reported speech, 
gendered categorical references (e.g., „because you‟re a woman‟) and category-bound 
activities combined with „yappari‟ to mark these activities as „commonsense‟ (see 
sections 5.2-5.4) are discursive features associated with the construction of hegemonic 
femininity. 
Concerning research question 1(b), „What subject positions (self and other) do 
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participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (a) hegemonic 
femininity?‟, participants assumed subject positions which range from complicit to 
resistant. The multifarious positions that participants assumed in relation to „Privileged‟ 
and „Bounded femininity‟ (see chapter 10) are noteworthy because they illustrates how 
some participants took up resistant subject positions in relation to repertoires which 
constitute hegemonic femininity. For instance, Hiromi (extract 13) negatively evaluates 
her parents‟ low expectations concerning her academic success, and for this reason can 
be seen as taking up a resistant subject position in relation to „Privileged femininity‟ at 
school. Her resistance is suggested when she uses reported speech in reference to her 
parents‟ expectations of her brother (e.g. „study hard‟) and then negated hypothetical 
reported speech (see section 5.2.8) to convey their lack of expectations for her („they‟ve 
never said that to me‟). Similarly, Michi, Keiko and Yayoi (extract 18), criticize men‟s 
purported assumption that women serve the food at work-related socials, and thus can 
be seen as assuming resistant subject positions in relation to „Bounded femininity‟. By 
assuming resistant subject positions, these women are attempting to draw on other 
repertoires which position both men and women as career professionals. We can 
conceptualize women who take up resistant subject positions in relation to hegemonic 
femininity as contributing to changing the status quo.  
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  However, the complicit positions which a majority of the participants assume 
in relation to „Privileged‟ and „Bounded‟ femininity repertoires illustrate how gender 
hegemony can operate subtly through these repertoires. That is, participants do not 
position themselves as disempowered by these repertoires but in fact empowered. For 
instance, a lack of pressure to excel in school and work could be constructed as a 
„freedom‟ associated with gender-category membership. In this line of thinking, women 
are empowered by their agency to select a course of study or job of their preference, 
unlike their male counterparts who are pressured to enter competitive universities and 
secure stable employment. Nevertheless, this „freedom‟ must be viewed in light of its 
implications about the heterosexual gender order (see section 2.3) of Japanese society 
where men are normatively positioned as „providers‟ and women „caregivers‟. In the 
end, women are not free but remain financially dependent on men in domestic 
partnerships.  
 The second research question asks: „Is there evidence of ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in 
participants‟ discourse?‟ Women who attempt to construct subjectivities outside the 
domestic realm can face ideological dilemmas due to contradictions between „Women 
as natural caregivers‟, „Women as eventually domestic‟ (see chapter 6) and alternative 
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repertoires (e.g., „Working professional). An ideological dilemma is also suggested 
when Akiko (see section 7.2.2) draws on „Privileged femininity‟ and presents femininity 
as a resource which qualifies women for certain occupations, but at other points in her 
interview expressed resistance to gender category membership being the sole reason for 
asking women to perform a task such as serving tea.   
Also concerning research question one, i.e. „What interpretative repertoires do 
participants draw on as they discursively construct (b) pariah femininity?‟, category 
membership as a single „career woman‟ or married „superwoman‟ can be seen as „pariah‟ 
femininities because they „trouble‟ the asymmetrical relationship between hegemonic 
masculinity and hegemonic femininity and for this reason can be psychologically 
difficult positions for participants to align with. Kayoko (extracts 19-20) does not draw 
on a „Women as eventually domestic‟ or „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire but 
instead on what we might call a „Working professional‟ repertoire, constructing her 
subjectivity accordingly. Akiko (extracts 21-22) draws on a „Working professional‟ 
repertoire but also a „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoire when she positions 
herself as responsible for domestic work. The fact that „career woman‟ and 
„superwoman‟ subjectivities contest the assumption that men are „providers‟ and women 
„provided for‟ results in a situation where participants are unable to enthusiastically 
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embrace these subject positions in any straightforward way. 
Research question 1(a) asks: „What discursive features are associated with 
interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah femininity?‟ A lexis of „ganbaru‟ 
(„work hard‟) and „issokenmei‟ („your whole heart and soul‟) and associated gendered 
category-bound activities are discursive features associated with the construction of 
pariah femininity. Notably, ganbaru and issokenmei are gendered; therefore, women 
who attempt to devote themselves to their careers can face ideological dilemmas 
because they draw on alternative repertoires which contest „Women as natural 
caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟. Reported speech, particularly 
„self-reported thought‟ to construct „guilty feelings‟ over neglected aspects of domestic 
life is another discursive feature associated with the construction of pariah femininity. 
Kayoko and Akiko both use „yappari‟ to construct their stigmatized status as either an 
„ambitious woman‟ who is seeking marriage or „guilty thoughts‟ over „neglected‟ 
maternal duties as „commonsense‟, thus „yappari‟ is another discursive feature 
associated with the construction of pariah femininity.  
 Regarding research question 1(b), i.e. „What subject positions (self and other) 
do participants take up in relation to interpretative repertoires constituting (b) pariah 
femininity?‟ Results of this study indicate that pariah femininities are by definition 
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difficult to embrace. For example, Kayoko positively constructs her independence and 
ambition; however, she also articulates concern that these same qualities may „scare 
men off‟ and thus result in her „not being chosen‟ (see Reynolds, 2008). Similarly, 
Akiko does not embrace a „superwoman‟ position but instead uses the language of 
„guilty thoughts‟ to present herself as a „good wife and wise mother‟ (see section 1.3). 
The participants‟ inability to wholeheartedly embrace „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ 
subject positions can stem from ideological dilemmas which emerge in their discourse.  
Research question two asks: „Is there evidence of ideological dilemmas 
generated from contradictions between different interpretative repertoires in 
participants‟ discourse?‟ A pervasive dilemma across these accounts was the participants‟ 
inability to position paid work and family responsibilities as complementary pursuits. A 
hegemonic „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as domestic‟ still position 
domestic work as women‟s responsibility, thus women who attempt to construct 
non-domestic subjectivities can face dilemmas. This is exemplified in the accounts of 
Kayoko and Akiko who struggle with ideological dilemmas which stem from their 
respective category membership as a „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟. Kayoko 
(extracts 19-20) cannot wholeheartedly celebrate her independence and ambitions 
because these same characteristics potentially prevent her from securing a long-term 
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heterosexual partnership, which is associated with hegemonic femininity. Similarly, 
Akiko (extracts 21-22) cannot wholeheartedly embrace a „working professional‟ subject 
position without risking being seen as a „negligent mother‟; therefore, she resolves this 
dilemma by drawing on the language of „guilty thoughts‟ and presenting herself as 
struggling to juggle the dual pursuits of work and motherhood.  
The final research question asks: „What discursive features are associated with 
ideological dilemmas generated from contradictions between interpretative repertoires 
in participants‟ discourse?‟ Kayoko uses gendered category membership to contrast how 
independence and ambition are undesirable characteristics for women seeking marriage, 
which she supports with „yappari‟. Akiko notably invokes a category contrast to 
position herself as concerned and her husband as unconcerned when aspects of domestic 
life are neglected. Ideological dilemmas are also suggested by both speakers‟ extensive 
use of reported speech. Diverging from previous chapters, Akiko invokes self-reported 
thought which is therefore a discursive feature specifically associated with pariah 
femininity. In sum, membership categories, „yappari‟, and reported speech are 
discursive features associated with the construction of pariah femininity.  
The contributions of this study are located within the discursive and thus 
symbolic realm of gender relations or contextually dependent meanings assigned to 
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masculinity and femininity (see section 2.2.4). Gender relations however also have 
material causes and consequences such as disparate wage structures and unequal 
divisions of domestic labor, manifestations of which are symbolically reflected in my 
participants‟ discourse. For instance, disparate power relations (see section 2.2.1) are 
reflected in the asymmetrical relationship between hegemonic masculinity and 
hegemonic femininity which play out discursively when my participants draw on a 
„Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ repertoires to 
construct hegemonic femininity. These two repertoires discursively position individuals 
in a conventional division of domestic labor where men engage in non-domestic work 
and women in unpaid and arguably undervalued domestic work, i.e. a gender division of 
labor (see section 2.2.2). Emotional relations (see section 2.2.3) are suggested by my 
participants‟ discursive construction of heterosexual relations as normative, e.g. 
women‟s ability to „resign‟ from work rests on the assumption they wish to and will 
marry, and by „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Privileged femininity‟ which 
positions women in caregiving roles, either within the home or workplace. Symbolic 
relations, then, are inextricably linked to material aspects of gender relations; therefore, 
the significance of discursive constructions of hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic 
femininity is that they notably reflect but conceivably also exert an influence on aspects 
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of the material world, i.e. they are constitutive.    
Although I am not suggesting that there is a direct connection between the 
discursive accounts analyzed here and the material consequences of gender relations, 
e.g. unequal wages, the relationship of dominance and submission constitutive of 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity is nevertheless symbolically reflected in my 
participants‟ discourse. „Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ repertoires equate „gender differences‟ not with „equality‟ („different but 
equal‟), but instead attach social significance to women‟s reproductive capacity and 
position women in domestic roles or in underpaid „pastoral occupations‟. Similarly, 
women‟s „privilege‟ to resign from work or perform certain jobs must be viewed in light 
of women being ultimately „bound‟ to men in domestic partnerships or to performing 
only supportive roles within the workplace. 
9.3 Contributions of the study 
This study has contributed to the study of gender in a non-Western context and 
hence to the field of Japanese studies. Japanese language and gender studies has 
traditionally focused on the study of distinct, gendered speech styles, i.e. „women‟s 
language‟ and „men‟ language‟ (see Okamoto & Smith, 2004). More recently, research 
has challenged the essentialist assumption of sex-based speech styles by demonstrating 
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that a multitude of factors such as age, gender, sexuality, and regional affiliation 
potentially influence individuals‟ linguistic practices (see Okamoto & Smith, 2004). For 
example, Sunaoshi (2004) found minimal gender differences between the speech of men 
and women in a rural farming community, which thereby challenges the assumption that 
gender category membership determines speech style. Similarly, Miyazaki (2004) 
demonstrated how junior high school girls and boys both use masculine and feminine 
personal pronouns. This research demonstrates how social identities are not static but 
fluid; therefore, a claim that „women‟ or „men‟ speak a distinct repertoire ignores 
variation based upon age, gender, sexuality, and specific communities of practice (see 
section 2.1.2) and thus runs the risk of being seen as essentialist.  
 This study has uniquely contributed to the field of Japanese studies by 
increasing our understanding of hegemonic and pariah femininities. Whereas the 
contributors in Okamoto and Smith (2004) investigated individuals‟ language use and 
what that indexes about social identities (e.g., gender, sexuality, age), I focused on how 
femininity is constructed through discourse. Unlike these contributors, I was not 
interested in destabilizing the relationship between gender and a distinct linguistic 
register, but on how a group of women construct femininity through discourse. In 
addition to contributing to the field of Japanese gender and language research, I have 
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also made a contribution to gender theory and critical discursive psychology.  
9.3.1 Gender theory 
„Hegemonic‟ and „pariah‟ femininities are relatively new theoretical concepts 
which have yet to be empirically investigated (see section 2.7). I have contributed to 
gender research by empirically investigating these underdeveloped theoretical 
constructs in the underexplored context of Japan.  
Wetherell and Edley (1999) argue that the concept „hegemonic masculinity‟ is 
theoretically vague and therefore “not sufficient for understanding the nitty gritty of 
negotiating masculine identities and men‟s identity strategies” (p. 336). In an attempt to 
clarify this concept, they define hegemonic masculinity as a set of subject positions (e.g., 
„heroic‟, „ordinary‟, and „rebellious‟ positions) which speakers take up or resist within 
discourse (see also section 3.3.2). Therefore, one way to „accomplish‟ hegemonic 
masculinity is to take up a heroic position by expressing confidence at work.  
Similarly, although Schippers has theoretically conceptualized both hegemonic 
and pariah femininity, research has yet to empirically investigate these concepts; 
therefore, it remains unclear how individuals construct feminine subjectivities. 
Following Wetherell and Edley (1999), I propose that hegemonic and pariah femininity 
can be defined in terms of interpretative repertoires and subject positions which 
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speakers assume in relation to these IRs. Therefore, „Women as natural caregivers‟ and 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ IRs and a „Professional homemaker‟ subject position 
constitute hegemonic femininity for this group of participants. This finding suggests that 
a „good wives and wise mothers‟ ideology (see section 1.3) continues to exert a 
hegemonic influence on the construction of femininity.  
This study has also demonstrated a fundamental difference between hegemonic 
masculinity and hegemonic femininity. In notable contrast to hegemonic masculinity, 
the „celebrated‟ characteristics associated with hegemonic femininity (e.g., caregiving) 
actually disempower women; thus, embodying hegemonic femininity is a paradoxical 
privilege for them. On the one hand, women may receive a certain degree of comfort 
from constructing a socially sanctioned subjectivity or „doing‟ (West and Zimmerman, 
1987) gender „appropriately‟. However, and significantly, this same „legitimized‟ 
subjectivity is not a position of power, but subordinate to hegemonic masculinity. Since 
gender hegemony depends upon naturalizing an unequal social order, women‟s consent 
is essential for this to occur (see section 2.5.1). We see then that hegemonic femininity 
serves as a handmaiden which supports hegemonic masculinity‟s ascendance to power 
through occupying a subordinate position. Accordingly, subordinating hegemonic and 
non-hegemonic (pariah) femininities is a key mechanism through which hegemonic 
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masculinity sustains its extolled position.    
This study shows that pariah femininity represents a subjectivity which may 
provide women with a politics of resistance. „career women‟ and „superwomen‟ 
challenge the „normative‟ assumption that the paid labor market is exclusively „men‟s 
territory‟ but can be psychology troubling for individuals to claim membership in, as 
illustrated by Kayoko and Akiko‟s accounts. More importantly, pariah femininity may 
subvert a patriarchal gender order where men „work‟ and women „care‟. Pariah 
femininity „troubles‟ the hierarchical and complementary relationship definitive of 
hegemonic masculinity and femininity (see section 2.5.3) and challenges the ascendant 
position of hegemonic masculinity and herein lies both its subversive potential and 
conceivably a source of empowerment for women. 
The study of different femininities is important because it illustrates the role 
femininity plays in supporting or challenging the ascendant position of hegemonic 
masculinity. However, in contrast to the plethora of research which has investigated 
„hegemonic masculinity‟, research has neglected to investigate the relationship between 
masculinities and femininities. In order to redress this imbalance, Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) call for more femininities research. Schippers‟ (2007) concepts 
of hegemonic and pariah femininities are useful theoretical constructs which can be 
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used to empirically investigate the subordination or resistance of women. This study 
represents one attempt to refocus attention on femininities.  
9.3.2 Critical Discursive Psychology 
9.3.2.1 Identifying Interpretative Repertoires 
In section 3.4.5 I discussed how „interpretative repertoire‟ would be an 
analytically stronger theoretical concept if it was utilized in terms of specific discursive 
features. In addition to clichés, metaphors, lexical items, and tropes (see section 3.4.5), I 
propose that analysts can use discursive devices such as „reported speech‟, „membership 
categories‟, and „yappari‟ as tools for identifying and analyzing interpretative 
repertoires (see sections 5.2-5.4). By characterizing given interpretative repertoires in 
terms of specific discursive features in specific contexts, analysts‟ claims about the 
workings of gender hegemony, racism, and so one are then identifiable in participants‟ 
discourse and therefore analytically stronger. This would place critical discursive 
psychologists in a more advantageous position to discredit the accusation that their 
research is a form of content analysis (Mills, 2007).  
 Reported speech (see section 5.2) can be seen as a linguistic „trace‟ (Talbot, 
1998) of an interpretative repertoire. For instance, Hiromi (extract 13) claims she was 
told „just do what you like‟ regarding her future while her parents pressured her brother 
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to study hard. She then claims that „everyone probably says that‟, which suggests that 
„Women as eventually domestic‟ and „Men as eventual breadwinners‟ may be 
repertoires which circulate in Japanese society.    
The reported thought of a group (see section 5.2.7) can also be seen as a 
discursive manifestation of an interpretative repertoire. When Ai and Ayaka (extract 12) 
invoke group-based reported thought („there‟s the way of thinking‟; see section 5.2.7) to 
position women as free to select their university of choice while men are expected to 
enter prestigious universities, they can be seen as drawing on „Women as eventually 
domestic‟ and „Men as eventual breadwinners‟ IRs. Ai and Ayaka‟s complicit subject 
position in relation to this repertoire is suggested by their claim that women possess an 
„escape route‟ of marriage which liberates them from the paid labor force. The reported 
thought of a group is an example of a discursive device which suggests the presence of 
an interpretative repertoire because it indexes the „normative‟ thinking of the members 
of a particular community of practice (see section 2.1.2).   
 Membership categories (see section 5.3) are a further example of a discursive 
device which suggests participants are drawing on particular IRs. For example, we can 
infer that Yurika and Yuka (extract 9) are drawing on „Women as eventually domestic‟ 
through their use of the membership category „onna no hito dakara‟ („because you‟re a 
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woman‟) to categorize childcare as a gendered category bound activity. 
However, categories are not always explicitly invoked, yet they can still be 
relevant to participants (see section 5.3). For instance, Kayoko (see extract 20) discusses 
how professional ambition is an undesirable characteristic for women seeking marriage. 
Specifically, she claims that individuals who devote themselves to personal pursuits are 
negatively viewed by members of society. Although she does not explicitly reference 
the category „woman‟ when she discusses the stigmatization facing individuals who 
ardently pursue their dreams, we can infer gender category membership from her earlier 
claim that men want to be in a higher position than their girlfriends or wives. Therefore, 
women face social stigmatization for pursuing their careers. My study has confirmed the 
membership categorization analysis claim that we can infer category membership from 
category-bound activities.  
 „Yappari‟ (see section 5.4) is another discursive device which suggests that 
participants are drawing on particular IRs. Participants‟ frequent use of „yappari‟ 
constructs a claim as „commonsense‟ or „taken-for granted‟. Since the use of „yappari‟ 
constructs information as commonly accepted knowledge for members of a particular 
CofP, I suggest that speakers‟ use of this device can indicate they are drawing on an 
interpretative repertoire (see section 5.4.2). For example, we can infer from Mayumi‟s 
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(extract 2) use of „yappari‟ in conjunction with her claim that women possess a 
„maternal instinct‟ that she is drawing on a „Women as natural caregivers‟ repertoire. 
Similarly, Akiko (extract 7) constructs the expectation that women perform housework 
as „commonsense‟ through the use of „yappari‟, which indicates she is drawing on 
„Women as eventually domestic‟. Participants‟ frequent use of „yappari‟ to construct 
gendered category bound activities (see section 5.3) as „commonsense‟ suggests that 
„Women as natural caregivers‟ and „Women as eventually domestic‟ are repertoires 
which are „naturalized‟ and thus circulate in Japanese society. 
 In the next section I discuss how ideological dilemmas (see section 3.4.2) are 
also traceable to speakers‟ discourse.  
9.3.2.2 Identifying Ideological dilemmas 
Ideological Dilemmas (see section 3.4.2) are apparent in the accounts of 
women who take up „pariah femininity‟ subjectivities (see section 2.5.4). „Career 
woman‟ and „superwoman‟ pariah femininity subjectivities are by definition 
psychologically troubling for individuals to claim membership in because they trouble 
the asymmetrical relationship between masculinity and femininity (see sections 
2.5.3-2.5.4). Therefore, Kayoko and Akiko struggle with ideological dilemmas which 
stem from their respective category membership as a „career woman‟ and 
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„superwoman‟.  
The ideological dilemmas which Kayoko and Akiko struggle with are traceable 
to specific utterances. For example, when I ask Kayoko (extract 19) if her independence 
is a source of pressure, she reformulates my question („is it a form of pressure‟) in lieu 
of providing an answer. Typically, an answer is the „unmarked‟ response to a question, 
thus Kayoko‟s inability to formulate a normative response may be because her 
independence is problematic and complex and indeed a source of pressure for her. 
Further support for this interpretation of her „marked‟ response is the fact that she later 
formulates men‟s reported desire to be in a higher professional position than their 
partners as „commonsense‟ with „yappari‟. In a similar manner, Akiko (extract 21) 
hesitates to answer my question, „do you think that women face social pressure‟, and 
instead produces an ambiguous response, „muzukashii na‟ (that‟s a difficult one‟). One 
reading of Kayoko‟s and Akiko‟s reluctance is that since category membership as a 
„career woman‟ or „superwoman‟ challenge hegemonic femininity, these subjectivities 
can be „troubling‟ or difficult to align with. 
Akiko‟s (see extracts 21-22) use of self-reported habitual thought (see section 
5.2.8) to resolve her ideological dilemma involving category membership as a „working 
mother‟ represents an important development from other chapters. For example, she 
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draws on a discourse of „guilty feelings‟ in order to present herself as struggling to 
balance the sometimes conflicting demands posed by her career and domestic 
„responsibilities‟. Therefore, self-reported habitual thought can be seen as a discursive 
device which speakers use to construct a positive self-presentation (see section 2.1.4) 
and thus resolve ideological dilemmas. 
I have attempted to demonstrate how interpretative repertoires and ideological 
dilemmas are traceable to specific places in speakers‟ discourse and therefore that 
critical discursive psychology is not simply a form of content analysis, but can be a 
legitimate and rigorous form of discourse analysis.   
My expanded utilization of IRs to incorporate reported speech, membership 
categories, and „yappari‟ is an example of a more „synthetic‟ form of discourse analysis, 
as suggested by Edley and Wetherell (2008) and Wetherell (1998, 2007). As I discussed 
(see section 3.3.4), Edley and Wetherell suggest combining fine-grained textual analysis 
with theories from post-structuralism to produce more rigorous discourse analysis. 
According to Edley and Wetherell, this is best accomplished using „interpretative 
repertoires‟, „subject positions‟, and „ideological dilemmas‟ as analytical concepts. I 
concur with Edley and Wetherell and also suggest that we can further bridge the gap 
between „micro‟ and „macro‟ levels of analysis by tracing our claims about the workings 
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of particular interpretative repertoires, subject positioning, and emergent ideological 
dilemmas to specific discursive features. In this study, reported speech, membership 
categories, and „yappari‟ (see sections 5.2-5.4) strengthen my analytical claims about 
the insidious workings of gender hegemony. 
9.3.2.3 Discursive Trouble 
 This study has also extended the concept of „troubled‟ identity, or an identity 
which is difficult to embrace at the level of conversational interaction (see section 8.2). 
Supporting and extending Reynolds‟ (2008) finding that „single woman‟ is a troubled 
subject position, a single „career woman‟ who is seeking marriage and married 
„superwoman‟ can both be seen as troubled subjectivities at two interrelated levels. First, 
the categories are psychologically troubling for individuals and thus difficult to express 
membership in. Therefore, Kayoko (see extracts 19-20) faces an ideological dilemma of 
celebrating her status as a goal-driven single woman who is also seeking marriage 
because those goals may in fact hinder her marriage prospects. Similarly, Akiko (see 
extracts 21-22) is unable to wholeheartedly embrace a subject position of „working 
professional‟ without running the risk of others viewing her as a „negligent‟ mother.  
In her study of single women, Reynolds (2008) (see also section 3.4.3) found a 
pattern where some women experienced difficulty celebrating „single‟ category 
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membership and expressing desire for a heterosexual relationship because if category 
membership as a single woman is positively constructed, then the need for a 
relationship is rendered obsolete. Thus, women tended to frame their desire for a 
relationship as an admission, e.g., „in all honesty‟. Reynolds‟ study indicates that 
„self-fulfilled single woman‟ and „woman who is looking for a relationship‟ are 
apparently „polarized‟ categories and women face difficulty articulating membership in 
both categories. 
 Kayoko and Akiko‟s „trouble‟ also emerges from the apparent „incompatibility‟ 
of membership in two polarized categories. Kayoko‟s trouble results from category 
membership as a „career woman‟ who also seeks marriage because her multiple goals 
and ambitions may „scare men away‟ and disqualify her from the marriage market. 
Therefore, she cannot wholeheartedly embrace a „career woman‟ subject position 
because it may result in „not being chosen‟ and thus movement into the denigrated 
category of „single woman‟. In Akiko‟s case, trouble arises from category membership 
as a „working professional‟ and „mother‟ because motherhood is considered a full-time 
endeavor in Japan (see section 1.3), thus self-positioning as „professionally successful‟ 
may prevent category membership as a „good wife, wise mother‟ (see section 1.3), 
which is the cornerstone of Japanese hegemonic femininity. Participants‟ trouble 
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articulating membership in apparently polarized categories reflects a discursive climate 
where professional ambition is incompatible with securing a heterosexual relationship 
or motherhood with pursuing a career.       
Second, „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ trouble the relationship between 
hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity. Because these women threaten to 
„contaminate‟ the complimentary but asymmetrical relationship between hegemonic 
masculinity and femininity (see section 2.5.3), they can also be seen as pariah 
femininity subjectivities (see section 2.5.4). Therefore, Kayoko articulated „concern‟ 
that her ambitions may decrease her chances of getting married and Akiko articulated 
the language of „guilty thoughts‟ to construct a self-presentation (see section 2.1.4) as a 
„good wife and wise mother‟ (see section 1.3). Therefore, an identity which is „troubling‟ 
for individuals to embrace at the level of conversational interaction can also „trouble‟ 
the relationship between hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity and can 
result in stigmatization or potential subversion of a hegemonic gender order (see section 
2.3).           
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
Because of my attempts to maintain reflexivity throughout the course of this 
study, I realize that this thesis has some limitations. These include the sample size and 
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the interviewer‟s potential influence on the data, which can be addressed by further 
research.  
First of all, the issue of sample size could be broadened by interviewing a more 
diverse pool of participants. The participants that I interviewed were heterogeneous in 
terms of age, education, occupation, and marital status, and the fact that all these 
economically-privileged, middle-class women are drawing on repertoires which 
position women in domestic roles (see sections 6.2-6.3) suggests that these repertoires 
are circulating in Japanese society. Nevertheless, my sample is relatively homogenous 
in terms of social class (middle class), sexuality (heterosexual), and place of residence 
(a major city in central Japan). Therefore, the scope of the study could be extended by 
interviewing women with more diverse backgrounds to see if they draw on similar 
repertoires. 
The strength of my findings presented in Chapter 8 based upon two speakers is 
also a potential limitation. It could be argued that the strength of my claims would 
increase if I had interviewed more participants; however, I contend that since IRs are 
socially-available and not individually-based (see section 3.4.1), Akiko and Kayoko are 
drawing on IRs which circulate in Japanese society. Therefore, I do not regard basing 
my claims on two participants as a weakness, but do acknowledge that interviewing 
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women with different backgrounds would further contribute to our understanding of 
pariah femininity.   
 Regarding the interviewer‟s influence on the data, I acknowledge that 
personally conducting the interviews influenced the data collection and analysis 
processes (see section 3.1.1; 4.3). My age, ethnicity, and gender may have all impacted 
the interviews and different data may have resulted had another researcher conducted 
the interviews. Personally conducting the interviews provided me with „insider‟ status 
when categorizing and analyzing the data; however, I also needed to distance myself 
from the data in order to conduct „objective‟ analysis. Despite the potential risk of 
„reading into the data‟ by interpreting what speakers meant by a particular utterance, I 
concur with Edley (2001a) that personally conducting the interviews assists the 
researcher in identifying the workings of interpretative repertoires, and for this reason I 
do not regret conducting them myself. I acknowledge that although my interpretation of 
this data is “constructed, provisional, perspectival, and context-driven” (Baxter 2003, p. 
59), I have attempted to remain self-reflexive throughout the entire research process.  
 While I thus acknowledge that despite my best efforts, my study has 
limitations; nevertheless, I do not view these limitations so much as „weaknesses‟ which 
undermine my findings but instead as points of departure for further research.    
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9.5 Further research directions 
 There are a number of areas future research can pursue in order to further our 
understanding of femininities which would also contribute to performing more 
multi-perspectival discourse analysis.  
 Future research, I argue, should attempt to further blur the distinction between 
„micro‟ and „macro‟ levels of analysis through investigating theoretical constructs such 
as „hegemonic‟ and „pariah‟ femininities utilizing „interpretative repertoires‟, „subject 
positions‟, and „ideological dilemmas‟ as analytical tools. My attempt to link the 
concept of interpretative repertoires to specific discursive analytical devices is part of a 
growing body of research that is transcending the micro-macro distinction and resulting 
in more synthetic critical discursive psychological analysis (Edley & Wetherell, 2008; 
Kamada, 2008, 2009; Reynolds, 2008). For example, research could focus on 
identifying interpretative repertoires in terms of other discursive features such as 
metaphors or proverbs. I cite these examples because they surfaced twice in my 
participants‟ discourse and therefore may provide direction for further research.  
 Given that „hegemonic femininity‟ is a relatively new theoretical construct, 
more empirical research needs to investigate this construct with other participants and in 
other, including non-western, contexts. For example, research could investigate the 
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interplay between social class and gender in the discursive construction of hegemonic 
and pariah femininity to provide a more comprehensive picture of how these constructs 
intersect with gender. Messerschmidt‟s (2004) (see section 2.5.4) study of „badass‟ and 
„preppy‟ femininity for example illustrates how hegemonic femininity varies according 
to class. 
Further empirical research investigating pariah femininities is also in order. I 
found that „career woman‟ and „superwoman‟ are pariah femininities because they 
„trouble‟ the asymmetrical relationship between masculinity and femininity. Additional 
research could investigate other provisionally identified „troubled‟ identities which have 
yet to be empirically investigated (e.g., nuns, transgendered individuals). The study of 
pariah femininities allows us to see how, when aspects of hegemonic masculinity are 
embodied by women, they result in discursive and non-discursive sanctions, which are 
crucial for hegemonic masculinity to maintain its provisionally ascendant position.     
9.6 Conclusion 
 My initial hypothesis based upon informal observations that Japan is in many 
ways still a very patriarchal society was the catalyst which prompted this study (see 
section 1.1). I had observed a traditional gendered division of labor within a workplace 
where men held authoritative positions and women supportive ones, such as serving tea. 
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The segregation of work duties by gender is an explicit form of gender discrimination 
which is still largely observed in practice; however, the findings of this study suggest a 
more insidious and arguably even more pervasive form of gender oppression—gender 
hegemony.  
 Hegemony, as shown, means that an ideology gains „commonsense‟ status not 
through coercive force, but by obtaining the populace‟s consent (see section 2.5.1). One 
interpretation of hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity is then that women 
are powerless victims of an implicit force that infiltrates their everyday lives which they 
cannot easily recognize or resist. However, this interpretation ignores the possibility of 
individual agency to contest hegemony. Post-structuralist research and thinking reminds 
us that a view of power as one-dimensional and oppressive is oversimplistic and 
deterministic because individuals fluctuate between positions of relative power and 
powerlessness (Baxter, 2003) which vary with specific „communities of practice‟ (see 
section 2.1.2), e.g. the workplace. Individuals also possess agency to resist gender 
hegemony by contesting or even reformulating interpretative repertoires.    
 My study has demonstrated that although some women articulate interpretative 
repertoires which position them in domestic roles, or „buy into‟ the notion of femininity 
as „privileged‟ due to its strong association with marriage, others resist these repertoires 
370 
 
(e.g., pariah femininities). Individuals who contest the commonsense espoused by 
interpretative repertoires or even attempt to reformulate those repertoires (pariah 
femininity) can contribute to gradually changing the gender order in Japanese society. 
Due to the strength of the association between marriage and Japanese hegemonic 
femininity (see section 1.3), I am not confident that the connection between marriage 
and hegemonic femininity will dissipate anytime soon; nevertheless, women who 
embody and enact „pariah femininities‟ are arguably the agents of social change who 
contest the ascendancy of hegemonic masculinity and contribute to the transformation 
of the current patriarchal gender order.    
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Appendix A: Interview Schedule 
1. What do you usually do everyday? 
2. What do you think are traditional men‟s roles? What sort of things do you think men 
do in the past? 
3. What do you think are traditional women‟s roles? What do you think women did in 
the past? 
4. How about men‟s roles today? Do men do different sorts of things today? 
5. How about women‟s roles today? Do women do different sorts of things today? 
6. What are life choices that women have today? What sort of choices do women have 
to make today? Do you have examples from your own life? 
7. Do you think that men and women are different? In what ways? 
8. If you work and have a family, how do you think you will balance the two?  
9. If you get married, what role do you envision your husband playing? 
10. Do you think that women face social pressure today to do certain things? What sort? 
Do you have examples? 
11. Have you ever felt social pressure as a woman? 
12. Do you think women can resist this social pressure? How? Do you have examples? 
What happens if they do resist it? 
13. Have you ever attempted to resist this social pressure? How? What happened? 
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Appendix B: Consent Form 
 The interview conducted today was audio-recorded and may be used as part of 
my doctoral research. This means that a portion of or the entire interview transcript may 
appear in an academic paper or in a public forum such as an academic conference. If I 
use extracts from our interview as part of my research, a pseudonym will be used to 
protect your anonymity. When the research is complete, copies of the findings will be 
made available to you. Your signature below indicates that you give consent to the terms 
I have outlined.  
Signature____________________ Date _____ 
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Justin Charlebois 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
373 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Profile of Participants 
1. Mayumi: 60, married with two adult children, runs a floral shop with her husband. 
2. Akiko: 42, married with a four-year old child, university lecturer. 
3. Yurika & Yuka: 18, university freshman. 
4. Reiko, Moeko, Manami: 22, university seniors. 
5. Ayaka, Ai: 19, university sophomores. 
6. Nayu: 30, single, art curator. 
7. Yukari: 42, married with no children, student. 
8. Michi, Keiko, Yayoi: 20, university juniors.  
9. Kayoko: 26, single, junior high school teacher. 
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Appendix D: Transcription Conventions 
(laughs) laughter 
[text] clarificatory information.  
“quote marks” words enclosed in quotation marks indicate quoted speech or the inferred 
voice of another. 
Punctuation is provided for increased readability rather than to indicate speech patterns.  
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